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題名 台灣汽車車體損失險之逆選擇與道德危險
其他題名 Asymmetric Information Problems in Taiwan$s Automobile Insurance Market
作者 王儷玲
貢獻者 政治大學風險管理與保險系
行政院國家科學委員會
關鍵詞 汽車保險;不對稱資訊;道德危險;逆選擇;自我選擇機智;經驗費
     率;自付額
auto insurance; asymmetric information; adverse selection; moral hazard;
     self-selection mechanisms; experience ratings; the deductible
日期 2002
上傳時間 22-Oct-2012 15:43:37 (UTC+8)
摘要 歷年來,台灣汽車保險的保費收入往往超過整個台灣產險市場一半以上的保費收入,然而許多產險公司卻經常抱怨汽車保險虧損連連,尤其是汽車車體損失險,長期以來一直有著嚴重的不對稱資訊問題,產險公司試圖設計不同的保單(分甲、乙及丙三式)、利用自付額及經驗費率等方式企圖降低車體損失險的損失率。本篇論文蒐集從1995 到1999 的汽車車體損失險的panel data,以回歸分析及t 檢定方法實證分析台灣汽車車體損失險的道德危險及逆選擇的問題。本研究實證結果確認台灣汽車車體損失險有嚴重之道德危險及逆選擇的現象,並進一步檢證提供不同保單所造成的自我選擇機制、或利用不同的自付額及經驗費率等方式能夠有效地降低車體損失險的損失頻率、損失嚴重程度或損失率。
This paper investigates asymmetric information problems for the automobile insurance market in Taiwan. Using panel data for comprehensive automobile insurance coverage from 1995 to 1999, this paper analyzes how types of coverage, deductible amounts, and experience ratings have affected the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in Taiwan’s automobile insurance market. The empirical results provide partial evidence to demonstrate that loss frequency and loss ratio were reduced by the addition of self-selection mechanisms in policies with different levels of coverage. In addition, the deductible amounts, experience ratings, and better control of underwriting and claims processing were shown to have possibly decreased potential losses from adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
關聯 應用研究
學術補助
研究期間:9108 ~ 9207
研究經費:287仟元
資料類型 report
dc.contributor 政治大學風險管理與保險系en_US
dc.contributor 行政院國家科學委員會en_US
dc.creator (作者) 王儷玲zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2002en_US
dc.date.accessioned 22-Oct-2012 15:43:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 22-Oct-2012 15:43:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 22-Oct-2012 15:43:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/53858-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 歷年來,台灣汽車保險的保費收入往往超過整個台灣產險市場一半以上的保費收入,然而許多產險公司卻經常抱怨汽車保險虧損連連,尤其是汽車車體損失險,長期以來一直有著嚴重的不對稱資訊問題,產險公司試圖設計不同的保單(分甲、乙及丙三式)、利用自付額及經驗費率等方式企圖降低車體損失險的損失率。本篇論文蒐集從1995 到1999 的汽車車體損失險的panel data,以回歸分析及t 檢定方法實證分析台灣汽車車體損失險的道德危險及逆選擇的問題。本研究實證結果確認台灣汽車車體損失險有嚴重之道德危險及逆選擇的現象,並進一步檢證提供不同保單所造成的自我選擇機制、或利用不同的自付額及經驗費率等方式能夠有效地降低車體損失險的損失頻率、損失嚴重程度或損失率。-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper investigates asymmetric information problems for the automobile insurance market in Taiwan. Using panel data for comprehensive automobile insurance coverage from 1995 to 1999, this paper analyzes how types of coverage, deductible amounts, and experience ratings have affected the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in Taiwan’s automobile insurance market. The empirical results provide partial evidence to demonstrate that loss frequency and loss ratio were reduced by the addition of self-selection mechanisms in policies with different levels of coverage. In addition, the deductible amounts, experience ratings, and better control of underwriting and claims processing were shown to have possibly decreased potential losses from adverse selection and moral hazard problems.-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) 應用研究en_US
dc.relation (關聯) 學術補助en_US
dc.relation (關聯) 研究期間:9108 ~ 9207en_US
dc.relation (關聯) 研究經費:287仟元en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 汽車保險;不對稱資訊;道德危險;逆選擇;自我選擇機智;經驗費
     率;自付額
en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) auto insurance; asymmetric information; adverse selection; moral hazard;
     self-selection mechanisms; experience ratings; the deductible
-
dc.title (題名) 台灣汽車車體損失險之逆選擇與道德危險zh_TW
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) Asymmetric Information Problems in Taiwan$s Automobile Insurance Marketen_US
dc.type (資料類型) reporten