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題名 銀行業中「大至不能倒」(Too Big to Fail)現象之防範與法制建構-兼論銀行事前預囑
作者 黃卲璿
Huang, Shao Hsuan
貢獻者 張冠群
Chang, Kuan Chun
黃卲璿
Huang, Shao Hsuan
關鍵詞 大至不能倒
系統性風險
外溢效應
紓困
2008年全球金融危機
次貸危機
指標性衡量法
系統重要性金融機構
系統重要性銀行
Dodd-Frank華爾街改革與消費者保護法
金融穩定委員會
巴塞爾銀行監理委員會
有效銀行監理核心原則
復原與退場計畫
銀行事前預囑
Too Big to Fail
Systemic Risk
Spillover Effect
Bail-out
Indicator-based measurement approach
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
Financial Stability Board
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
Recovery and Resolution Plan
Bank Living Wills
日期 2011
上傳時間 30-Oct-2012 11:08:18 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文所要探討的問題在於如何消弭銀行業中具有「大至不能倒」地位的銀行對整體經濟與金融體系所帶來的負面效應。
為了處理此一問題，本文將從比較法經驗進行歸納分析，理出「大至不能倒」理論在美國法上的面貌，並對「大至不能倒」銀行的界定提出比較法上採取的途徑，之後本文將進入檢閱現有的「大至不能倒」的解決方案，並以本文核心目標：『正視「大至不能倒」銀行的存在，並最小化「大至不能倒」政策適用的餘地！』來檢驗這些解決方案，緊接著本文將提出金融穩定委員會對於「大至不能倒」銀行的「資本強化」、「監理強化」與「復原與退場計畫」這三個監理方案供參酌，本文在結論上強力主張應將「復原與退場計畫」納入我國的法制架構中，為我國未來面對「大至不能倒」議題預做準備，並提出立法建議。
所謂「復原與退場計畫」(銀行事前預囑)是國際上處理「大至不能倒」問題所創造出全新的監理工具，簡介其內容，就是藉由事前周全的計畫使大型銀行在遭遇嚴重的壓力事件(尤其是系統性事件)時能藉由實施事前計劃快速地使財務狀況回復正常，或退而求其次藉由實施事前計畫使銀行能在不影響金融穩定或損及納稅人(即紓困政策)的狀況下退出金融市場。簡而言之其精神在於「卸除大型銀行的系統重要性」。
參考文獻 壹、中文文獻
1. 王文宇，控股公司與金融控股公司法，元照，2001年12月初版二刷
2. 王文宇 主編，金融法，元照，2007年9月三版一刷
3. 王志誠，現代金融法，新學林，2009年9月初版
4. Anthony Saunders原著；郭照榮‧沈中華 編譯，金融機構管理，華泰，2001年9月初版
5. 沈中華，金融市場─全球的觀點，新陸書局，99年10月三版修訂版
6. 卲慶平，金融危機的形成、處理機制與法制基礎─對美國次級房貸金融危機的觀察，月旦法學雜誌第165期，2009年2月
7. 陳彩稚，財產與責任保險，智勝文化，2006年9月初版
8. 陳威光，衍生性商品：選擇權、期貨、交換與風險管理，智勝文化，2010年3月再版
9. 彭金隆，金融控股公司─法制監理與經營策略，智勝文化，2004年9月初版
10. 賴英照，最新證券交易法解析，著者自版，2006年2月初版
貳、外文文獻
一、專書
1. DOUGLAS D. EVANOFF & GEORGE G. KAUFMAN ET AL., SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES – RESOLVING LARGE BANK INSOLVENCIES (2005)
2. GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS (2004)
3. G. N. OLSON, BANKS IN DISTRESS: LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF THE 1980S (2000)
4. JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, WHY ARE THERE SO MANY BANKING CRISES? (2008)
5. JEFFREY FRIEDMAN, WHAT CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2011)
6. JOHN LANCHESTER, I.O.U.: WHY EVERYONE OWES EVERYONE AND NO ONE CAN PAY (First Simon & Schuster trade paperback, ed., Simon & Schuster Paperbacks 2010)
7. LLOYD BONFIELD, AMERICAN LAW AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2006)
8. ROBERT POZEN, TOO BIG TO SAVE? HOW FIX THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2010)
二、期刊論文
1. Adam Nguyen & Matt Watkins, Financial Services Reform, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 579 (2000).
2. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 35 Brooklyn J. Int`l L. 707 (2010).
3. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 Or. L. Rev. 951 (2011).
4. Cornelius Hurley, Paying the Price for Too Big to Fail, 4 Entrepren. Bus. L.J. 351 (2010).
5. David Reiss, The Federal Government Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac`s Obligation: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 1019 (2008).
6. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Function of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 434 (1998).
7. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk after Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies beyond Oversight, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 795 (2011).
8. Lisa M. DeFerrari & David E. Palmer, Supervision of Large Complex Banking Organizations, FED. RES. BULL., Feb. 2001, available at http://www.federalreserve. gov/pubs/bulletin/2001/0201lead.pdf.
9. Reinier Kraakman & Henry Hansmann, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387 (2000).
10. Roshni Banker, Glass-Steagall through the Back Door: Creating a Divide in Banking Functions Through the Use of Corporate Living Wills, 2010 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 424 (2010).
11. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibu, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, FDIC Banking Review Vol. 13, No. 2, (2000), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf.
三、非期刊論文
1. George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What Is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?, The Independent Review, v. VII, n. 3, 371 (2003), available at http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_07_3_scott.pdf.
2. John Beccia & Cornelius Hurley, Compliance Function in Diversified Financial Institutions: Harmonizing the Regulatory Environment for Financial Services Firms (2007), available at http://www.fsround.org/publications/pdfs/ComplianceFunctioninDiversifiedFinancialInstitutions.pdf.
3. Oliver De Bandt & Philipp Hartmann, What is Systemic Risk Today?, Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk: Proceedings of the Second Joint Central Bank Research Conference, (1999), available at http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/cbrc/cbrc-02.pdf.
4. Svein Andresen, Reducing the Risks and Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Korea-FSB Financial Reform Conference - An Emerging Market Perspective, (2010).
四、外國政府與國際監理組織出版品
(一)美國聯邦政府
1. Ben S. Bernanke, Preserving a Central Role for Community Banking (Speech at the Independent Community Bankers of America National Convention, Orlando, Florida), Mar. 20, 2010, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke 20100320a.htm#fn1.
2. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT - FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf.
3. GAO, Financial Audit: Resolution Trust Corporation’s 1995 and 1994 Financial Statements, available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ai96123.pdf. (last visited 2012/4/4)
4. PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNITED STATES SENATE, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT, available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-psi-staff-report-wall-street-and-the-financial-crisis-anatomy-of-a-financial-collapse.
5. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323-340 (Nov. 1, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 243 & 12 C.F.R. pt. 381).
6. U.S. Treasury Department, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf.
(二)英國金融服務監理局
1. Financial Services Authority, Recovery and Resolution Plans Consultation Paper (CP11/16), (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp11_16.pdf.
2. Financial Services Authority, RRP Guidance Pack for Firms, (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/cp/cp11_16_rrp_guidance_pack.pdf.
3. Financial Services Authority, Recovery and Resolution Plans CP/DP Annexes, (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/cp/cp11_16_dp_annexes.pdf.
4. Thomas F. Huertas, Living Wills: How Can the Concept be Implemented? (Speech at Wharton School of Management, University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia), (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/library/communication/speeches/2010/0212_th.shtml.
(二)20國集團(G20)
1. G20, Communiqué Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Gyeongju, Republic of Korea, (Oct. 23, 2010), available at http://www.g20.org/images/stories/canalfinan/docs/repcore/03gyeongju.pdf.
2. G20, Cannes Summit Final Declaration, Nov. 11–12, 2010, http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g20/english/for-the-press/news-releases/cannes-summit-final-declaration.1557.html.
(三)金融穩定委員會(FSB)
1. IMF, BIS, FSB, Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations, (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107c.pdf.
2. FSB, Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions, (Nov. 4, 2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf.
3. FSB Report on the Overview of Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability, (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104.htm.
4. MAG under FSB & BCBS, Assessment of the Macroeconomic Impact of Higher Loss Absorbency for Global Systemically Important Banks, (Oct. 10, 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs202.pdf.
5. FSB, Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision - Recommendations for Enhanced Supervision, (Nov. 2, 2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard. org/publications/r_101101.pdf.
6. FSB, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf.
7. FSB, Effective Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions - Overview of Responses to the Public Consultation, (Nov. 4, 2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104dd.pdf.
8. FSB, Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision - Progress Report on Implementing the Recommendations on Enhanced Supervision, (Oct. 27, 2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104ee.pdf.
(四)巴塞爾銀行監理委員會(BCBS)暨國際清算銀行(BIS)
1. BIS, Annual Report of 1994, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/archive/ar1994_en.pdf.
2. BCBS, Global Systemically Important Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional Loss Absorbency Requirement - Rules Text, (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.pdf.
3. BCBS, Global Systemically Important Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional Loss Absorbency Requirement - Cover Note, (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207cn.pdf.
4. BCBS, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, (Dec. 2010), available at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
5. BCBS, Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework - Comprehensive Version - Part 2: The First Pillar – Minimum Capital Requirements, (June 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/ publ/bcbs128b.pdf.
6. BCBS, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Version 1), (Sept. 1997), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf.
7. BCBS, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.pdf.
8. BCBS, Core Principles Methodology, (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs130.pdf.
9. BCBS, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group, (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf.
10. BCBS, Resolution Policies and Frameworks – Progress So Far, (July 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs200.pdf.
11. BCBS, Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance, (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.pdf.
12. BCBS, Principles for Sound Stress Testing Practices and Supervision, (May 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155.pdf.
13. BIS & IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures - Consultative Report, (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss94.pdf.
五、報導、專訪(依時間排序)
1. Cornelius Hurley, Getting It Right the Next Time on “Too Big to Fail”, REUTERS, Sept. 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersComService4/idUSTRE48S7XQ20080929.
2. Greenspan: Economy in `Once-In-A-Century` Crisis, CNN MONEY, Sept. 14, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/14/news/economy/greenspan/.
3. David Lawder, "Too Big to Fail" Must End for All: FDIC Chief, REUTERS, Oct. 4, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/wtUSInvestingNews/idUSTRE59313Y20091004.
4. Jill Treanor, FSA to Demand `Living Wills` for Banks, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/oct/22/financial-services-authority-living-wills-banks.
5. Steve Matthews & Phil Mattingly, Bernanke Says Public Shouldn’t Pay to Wind Down Financial Firms, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 22, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aBzldmyPmc9o.
6. Yalman Onaran et al., The Battle over Bank Rules at Basel III, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 27, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_23/b4181041624904.htm.
7. Mark Leftly, British Banks` Survival Plans Set for G20, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 5, 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/british-banks-survival-plans-set-for-g20-2070604.html.
8. Louise Egan, Canada Advances on Plans to Deal with Bank Failures, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2011, http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/01/25/canada-banks-regulation-idINN2525421320110125.
9. Alexander Eichler, Volcker Rule Deadline Likely Blown, Says Bernanke, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 1, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/01/volcker-rule-deadline_n_1313299.html?ref=business.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
法律學研究所
97651023
100
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097651023
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 張冠群zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Chang, Kuan Chunen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃卲璿zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Huang, Shao Hsuanen_US
dc.creator (作者) 黃卲璿zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Huang, Shao Hsuanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2011en_US
dc.date.accessioned 30-Oct-2012 11:08:18 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 30-Oct-2012 11:08:18 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 30-Oct-2012 11:08:18 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0097651023en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54467-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 法律學研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 97651023zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 100zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文所要探討的問題在於如何消弭銀行業中具有「大至不能倒」地位的銀行對整體經濟與金融體系所帶來的負面效應。
為了處理此一問題，本文將從比較法經驗進行歸納分析，理出「大至不能倒」理論在美國法上的面貌，並對「大至不能倒」銀行的界定提出比較法上採取的途徑，之後本文將進入檢閱現有的「大至不能倒」的解決方案，並以本文核心目標：『正視「大至不能倒」銀行的存在，並最小化「大至不能倒」政策適用的餘地！』來檢驗這些解決方案，緊接著本文將提出金融穩定委員會對於「大至不能倒」銀行的「資本強化」、「監理強化」與「復原與退場計畫」這三個監理方案供參酌，本文在結論上強力主張應將「復原與退場計畫」納入我國的法制架構中，為我國未來面對「大至不能倒」議題預做準備，並提出立法建議。
所謂「復原與退場計畫」(銀行事前預囑)是國際上處理「大至不能倒」問題所創造出全新的監理工具，簡介其內容，就是藉由事前周全的計畫使大型銀行在遭遇嚴重的壓力事件(尤其是系統性事件)時能藉由實施事前計劃快速地使財務狀況回復正常，或退而求其次藉由實施事前計畫使銀行能在不影響金融穩定或損及納稅人(即紓困政策)的狀況下退出金融市場。簡而言之其精神在於「卸除大型銀行的系統重要性」。		zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 謝辭 I
論文摘要 I
簡 目 I
詳 目 III
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與研究目的 1
壹、研究動機 1
貳、研究目的 1
第二節 研究方法與範圍限制 2
壹、研究方法 2
貳、研究範圍與限制 3
第三節 用語釐清與本文體例 4
第四節 研究架構 5
第二章 大至不能倒(Too Big to Fail)理論 7
第一節 理論概觀 7
第一項 大至不能倒(Too Big to Fail)的意義 7
第一款 大型銀行 8
第二款 保護債權人不受經營失敗所生損失的政策 8
第二項 釐清對「大至不能倒」一詞的誤解 8
第一款 非關「大小」 8
第二款 「不能不救銀行」與「不能不救銀行債權人」之觀念比較 9
第二節 政策的成因與背景─考察美國經驗 10
第一項 系統重要性金融機構的形成 10
第一款 說明─從金融去管制化談起 10
第二款 金融業集中趨勢─金融寡占 11
第三款 金融創新 13
第二項 慣行的紓困政策 14
第一款 80年代的儲貸危機 14
第二款 伊利諾大陸銀行紓困案 15
第三款 2008年不良資產收購計畫 16
第三節 大至不能倒銀行造成的問題──外溢效應(Spillover Effect) 17
第一項 外溢效應與系統性風險 17
第一款 定義系統性風險 17
第二款 系統性風險與金融市場 19
第二項 大至不能倒銀行可能引起的系統性風險 19
第一款 直接影響─違約 20
第二款 間接影響─市場恐慌傳染效應(contagion effect) 20
第四節 大至不能倒政策的不當與負面效應 20
第一項 政策本身不當──外部不經濟 20
第二項 政策的負面後續效應 21
第一款 引發債權人的道德風險 21
第二款 引發大至不能倒銀行過度風險承擔 22
第三款 引發大至不能倒銀行經營欠缺效率 22
第四款 引發金融市場與整體經濟的連鎖反應 22
第五款 強化大至不能倒地位 23
第三章 界定大至不能倒銀行 25
第一節 為何需要定義大至不能倒銀行 25
第二節 聯準會之大型複雜銀行監理計畫 26
第三節 巴塞爾委員會的跨國系統重要性銀行鑑別準則 27
第一項 G20於金融危機後的回應 27
第二項 鑑別準則之內容 28
第一款 指標性衡量法 28
第二款 程度分級法 35
第三款 監理裁量 35
第四款 定期重新篩選與機制更新 38
第三項 現行名單與擴張適用 39
第四節 Dodd-Frank法所選定之公司 40
第一項Dodd-Frank法的規範 40
第二項 分析整理 41
第五節 評析與建議 42
第四章 大至不能倒的排除措施總覽 45
第一節 防範措施設計原理原則 45
第一項 問題釐清與本文目標 45
第二項 解決方案的選擇思維 46
第三項 大至不能倒政策的定位與最後手段性 48
第二節 國際監理組織最新趨勢 48
第一項 整體藍圖 49
第二項 資本強化部分 49
第一款 規範內容 49
第二款 評析 50
第三項 監理強化部分 51
第一款 規範內容 51
第二款 評析 53
第四項 退場制度改革與事前計畫部分 53
第一款 現況 53
第二款 規範內容 54
第三款 評析 57
第三節 Dodd-Frank法對大至不能倒的回應 59
第一項立法歷程與訴求 59
第二項 對於大型複雜金融機構併購的限制 60
第一款 訴求與限制內容 60
第二款 規範上的缺失 62
第三項 有序清算權 63
第一款 訴求與內容 63
第二款 規範上的缺失 64
第四項 合併監理與增強審慎標準 67
第一款 訴求與內容 67
第二款 對資本基礎監理抱持的悲觀論 68
第五項 有序清算基金與金融危機責任費 70
第一款 訴求與內容 70
第二款 規範上的缺失 72
第六項 伏爾克條款(Volcker Rule) 75
第一款 訴求之說明 75
第二款 Dodd-Frank法的內容 75
第三款 實施進度與評價 77
第四節 評析與建議 79
第五章 大至不能倒銀行的資本強化 81
第一節 巴塞爾資本協定 81
第二節 對跨國系統重要性金融機構的資本強化計畫 82
第一項 跨國系統重要性銀行的具體資本強化要求 82
第二項 資本強化所帶來的影響 83
第三項 資本強化工具 84
第一款 普通股權益第一類資本 84
第二款 低觸發性或有資本 84
第三款 高觸發性或有資本 85
第三節 評析與建議 89
第六章 大至不能倒銀行的監理措施強化 91
第一節 銀行監理的核心原則 91
第一項 核心原則的演變 91
第二項 核心原則的遵行評估 93
第二節 FSB與IMF對監理核心原則的建議 94
第一項 逐項建議說明 94
第一款 權責 94
第二款 獨立性 96
第三款 監理資源 97
第四款 監理權能 98
第五款 監理技術的改進 99
第六款 集團式監理與合併監理 106
第七款 持續並廣泛的監理 107
第八款 監理聯盟與資訊分享 107
第九款 總體審慎監理 108
第十款 監理事務外包 109
第二項 對核心監理原則的總體建議 110
第三節 評析與建議 111
第七章 新型監理工具──復原與退場計畫(銀行事前預囑) 115
第一節 復原與退場計畫 115
第一項 復原與退場計畫概觀 115
第一款 復原計畫與退場計畫的意義 116
第二款 適用對象與特性 118
第三款 治理與監管 118
第二項 內容與架構 120
第一款 共通架構 120
第二款 復原計畫的必要元素 121
第三款 退場計畫的必要元素 123
第三項 制定計劃資訊要求 124
第二節 退場可能性測試 125
第一項 測試的意義與目標 125
第二項 測試程序 126
第三項 退場策略的可行性測試 127
第一款 銀行的組織結構與業務(Firm structure and operations) 128
第二款 內部連結性(internal interconnectedness) 128
第三款 金融市場基礎設施的成員資格(Membership in FMIs) 129
第四款 管理資訊系統(Management information systems) 130
第五款 各國退場制度與工具的協調 131
第四項 系統性影響測試(可信性測試) 132
第三節 他國立法觀察─以美國實施為例 133
第一項 Dodd-Frank法的相關規定 133
第二項 目前的規範架構體系 135
第三項 聯準會與聯邦存款保險公司發布之規則 138
第一款 大綱 138
第二款 退場計畫的提交 139
第三款 退場計畫的資訊要求 141
第四款 退場計畫的審查與缺失之修正 147
第五款 其他條款 149
第四節 評析與建議 151
第一項 復原與退場計畫之優點 151
第一款 強化危機處理能力 151
第二款 簡化銀行內部組織結構並提高透明性 152
第三款 降低銀行風險承擔的導引功能 153
第四款 政治現實上優勢 153
第二項 對復原與退場計畫的質疑與本文反駁 154
第一款 能否具體化之質疑 154
第二款 實效性之質疑 155
第三款 帶來過高的法規遵循(legal compliance)成本之質疑 155
第四款 保密性之質疑 157
第三項 小結 157
第八章 我國法制與監理機制之建構 159
第一節 我國銀行業的過去、現況與展望 159
第一項 台灣近十年金融發展史 159
第一款 台灣近年經歷之系統性事件 159
第二款 台灣近年在法制與金融業中的集中趨勢 159
第三款 台灣政府對金融業紓困之慣性──以RTC之運作為例 160
第二項 歷史事件歸納 161
第二節 大至不能倒管制架構的移植 161
第一項 移植規範的選擇 161
第一款 資本強化規範的移植──僅涉法規命令層級的修正 162
第二款 監理強化規範的移植──僅涉法規命令層級的修正 162
第三款 復原與退場計畫的移植──應立法採取 163
第二項 規範的定位 164
第三項 與現行規範調和 164
第四項 具體條文試擬 166
第九章 結論 171
參考文獻 175
壹、中文文獻 175
貳、外文文獻 175
一、專書 175
二、期刊論文 176
三、非期刊論文 177
四、外國政府與國際監理組織出版品 177
(一)美國聯邦政府 177
(二)20國集團(G20) 179
(三)金融穩定委員會(FSB) 179
(四)巴塞爾銀行監理委員會(BCBS)暨國際清算銀行(BIS) 180
五、報導、專訪(依時間排序) 181
參、圖表索引 182		zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097651023en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 大至不能倒zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 系統性風險zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 外溢效應zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 紓困zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 2008年全球金融危機zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 次貸危機zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 指標性衡量法zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 系統重要性金融機構zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 系統重要性銀行zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Dodd-Frank華爾街改革與消費者保護法zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 金融穩定委員會zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 巴塞爾銀行監理委員會zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 有效銀行監理核心原則zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 復原與退場計畫zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 銀行事前預囑zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Too Big to Failen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Systemic Risken_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Spillover Effecten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Bail-outen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Indicator-based measurement approachen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Acten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Financial Stability Boarden_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Basel Committee on Banking Supervisionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Recovery and Resolution Planen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Bank Living Willsen_US
dc.title (題名) 銀行業中「大至不能倒」(Too Big to Fail)現象之防範與法制建構-兼論銀行事前預囑zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 壹、中文文獻
1. 王文宇，控股公司與金融控股公司法，元照，2001年12月初版二刷
2. 王文宇 主編，金融法，元照，2007年9月三版一刷
3. 王志誠，現代金融法，新學林，2009年9月初版
4. Anthony Saunders原著；郭照榮‧沈中華 編譯，金融機構管理，華泰，2001年9月初版
5. 沈中華，金融市場─全球的觀點，新陸書局，99年10月三版修訂版
6. 卲慶平，金融危機的形成、處理機制與法制基礎─對美國次級房貸金融危機的觀察，月旦法學雜誌第165期，2009年2月
7. 陳彩稚，財產與責任保險，智勝文化，2006年9月初版
8. 陳威光，衍生性商品：選擇權、期貨、交換與風險管理，智勝文化，2010年3月再版
9. 彭金隆，金融控股公司─法制監理與經營策略，智勝文化，2004年9月初版
10. 賴英照，最新證券交易法解析，著者自版，2006年2月初版
貳、外文文獻
一、專書
1. DOUGLAS D. EVANOFF & GEORGE G. KAUFMAN ET AL., SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES – RESOLVING LARGE BANK INSOLVENCIES (2005)
2. GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS (2004)
3. G. N. OLSON, BANKS IN DISTRESS: LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF THE 1980S (2000)
4. JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, WHY ARE THERE SO MANY BANKING CRISES? (2008)
5. JEFFREY FRIEDMAN, WHAT CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2011)
6. JOHN LANCHESTER, I.O.U.: WHY EVERYONE OWES EVERYONE AND NO ONE CAN PAY (First Simon & Schuster trade paperback, ed., Simon & Schuster Paperbacks 2010)
7. LLOYD BONFIELD, AMERICAN LAW AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2006)
8. ROBERT POZEN, TOO BIG TO SAVE? HOW FIX THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2010)
二、期刊論文
1. Adam Nguyen & Matt Watkins, Financial Services Reform, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 579 (2000).
2. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 35 Brooklyn J. Int`l L. 707 (2010).
3. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 Or. L. Rev. 951 (2011).
4. Cornelius Hurley, Paying the Price for Too Big to Fail, 4 Entrepren. Bus. L.J. 351 (2010).
5. David Reiss, The Federal Government Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac`s Obligation: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 1019 (2008).
6. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Function of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 434 (1998).
7. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk after Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies beyond Oversight, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 795 (2011).
8. Lisa M. DeFerrari & David E. Palmer, Supervision of Large Complex Banking Organizations, FED. RES. BULL., Feb. 2001, available at http://www.federalreserve. gov/pubs/bulletin/2001/0201lead.pdf.
9. Reinier Kraakman & Henry Hansmann, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387 (2000).
10. Roshni Banker, Glass-Steagall through the Back Door: Creating a Divide in Banking Functions Through the Use of Corporate Living Wills, 2010 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 424 (2010).
11. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibu, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, FDIC Banking Review Vol. 13, No. 2, (2000), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf.
三、非期刊論文
1. George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What Is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?, The Independent Review, v. VII, n. 3, 371 (2003), available at http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_07_3_scott.pdf.
2. John Beccia & Cornelius Hurley, Compliance Function in Diversified Financial Institutions: Harmonizing the Regulatory Environment for Financial Services Firms (2007), available at http://www.fsround.org/publications/pdfs/ComplianceFunctioninDiversifiedFinancialInstitutions.pdf.
3. Oliver De Bandt & Philipp Hartmann, What is Systemic Risk Today?, Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk: Proceedings of the Second Joint Central Bank Research Conference, (1999), available at http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/cbrc/cbrc-02.pdf.
4. Svein Andresen, Reducing the Risks and Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Korea-FSB Financial Reform Conference - An Emerging Market Perspective, (2010).
四、外國政府與國際監理組織出版品
(一)美國聯邦政府
1. Ben S. Bernanke, Preserving a Central Role for Community Banking (Speech at the Independent Community Bankers of America National Convention, Orlando, Florida), Mar. 20, 2010, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke 20100320a.htm#fn1.
2. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT - FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf.
3. GAO, Financial Audit: Resolution Trust Corporation’s 1995 and 1994 Financial Statements, available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ai96123.pdf. (last visited 2012/4/4)
4. PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNITED STATES SENATE, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT, available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-psi-staff-report-wall-street-and-the-financial-crisis-anatomy-of-a-financial-collapse.
5. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323-340 (Nov. 1, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 243 & 12 C.F.R. pt. 381).
6. U.S. Treasury Department, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf.
(二)英國金融服務監理局
1. Financial Services Authority, Recovery and Resolution Plans Consultation Paper (CP11/16), (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp11_16.pdf.
2. Financial Services Authority, RRP Guidance Pack for Firms, (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/cp/cp11_16_rrp_guidance_pack.pdf.
3. Financial Services Authority, Recovery and Resolution Plans CP/DP Annexes, (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/cp/cp11_16_dp_annexes.pdf.
4. Thomas F. Huertas, Living Wills: How Can the Concept be Implemented? (Speech at Wharton School of Management, University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia), (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/library/communication/speeches/2010/0212_th.shtml.
(二)20國集團(G20)
1. G20, Communiqué Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Gyeongju, Republic of Korea, (Oct. 23, 2010), available at http://www.g20.org/images/stories/canalfinan/docs/repcore/03gyeongju.pdf.
2. G20, Cannes Summit Final Declaration, Nov. 11–12, 2010, http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g20/english/for-the-press/news-releases/cannes-summit-final-declaration.1557.html.
(三)金融穩定委員會(FSB)
1. IMF, BIS, FSB, Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations, (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107c.pdf.
2. FSB, Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions, (Nov. 4, 2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf.
3. FSB Report on the Overview of Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability, (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104.htm.
4. MAG under FSB & BCBS, Assessment of the Macroeconomic Impact of Higher Loss Absorbency for Global Systemically Important Banks, (Oct. 10, 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs202.pdf.
5. FSB, Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision - Recommendations for Enhanced Supervision, (Nov. 2, 2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard. org/publications/r_101101.pdf.
6. FSB, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf.
7. FSB, Effective Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions - Overview of Responses to the Public Consultation, (Nov. 4, 2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104dd.pdf.
8. FSB, Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision - Progress Report on Implementing the Recommendations on Enhanced Supervision, (Oct. 27, 2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104ee.pdf.
(四)巴塞爾銀行監理委員會(BCBS)暨國際清算銀行(BIS)
1. BIS, Annual Report of 1994, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/archive/ar1994_en.pdf.
2. BCBS, Global Systemically Important Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional Loss Absorbency Requirement - Rules Text, (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.pdf.
3. BCBS, Global Systemically Important Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional Loss Absorbency Requirement - Cover Note, (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207cn.pdf.
4. BCBS, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, (Dec. 2010), available at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
5. BCBS, Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework - Comprehensive Version - Part 2: The First Pillar – Minimum Capital Requirements, (June 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/ publ/bcbs128b.pdf.
6. BCBS, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Version 1), (Sept. 1997), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf.
7. BCBS, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.pdf.
8. BCBS, Core Principles Methodology, (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs130.pdf.
9. BCBS, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group, (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf.
10. BCBS, Resolution Policies and Frameworks – Progress So Far, (July 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs200.pdf.
11. BCBS, Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance, (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.pdf.
12. BCBS, Principles for Sound Stress Testing Practices and Supervision, (May 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155.pdf.
13. BIS & IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures - Consultative Report, (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss94.pdf.
五、報導、專訪(依時間排序)
1. Cornelius Hurley, Getting It Right the Next Time on “Too Big to Fail”, REUTERS, Sept. 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersComService4/idUSTRE48S7XQ20080929.
2. Greenspan: Economy in `Once-In-A-Century` Crisis, CNN MONEY, Sept. 14, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/14/news/economy/greenspan/.
3. David Lawder, "Too Big to Fail" Must End for All: FDIC Chief, REUTERS, Oct. 4, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/wtUSInvestingNews/idUSTRE59313Y20091004.
4. Jill Treanor, FSA to Demand `Living Wills` for Banks, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/oct/22/financial-services-authority-living-wills-banks.
5. Steve Matthews & Phil Mattingly, Bernanke Says Public Shouldn’t Pay to Wind Down Financial Firms, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 22, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aBzldmyPmc9o.
6. Yalman Onaran et al., The Battle over Bank Rules at Basel III, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 27, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_23/b4181041624904.htm.
7. Mark Leftly, British Banks` Survival Plans Set for G20, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 5, 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/british-banks-survival-plans-set-for-g20-2070604.html.
8. Louise Egan, Canada Advances on Plans to Deal with Bank Failures, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2011, http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/01/25/canada-banks-regulation-idINN2525421320110125.
9. Alexander Eichler, Volcker Rule Deadline Likely Blown, Says Bernanke, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 1, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/01/volcker-rule-deadline_n_1313299.html?ref=business.		zh_TW