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題名 超額認購後公司資金後續運用之研究
The use of loans from international syndicated market
作者 盧怡寧
貢獻者 張元晨
盧怡寧
關鍵詞 聯合貸款市場
超額認購
貸款資金之運用
代理問題
日期 2011
上傳時間 30-Oct-2012 10:41:55 (UTC+8)
摘要 在日益競爭激烈的聯貸市場中，發生超額認購之情形越來越普遍。當公司發生超額認購後，通常會對貸款條件進行調整。本研究使用LPC資料庫與Compustat資料庫，並且依據「超額認購後公司的調整情形」作分類，分別研究其後續資金運用之決策上有何差異。實證結果指出，超額認購後調升貸款金額的公司中，投資機會較高之公司群後續將資金運用於資本支出上，投資機會較低之公司群則是將資金以現金形式保留在公司內部，且兩者均不會將資金發還給外部投資人。另外，此兩類公司之經理人薪資以及紅利均上升，但是卻伴隨著較差的盈餘表現，印證公司內部存在某種代理問題。尤以投資機會較高之公司群而言，前三大經理人持股反而在高額認購後下降，更加深股東與經理人之間存在代理問題的疑慮。
參考文獻 1. Bates, T. W.,2005," Asset sales, investment opportunities, and the use of proceeds. "Journal of Finance, 60, 105–135.

2. Blanchard, O., F. Lopez de Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 1997, What do firms do with cash windfalls?, Journal of Financial Economics 36, 337-360.

3. Fenn George W., and Nellie Liang, 2001, "Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives", Journal of Financial Economics 60, 45-72.

4. Froot, K, Scharfstein D ,and J. Stein, 1993, "Risk management: Coordinating corporate investment and financing policies, Journal of Finance 48, 1629-1648.

5. Harford,J."Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions." ,1999,Journal of Finance 54, 1969-1997

6. Harford, J., and D. Haushalter. ,2003, "Cash Flow Shocks, Investment, and Financial Constraint: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.` Unpibl. Paper. Univ. of Orefon

7. Hite, Gailen, James Owers, and Ronald Rogers, 1987, "The market for interfirm asset sales:Partial sell-offs and total liquidations", Journal of Financial Economics 18, 229-252.

8. Ivashina, V. and Z. Sun, 2008, “Institutional Demand Pressure and the Cost of Leveraged Loans,” Harvard Business School Working Paper.

9. Jensen, Michael C., 1986, "Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers", American Economic Review 76, 323-329.

10. Jensen, M., and W. Meckling, 1976, "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.

11. Lang, Larry H. P., and Robert H. Litzenberger, 1989, “Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow Signalling Vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis.” Journal of Financial Economics, September 24(1), pp.181-192.
12. Mello, A., and J. Parsons, 2000, Hedging and Liquidity, Review of Financial Studies 13, 127-153

13. Myers, S., and N. Majluf, 1984,"Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information Investors Do Not Have", Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-220

14. Murphy, Kevin, 1985, "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis", Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 11-42

15. Opler, Tim, Lee Pinkowitz, Rene M. Stulz, and Rohan Williamson, 1999, "The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings", Journal of Financial Economics 52, 3-46

16. Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1992, "Liquidity values and debt capacity: A market equilibrium approach", Journal of Finance 47, 1343-1367.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
99357010
100
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099357010
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 張元晨zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 盧怡寧zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 盧怡寧zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2011en_US
dc.date.accessioned 30-Oct-2012 10:41:55 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 30-Oct-2012 10:41:55 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 30-Oct-2012 10:41:55 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0099357010en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54306-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 99357010zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 100zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在日益競爭激烈的聯貸市場中，發生超額認購之情形越來越普遍。當公司發生超額認購後，通常會對貸款條件進行調整。本研究使用LPC資料庫與Compustat資料庫，並且依據「超額認購後公司的調整情形」作分類，分別研究其後續資金運用之決策上有何差異。實證結果指出，超額認購後調升貸款金額的公司中，投資機會較高之公司群後續將資金運用於資本支出上，投資機會較低之公司群則是將資金以現金形式保留在公司內部，且兩者均不會將資金發還給外部投資人。另外，此兩類公司之經理人薪資以及紅利均上升，但是卻伴隨著較差的盈餘表現，印證公司內部存在某種代理問題。尤以投資機會較高之公司群而言，前三大經理人持股反而在高額認購後下降，更加深股東與經理人之間存在代理問題的疑慮。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 中文摘要 1
第一章、緒論 5
第一節 研究背景及動機 5
第二節 研究目的 7
第三節 研究架構 8
第二章、文獻回顧 9
第一節 相關假說內容探討 9
第二節 先前實證文獻 12
第三章、研究方法 15
第一節 資料來源與資料庫的合併 15
第二節 資料之分類 15
第三節 樣本敘述統計 17
第四節、探討資金流向之變數 21
第四章、實證結果 23
第一節 檢視投資機會之變化 23
第二節 檢視公司資金是否流向公司內部 25
第三節 檢視公司資金是否流向公司外部 34
第四節 超額認購後公司後續股價表現以及盈餘表現 38
第五節 實證研究之闡述 41
第五章、結論及後續研究 47
第一節 結論 47
第二節 研究限制 48
第三節 後續研究建議 48
參考文獻 49
附錄 51		zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099357010en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 聯合貸款市場zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 超額認購zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 貸款資金之運用zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 代理問題zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 超額認購後公司資金後續運用之研究zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The use of loans from international syndicated marketen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1. Bates, T. W.,2005," Asset sales, investment opportunities, and the use of proceeds. "Journal of Finance, 60, 105–135.

2. Blanchard, O., F. Lopez de Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 1997, What do firms do with cash windfalls?, Journal of Financial Economics 36, 337-360.

3. Fenn George W., and Nellie Liang, 2001, "Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives", Journal of Financial Economics 60, 45-72.

4. Froot, K, Scharfstein D ,and J. Stein, 1993, "Risk management: Coordinating corporate investment and financing policies, Journal of Finance 48, 1629-1648.

5. Harford,J."Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions." ,1999,Journal of Finance 54, 1969-1997

6. Harford, J., and D. Haushalter. ,2003, "Cash Flow Shocks, Investment, and Financial Constraint: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.` Unpibl. Paper. Univ. of Orefon

7. Hite, Gailen, James Owers, and Ronald Rogers, 1987, "The market for interfirm asset sales:Partial sell-offs and total liquidations", Journal of Financial Economics 18, 229-252.

8. Ivashina, V. and Z. Sun, 2008, “Institutional Demand Pressure and the Cost of Leveraged Loans,” Harvard Business School Working Paper.

9. Jensen, Michael C., 1986, "Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers", American Economic Review 76, 323-329.

10. Jensen, M., and W. Meckling, 1976, "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.

11. Lang, Larry H. P., and Robert H. Litzenberger, 1989, “Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow Signalling Vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis.” Journal of Financial Economics, September 24(1), pp.181-192.
12. Mello, A., and J. Parsons, 2000, Hedging and Liquidity, Review of Financial Studies 13, 127-153

13. Myers, S., and N. Majluf, 1984,"Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information Investors Do Not Have", Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-220

14. Murphy, Kevin, 1985, "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis", Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 11-42

15. Opler, Tim, Lee Pinkowitz, Rene M. Stulz, and Rohan Williamson, 1999, "The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings", Journal of Financial Economics 52, 3-46

16. Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1992, "Liquidity values and debt capacity: A market equilibrium approach", Journal of Finance 47, 1343-1367.		zh_TW