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題名 併購獨立專家之選擇及併購後綜效之探討
A study on the choice of independent experts and the synergy in the M&A transaction
作者 黃玉雯
貢獻者 林宛瑩
黃玉雯
關鍵詞 獨立專家
併購綜效
代理成本
Independent experts
M&A synergy
Agency cost
日期 2011
上傳時間 30-Oct-2012 14:35:30 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究將我國獨立專家可能發揮之功能分為能夠認證交易係公平且無弊端之「消極認證功能」及能積極預測綜效並為市場排除不具綜效交易之「積極認證功能」，並藉由分析代理成本與獨立專家選擇之關聯性，以及獨立專家自我選擇與併購後綜效之關聯性，實證探討我國獨立專家制度之運作概況及其功能。
研究結果發現，衡量代理成本之公司及交易特性變數中，負債比率較高、外部大股東持股比率較低、機構投資人持股比率較低、併購溢價較高、主併與被併公司相對規模較接近時，公司聘僱高聲譽獨立專家的可能性較高，支持我國獨立專家可能具有降低代理成本之消極認證功能之論點。積極認證功能方面，本研究發現，以併購金額市佔率衡量獨立專家聲譽時，高聲譽獨立專家簽發評價報告之併購案，併購後市場佔有率成長幅度較高，支持我國獨立專家可能具有積極認證功能之論點，但僅限於市場綜效部分。
This study tests whether the negative certification function and positive certification function are important service performed by independent experts in the M&A transaction. It conducts an empirical investigation of the choice of independent experts and the synergy in the M&A transaction.
The result demonstrates that when the debt ratio is high, the percentage of stock owned by institutional owners and external shareholders is low, the premium is high, and the size of acquirer and target is similar, acquirer tends to hire a more prestigious independent expert. It confirms that the negative certification function exists. In addition, we find that when the reputation (measured by market share) of independent experts is high, the market synergy in the M&A may be higher than others. It is because of that the independent experts tend to protect their reputation by choosing their clients rigorously. Therefore, the positive certification function is also confirmed.
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王志誠，2005，營業讓與之法制構造，中正大學法學集刊，第19期(11月)：147-200。
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林宛瑩、陳宜伶，2012，獨立董監之設置決策與績效，管理與系統(forthcoming)。
林悟玄，2008，企業組織再造時股東及債權人保護之研究，私立輔仁大學法律研究所碩士論文。
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孫梅瑞、陳隆麒，2002，台灣地區上市公司從事購併活動對經營績效影響之研究，中山管理評論，第10卷第1期：155-184。
陳介山，2005，企業併購法第六條獨立專家之研究，財產法暨經濟法，第2期(6月)：65-96。
陳傳毅，2010，企業併購交易中獨立專家意見之功能與法律責任，東吳大學法律學系碩士在職專班法律專業組碩士論文。
曾宛如，2002，公司組織重整─新舊公司法及企業併購法之異同，台灣本土法學雜誌，第35期(6月)：231-246。
黃銘傑，2003，企業併購法之檢討與省思(下)，月旦法學雜誌，第97期(6月)：203-216。
盧曉彥，2004，美國母子公司合併子公司少數股東保護之研究—兼評台灣實務案例與相關規範設計之缺憾，國立政治大學法律研究所碩士論文。
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Bowers, H. M. and R. E. Miller. 1990. Choice of Investment Banker and Shareholders` Wealth of Firms Involved in Acquisitions. Financial Management 19 (4):34-34.
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
99353017
100
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099353017
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 林宛瑩zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃玉雯zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 黃玉雯zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2011en_US
dc.date.accessioned 30-Oct-2012 14:35:30 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 30-Oct-2012 14:35:30 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 30-Oct-2012 14:35:30 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0099353017en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54993-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 99353017zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 100zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究將我國獨立專家可能發揮之功能分為能夠認證交易係公平且無弊端之「消極認證功能」及能積極預測綜效並為市場排除不具綜效交易之「積極認證功能」，並藉由分析代理成本與獨立專家選擇之關聯性，以及獨立專家自我選擇與併購後綜效之關聯性，實證探討我國獨立專家制度之運作概況及其功能。
研究結果發現，衡量代理成本之公司及交易特性變數中，負債比率較高、外部大股東持股比率較低、機構投資人持股比率較低、併購溢價較高、主併與被併公司相對規模較接近時，公司聘僱高聲譽獨立專家的可能性較高，支持我國獨立專家可能具有降低代理成本之消極認證功能之論點。積極認證功能方面，本研究發現，以併購金額市佔率衡量獨立專家聲譽時，高聲譽獨立專家簽發評價報告之併購案，併購後市場佔有率成長幅度較高，支持我國獨立專家可能具有積極認證功能之論點，但僅限於市場綜效部分。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study tests whether the negative certification function and positive certification function are important service performed by independent experts in the M&A transaction. It conducts an empirical investigation of the choice of independent experts and the synergy in the M&A transaction.
The result demonstrates that when the debt ratio is high, the percentage of stock owned by institutional owners and external shareholders is low, the premium is high, and the size of acquirer and target is similar, acquirer tends to hire a more prestigious independent expert. It confirms that the negative certification function exists. In addition, we find that when the reputation (measured by market share) of independent experts is high, the market synergy in the M&A may be higher than others. It is because of that the independent experts tend to protect their reputation by choosing their clients rigorously. Therefore, the positive certification function is also confirmed.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究問題 4
第三節 論文架構 5
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 我國獨立專家制度簡介 6
第二節 相關實證研究探討 19
第三章 研究方法 26
第一節 研究假說 26
第二節 實證模型與變數衡量 35
第三節 樣本選取及資料來源 46
第四章 實證結果 47
第一節 消極認證功能之實證分析結果 47
第二節 積極認證功能之實證分析結果 63
第五章 結論與建議 74
第一節 研究結果 74
第二節 法制修正建議 78
第三節 研究限制與未來研究建議 81		zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099353017en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 獨立專家zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 併購綜效zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 代理成本zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Independent expertsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) M&A synergyen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Agency costen_US
dc.title (題名) 併購獨立專家之選擇及併購後綜效之探討zh_TW
dc.title (題名) A study on the choice of independent experts and the synergy in the M&A transactionen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王文宇，2002，企業併購法總評，月旦法學雜誌，第83期(4月)：71-80。
王志誠，2005，營業讓與之法制構造，中正大學法學集刊，第19期(11月)：147-200。
王絃如，2011，論企業併購之訊息揭露時點和內容─分別從「盡職調查評估」和「獨立專家制度」之觀點切入，國立中正大學財經法律學研究所碩士論文。
卓家慶，2005，會計師選擇與公司治理之探討，2005當前會計理論與實務研討會，銘傳大學會計學系。
林宛瑩、陳宜伶，2012，獨立董監之設置決策與績效，管理與系統(forthcoming)。
林悟玄，2008，企業組織再造時股東及債權人保護之研究，私立輔仁大學法律研究所碩士論文。
林嬋娟、吳安妮，1992，台灣企業併購綜效及績效之實證研究，會計評論，第26期（4月）：1-23。
孫梅瑞、陳隆麒，2002，台灣地區上市公司從事購併活動對經營績效影響之研究，中山管理評論，第10卷第1期：155-184。
陳介山，2005，企業併購法第六條獨立專家之研究，財產法暨經濟法，第2期(6月)：65-96。
陳傳毅，2010，企業併購交易中獨立專家意見之功能與法律責任，東吳大學法律學系碩士在職專班法律專業組碩士論文。
曾宛如，2002，公司組織重整─新舊公司法及企業併購法之異同，台灣本土法學雜誌，第35期(6月)：231-246。
黃銘傑，2003，企業併購法之檢討與省思(下)，月旦法學雜誌，第97期(6月)：203-216。
盧曉彥，2004，美國母子公司合併子公司少數股東保護之研究—兼評台灣實務案例與相關規範設計之缺憾，國立政治大學法律研究所碩士論文。
Allen, L., J. Julapa, S. Peristiani, and A. Saunders. 2004. The Role of Bank Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36 (2):197-224.
Ashbaugh, H. and T. D. Warfield. 2003. Audits as a corporate governance mechanism: Evidence from the German market. Journal of International Accounting Research 2:1-21.
Bacon, F. W., T. S. Shin, and N. B. Murphy. 1994. Factors motivating mergers: The case of rural electric cooperatives. Journal of Economics and Business 46 (2):129-134.
Barnhart, S. W. and S. Rosenstein. 1998. Board conposition, managerial ownership, and firm performance: An empirical analysis. The Financial Review 33 (4):1-16.
Becker, C. L., M. L. Defond, J. Jiambalvo, and K. R. Subramanyam. 1998. The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research 15 (1):1-24.
Benston, G. 1975.Accountant’s Integrity & Financial Reporting. Financial Executive 8：10-14.
Bowers, H. M. 2002.Fairness Opinions and the Business Judgment Rule an Empirical Investigation of Target Firms` Use of Fairness Opinions. Northwestern University Law Review 96(2):567-578
Bowers, H. M. and R. E. Miller. 1990. Choice of Investment Banker and Shareholders` Wealth of Firms Involved in Acquisitions. Financial Management 19 (4):34-34.
Bowers, H. M. and W.Latham. 2004. Value of Fairness Opinions in US Mergers and Acquisitions, 1980-2003. Working Paper. University of Delaware.
Brickley, J. A., R. C. Lease, and C. W. Smith, Jr. 1988. Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1,2):267-267.
Chemmanur, T. J. and P. Fulghieri. 1994. Investment Bank Reputation, Information Production, and Financial Intermediation. The Journal of Finance 49 (1):57-79.
Chen, K. Y. and K. S. Wu. 2002. The effect of industry specialization on audit fees in Taiwan: The role of industry type. Working Paper. National Cheng Kung University.
Chen, K. Y. and R. J. Elder. 2001. Industry specialization and audit fees: The effect of industry type and market definition. Working Paper. Syracuse University.
Chen, L. H.-J., and H. Sami. 2010. Does the Use of Fairness Opinions Impair the Acquirers` Abnormal Returns? The Litigation Risk Effect. Advances in Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management 4:81-112.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. P. H. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia: Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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