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題名 資本稅制對公共政策之影響─從量從價大不同 作者 趙珮涵
Chao, Pei Han貢獻者 賴育邦
Lai, Yu Bong
趙珮涵
Chao, Pei Han關鍵詞 租稅競爭
環境政策
從量稅
從價稅
tax competition
environmental policy
unit tax
ad valorem tax日期 2011 上傳時間 30-Oct-2012 16:12:07 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文以 Oates and Schwab (1988) 及 Lockwood (2004) 兩篇文章為基礎。採用 Oates and Schwab (1988) 中各地方政府同時選擇資本稅率及環境標準的模型為主要架構，並結合 Lockwood (2004) 中從量及從價資本稅之相關設定，將公共財及環境品質納入代表性個人的效用函數中，求得對稱納許均衡解 (symmetric Nash equilibrium) 。我們發現在考慮地區間策略性行為 (strategic behavior) 時，不論地區採用從量或從價資本稅以融通地區性公共財，均衡稅率及環境品質皆會低於最適水準，其中又以從價資本稅的扭曲更為嚴重。而中央集權時，無論採用從量或從價稅制，均衡稅率及環境品質皆為最適水準；完全地方分權時，從量稅和從價稅兩者等價，各區間彼此競爭，不論在公共財或環境水準，都有向下沉淪 (race to the bottom) ，偏離最適解的結果。
The thesis is based on the setting of Oates and Schwab (1988) and Lockwood (2004). I consider that each local government has two policy instruments available: the capital tax and the environmental standard. Local governments levy tax on the capital of polluting industries, with either unit taxes or ad valorem taxes.All capital tax revenues are used to provide local public goods. The aim of the thesis is to examine whether the two distinct capital tax systems lead to different outcomes.I find that when strategic behavior among jurisdictions is considered, both the tax rates and the environmental standards are set below the optimal levels under the two tax systems. Compared to the unit tax case, it`s even more inefficient with the ad valorem tax.Another finding is that the government would set both tax rate and environmental standard at the optimal level under the centralized case. Contrarily, under the decentralized cases, the competition among jurisdictions will lead to a race to the bottom in both local public goods provision and environment policy. Unit taxes and ad valorem taxes are equivalent in these two special cases.參考文獻 Akai, Nobuo, Ogawa, Hikaru, and Ogawa, Yoshitomo (2011), "Endogenous choice on tax instruments in a tax competition model: Unit tax versus ad valorem tax", InternationalTax and Public Finance, 18(5), 495-506.Cropper, ML and Oates, WE (1992), "Environmental economics - a survey", Journal of Economic Literature, 30(2), 675-740.Hoyt, WH (1991), "Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power", Journal of Urban Economics, 30(1), 123-31.Kunce, M and Shogren, JF (2002), "On environmental federalism and direct emission control", Journal of Urban Economics, 51(2), 238-45.Kunce, M and Shogren, JF (2005), "On interjurisdictional competition and environmental federalism", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50(1), 212-24.Kunce, M and Shogren, JF (2008), "E cient decentralized scal and environmental policy: A dual purpose henry george tax", Ecological Economics, 65(3), 569-73.Lockwood, B (2004), "Competition in unit vs. ad valorem taxes", International Tax and Public Finance, 11(6), 763-72.Oates, WE and Schwab, RM (1988), "Economic ompetition among jurisdictions - effciency enhancing or distortion inducing", Journal of Public Economics, 35(3), 333-354.Ogawa, Hikaru and Wildasin, DE (2009), "Think locally, act locally: Spillovers, spillbacks, and e cient decentralized policymaking", American Economic Review, 99(4), 1206-17.Wilson, JD (1999), "Theories of tax competition", National Tax Journal, 52(2), 269-304.Wilson, JD and Wildasin, DE (2004), "Capital tax competition: Bane or boon", Journal of Public Economics, 88(6), 1065-91.Woods, ND (2006), "Interstate competition and environmental regulation: A test of the race-to-the-bottom thesis", Social Science Quarterly, 87(1), 174-89.Zodrow, GR and Mieszkowski, P (1986), `Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods", Journal of Urban Economics, 19(3), 356-70. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
99255005
100資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0992550051 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 賴育邦 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Lai, Yu Bong en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 趙珮涵 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chao, Pei Han en_US dc.creator (作者) 趙珮涵 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chao, Pei Han en_US dc.date (日期) 2011 en_US dc.date.accessioned 30-Oct-2012 16:12:07 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 30-Oct-2012 16:12:07 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 30-Oct-2012 16:12:07 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0992550051 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/55094 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 99255005 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 100 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文以 Oates and Schwab (1988) 及 Lockwood (2004) 兩篇文章為基礎。採用 Oates and Schwab (1988) 中各地方政府同時選擇資本稅率及環境標準的模型為主要架構，並結合 Lockwood (2004) 中從量及從價資本稅之相關設定，將公共財及環境品質納入代表性個人的效用函數中，求得對稱納許均衡解 (symmetric Nash equilibrium) 。我們發現在考慮地區間策略性行為 (strategic behavior) 時，不論地區採用從量或從價資本稅以融通地區性公共財，均衡稅率及環境品質皆會低於最適水準，其中又以從價資本稅的扭曲更為嚴重。而中央集權時，無論採用從量或從價稅制，均衡稅率及環境品質皆為最適水準；完全地方分權時，從量稅和從價稅兩者等價，各區間彼此競爭，不論在公共財或環境水準，都有向下沉淪 (race to the bottom) ，偏離最適解的結果。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The thesis is based on the setting of Oates and Schwab (1988) and Lockwood (2004). I consider that each local government has two policy instruments available: the capital tax and the environmental standard. Local governments levy tax on the capital of polluting industries, with either unit taxes or ad valorem taxes.All capital tax revenues are used to provide local public goods. The aim of the thesis is to examine whether the two distinct capital tax systems lead to different outcomes.I find that when strategic behavior among jurisdictions is considered, both the tax rates and the environmental standards are set below the optimal levels under the two tax systems. Compared to the unit tax case, it`s even more inefficient with the ad valorem tax.Another finding is that the government would set both tax rate and environmental standard at the optimal level under the centralized case. Contrarily, under the decentralized cases, the competition among jurisdictions will lead to a race to the bottom in both local public goods provision and environment policy. Unit taxes and ad valorem taxes are equivalent in these two special cases. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 1 緒論 1 1.1 研究動機與背景....................................1 1.2 研究方法..........................................2 1.3 本文架構..........................................22 文獻回顧 3 2.1 從量稅與從價稅....................................3 2.2 環境政策與租稅政策間之互動........................4 2.3 綜合整理..........................................63 模型設定 7 3.1 經濟環境..........................................7 3.1.1 生產部門.....................................7 3.1.2 代表性個人...................................9 3.1.3 地方政府目標................................10 3.2 從量資本稅.......................................11 3.3 從價資本稅.......................................134 均衡結果與比較 16 4.1 與最適解之差異...................................16 4.2 比較從量資本稅與從價資本稅下結果.................18 4.2.1 公共財水準..................................18 4.2.2 環境品質....................................19 4.3 極度中央集權的例子...............................21 4.4 極度地方分權的例子...............................22 4.5 綜合整理與比較...................................245 結論 26參考文獻 28 zh_TW dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0992550051 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅競爭 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 環境政策 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 從量稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 從價稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) tax competition en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) environmental policy en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) unit tax en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) ad valorem tax en_US dc.title (題名) 資本稅制對公共政策之影響─從量從價大不同 zh_TW dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Akai, Nobuo, Ogawa, Hikaru, and Ogawa, Yoshitomo (2011), "Endogenous choice on tax instruments in a tax competition model: Unit tax versus ad valorem tax", InternationalTax and Public Finance, 18(5), 495-506.Cropper, ML and Oates, WE (1992), "Environmental economics - a survey", Journal of Economic Literature, 30(2), 675-740.Hoyt, WH (1991), "Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power", Journal of Urban Economics, 30(1), 123-31.Kunce, M and Shogren, JF (2002), "On environmental federalism and direct emission control", Journal of Urban Economics, 51(2), 238-45.Kunce, M and Shogren, JF (2005), "On interjurisdictional competition and environmental federalism", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50(1), 212-24.Kunce, M and Shogren, JF (2008), "E cient decentralized scal and environmental policy: A dual purpose henry george tax", Ecological Economics, 65(3), 569-73.Lockwood, B (2004), "Competition in unit vs. ad valorem taxes", International Tax and Public Finance, 11(6), 763-72.Oates, WE and Schwab, RM (1988), "Economic ompetition among jurisdictions - effciency enhancing or distortion inducing", Journal of Public Economics, 35(3), 333-354.Ogawa, Hikaru and Wildasin, DE (2009), "Think locally, act locally: Spillovers, spillbacks, and e cient decentralized policymaking", American Economic Review, 99(4), 1206-17.Wilson, JD (1999), "Theories of tax competition", National Tax Journal, 52(2), 269-304.Wilson, JD and Wildasin, DE (2004), "Capital tax competition: Bane or boon", Journal of Public Economics, 88(6), 1065-91.Woods, ND (2006), "Interstate competition and environmental regulation: A test of the race-to-the-bottom thesis", Social Science Quarterly, 87(1), 174-89.Zodrow, GR and Mieszkowski, P (1986), `Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods", Journal of Urban Economics, 19(3), 356-70. zh_TW
