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題名 「我」的重要性──論帕菲特人格同一的主張
The Significance of Self--On Parfit`s Personal Identity作者 陳安琪 貢獻者 林從一
陳安琪關鍵詞 人格同一性
進一步事實
自我關懷
自我同一
分腦實驗日期 2012 上傳時間 1-Jul-2013 16:28:28 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文主要是透過帕菲特（Derek Parfit）和莊子頓（Mark Johnston） 的爭論來闡明帕菲特的人格同一理論。除了著重說明帕菲特如何看待「人格同一」這個概念，以及他如何發展其理論外，更特別借重莊子頓對於帕菲特的批評，來對帕菲特的觀點進一步闡述。討論將聚焦於「人格同一是否重要」，我將透過他們對彼此的攻擊和回應來檢視其論證的合理性，並思考如何在符合前理論直覺的前提下，嘗試為帕菲特辯護。 參考文獻 Ayers, M., 1990, Locke, vol. 2, London: Routledge. Baker, L. R., 2000, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge University Press. Hume, D., 1978, Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press (original work 1739); partly reprinted in Perry 1975. Johnston, M., 1987, ‘Human Beings’, Journal of Philosophy 84: 59–83. ───, 1989, ‘Fission and the Facts ’, in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory (1989), Ridgeview Publishing Company. ───, 1992, ‘Reasons and Reductionism’, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review. ───, 1997, ‘Human Concerns without Superlative Selves’, in Reading Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. ───, 2010, Surviving Death, Princeton University Press. Lewis, D., 1976, ‘Survival and Identity’, in The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley: California, and reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. I, Oxford University Press, 1983. Locke, J., 1975, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press (original work, 2nd ed., first published 1694); partly reprinted in Perry 1975. Mackie, D., 1999, ‘Personal Identity and Dead People’, Philosophical Studies 95: 219–242. McDowell, J., 1997, ‘Reductionism and the First Person’, in Reading Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. Noonan, H., 2003, Personal Identity, London: Routledge. Olson, E., 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology, Oxford University Press. ───, 2002(revised 2007, 2008, 2010), ‘Personal Identity’, Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. Parfit, D., 1971, ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review 80: 3–27, and reprinted in Perry 1975. ───, 1976, ‘Lewis, Perry, and What Matters’, in The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press. ───, 1984, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ───, 1995, ‘The Unimportance of Identity’, in Identity, H. Harris (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Martin and Barresi 2003. ───, 2007, ‘Is personal identity what matters?’, The Ammonius Foundation, http://www.stafforini.com/txt/parfit_-_is_personal_identity_what_matters.pdf Perry, J., 1972, ‘Can the Self Divide?’ Journal of Philosophy 69: 463–488. ─── (ed.), 1975, Personal Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press. Shoemaker, S., 1963, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ───, 1970, ‘Persons and Their Pasts’, American Philosophical Quarterly 7: 269–285. ───, 1984, ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist`s Account’, in Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell. ───, 1997, ‘Self and Substance’, in Philosophical Perspectives 11, J. Tomberlin (ed.): 283–319. ───, 1999, ‘Self, Body, and Coincidence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 73: 287–306. Unger, P., 1990, Identity, Consciousness, and Value, Oxford University Press. ───, 2000, ‘The Survival of the Sentient’, in Philosophical Perspectives 11, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Malden, MA: Blackwell. Williams, B., 1956–7, ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57, and reprinted in his Problems of the Self, Cambridge University Press, 1973. ───, 1970, ‘The Self and the Future’, Philosophical Review 59, and reprinted in his Problems of the Self , Cambridge University Press, 1973. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
哲學研究所
96154003
101資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096154003 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 林從一 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳安琪 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 陳安琪 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2012 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2013 16:28:28 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Jul-2013 16:28:28 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2013 16:28:28 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0096154003 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/58653 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 哲學研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 96154003 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 101 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文主要是透過帕菲特（Derek Parfit）和莊子頓（Mark Johnston） 的爭論來闡明帕菲特的人格同一理論。除了著重說明帕菲特如何看待「人格同一」這個概念，以及他如何發展其理論外，更特別借重莊子頓對於帕菲特的批評，來對帕菲特的觀點進一步闡述。討論將聚焦於「人格同一是否重要」，我將透過他們對彼此的攻擊和回應來檢視其論證的合理性，並思考如何在符合前理論直覺的前提下，嘗試為帕菲特辯護。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 導論…………………………………………………………………1 第一章 「人格同一」的兩種理論 1.1 何謂「同一性」及人格同一性問題的哲學重要性…………4 1.2 心理主義的判準………………………………………………6 1.3 動物主義的觀點………………………………………………11 1.4 動物主義對心理主義的回應…………………………………17 第二章 心理主義與帕菲特的分腦實驗 2.1 心理主義對人格同一性問題的看法…………………………24 2.2 帕菲特如何理解人格同一性問題……………………………27 2.3 帕菲特的分腦實驗及其對人格同一性問題的主張…………34 2.4 「是不是同一個人」真的重要嗎？…………………………40 第三章 莊子頓的自我概念與同一性 3.1 莊子頓的「自我」概念………………………………………47 3.2 自我的同一與人格的同一……………………………………53 3.3 人的本質到底是什麼？………………………………………56 結論…………………………………………………………………62 參考書目……………………………………………………………72 zh_TW dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096154003 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 人格同一性 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 進一步事實 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 自我關懷 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 自我同一 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 分腦實驗 zh_TW dc.title (題名) 「我」的重要性──論帕菲特人格同一的主張 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Significance of Self--On Parfit`s Personal Identity en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Ayers, M., 1990, Locke, vol. 2, London: Routledge. Baker, L. R., 2000, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge University Press. Hume, D., 1978, Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press (original work 1739); partly reprinted in Perry 1975. Johnston, M., 1987, ‘Human Beings’, Journal of Philosophy 84: 59–83. ───, 1989, ‘Fission and the Facts ’, in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory (1989), Ridgeview Publishing Company. ───, 1992, ‘Reasons and Reductionism’, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review. ───, 1997, ‘Human Concerns without Superlative Selves’, in Reading Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. ───, 2010, Surviving Death, Princeton University Press. Lewis, D., 1976, ‘Survival and Identity’, in The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley: California, and reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. I, Oxford University Press, 1983. Locke, J., 1975, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press (original work, 2nd ed., first published 1694); partly reprinted in Perry 1975. Mackie, D., 1999, ‘Personal Identity and Dead People’, Philosophical Studies 95: 219–242. McDowell, J., 1997, ‘Reductionism and the First Person’, in Reading Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. Noonan, H., 2003, Personal Identity, London: Routledge. Olson, E., 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology, Oxford University Press. ───, 2002(revised 2007, 2008, 2010), ‘Personal Identity’, Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. Parfit, D., 1971, ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review 80: 3–27, and reprinted in Perry 1975. ───, 1976, ‘Lewis, Perry, and What Matters’, in The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press. ───, 1984, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ───, 1995, ‘The Unimportance of Identity’, in Identity, H. Harris (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Martin and Barresi 2003. ───, 2007, ‘Is personal identity what matters?’, The Ammonius Foundation, http://www.stafforini.com/txt/parfit_-_is_personal_identity_what_matters.pdf Perry, J., 1972, ‘Can the Self Divide?’ Journal of Philosophy 69: 463–488. ─── (ed.), 1975, Personal Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press. Shoemaker, S., 1963, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ───, 1970, ‘Persons and Their Pasts’, American Philosophical Quarterly 7: 269–285. ───, 1984, ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist`s Account’, in Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell. ───, 1997, ‘Self and Substance’, in Philosophical Perspectives 11, J. Tomberlin (ed.): 283–319. ───, 1999, ‘Self, Body, and Coincidence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 73: 287–306. Unger, P., 1990, Identity, Consciousness, and Value, Oxford University Press. ───, 2000, ‘The Survival of the Sentient’, in Philosophical Perspectives 11, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Malden, MA: Blackwell. Williams, B., 1956–7, ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57, and reprinted in his Problems of the Self, Cambridge University Press, 1973. ───, 1970, ‘The Self and the Future’, Philosophical Review 59, and reprinted in his Problems of the Self , Cambridge University Press, 1973. zh_TW
