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題名 「我」的重要性──論帕菲特人格同一的主張
The Significance of Self--On Parfit`s Personal Identity
作者 陳安琪
貢獻者 林從一
陳安琪
關鍵詞 人格同一性
進一步事實
自我關懷
自我同一
分腦實驗
日期 2012
上傳時間 1-Jul-2013 16:28:28 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文主要是透過帕菲特（Derek Parfit）和莊子頓（Mark Johnston） 的爭論來闡明帕菲特的人格同一理論。除了著重說明帕菲特如何看待「人格同一」這個概念，以及他如何發展其理論外，更特別借重莊子頓對於帕菲特的批評，來對帕菲特的觀點進一步闡述。討論將聚焦於「人格同一是否重要」，我將透過他們對彼此的攻擊和回應來檢視其論證的合理性，並思考如何在符合前理論直覺的前提下，嘗試為帕菲特辯護。
參考文獻 Ayers, M., 1990, Locke, vol. 2, London: Routledge.\r\nBaker, L. R., 2000, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge University Press.\r\nHume, D., 1978, Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press (original work 1739); partly reprinted in Perry 1975.\r\nJohnston, M., 1987, ‘Human Beings’, Journal of Philosophy 84: 59–83.\r\n───, 1989, ‘Fission and the Facts ’, in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory (1989), Ridgeview Publishing Company.\r\n───, 1992, ‘Reasons and Reductionism’, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review.\r\n───, 1997, ‘Human Concerns without Superlative Selves’, in Reading Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell.\r\n───, 2010, Surviving Death, Princeton University Press.\r\nLewis, D., 1976, ‘Survival and Identity’, in The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley: California, and reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. I, Oxford University Press, 1983.\r\nLocke, J., 1975, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press (original work, 2nd ed., first published 1694); partly reprinted in Perry 1975.\r\nMackie, D., 1999, ‘Personal Identity and Dead People’, Philosophical Studies 95: 219–242.\r\nMcDowell, J., 1997, ‘Reductionism and the First Person’, in Reading Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell.\r\nNoonan, H., 2003, Personal Identity, London: Routledge.\r\nOlson, E., 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology, Oxford University Press.\r\n───, 2002(revised 2007, 2008, 2010), ‘Personal Identity’, Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy.\r\nParfit, D., 1971, ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review 80: 3–27, and reprinted in Perry 1975.\r\n───, 1976, ‘Lewis, Perry, and What Matters’, in The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press.\r\n───, 1984, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\r\n───, 1995, ‘The Unimportance of Identity’, in Identity, H. Harris (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Martin and Barresi 2003.\r\n───, 2007, ‘Is personal identity what matters?’, The Ammonius Foundation, http://www.stafforini.com/txt/parfit_-_is_personal_identity_what_matters.pdf\r\nPerry, J., 1972, ‘Can the Self Divide?’ Journal of Philosophy 69: 463–488.\r\n─── (ed.), 1975, Personal Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press.\r\nShoemaker, S., 1963, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.\r\n───, 1970, ‘Persons and Their Pasts’, American Philosophical Quarterly 7: 269–285.\r\n───, 1984, ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist`s Account’, in Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell.\r\n───, 1997, ‘Self and Substance’, in Philosophical Perspectives 11, J. Tomberlin (ed.): 283–319.\r\n───, 1999, ‘Self, Body, and Coincidence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 73: 287–306.\r\nUnger, P., 1990, Identity, Consciousness, and Value, Oxford University Press.\r\n───, 2000, ‘The Survival of the Sentient’, in Philosophical Perspectives 11, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Malden, MA: Blackwell.\r\nWilliams, B., 1956–7, ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57, and reprinted in his Problems of the Self, Cambridge University Press, 1973.\r\n───, 1970, ‘The Self and the Future’, Philosophical Review 59, and reprinted in his Problems of the Self , Cambridge University Press, 1973.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
哲學研究所
96154003
101
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096154003
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 林從一zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳安琪zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 陳安琪zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2012en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2013 16:28:28 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Jul-2013 16:28:28 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2013 16:28:28 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0096154003en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=66289-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 哲學研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 96154003zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 101zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文主要是透過帕菲特（Derek Parfit）和莊子頓（Mark Johnston） 的爭論來闡明帕菲特的人格同一理論。除了著重說明帕菲特如何看待「人格同一」這個概念，以及他如何發展其理論外，更特別借重莊子頓對於帕菲特的批評，來對帕菲特的觀點進一步闡述。討論將聚焦於「人格同一是否重要」，我將透過他們對彼此的攻擊和回應來檢視其論證的合理性，並思考如何在符合前理論直覺的前提下，嘗試為帕菲特辯護。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 導論…………………………………………………………………1\r\n第一章 「人格同一」的兩種理論\r\n1.1 何謂「同一性」及人格同一性問題的哲學重要性…………4\r\n1.2 心理主義的判準………………………………………………6\r\n1.3 動物主義的觀點………………………………………………11\r\n1.4 動物主義對心理主義的回應…………………………………17\r\n第二章 心理主義與帕菲特的分腦實驗\r\n2.1 心理主義對人格同一性問題的看法…………………………24\r\n2.2 帕菲特如何理解人格同一性問題……………………………27\r\n2.3 帕菲特的分腦實驗及其對人格同一性問題的主張…………34\r\n2.4 「是不是同一個人」真的重要嗎？…………………………40\r\n第三章 莊子頓的自我概念與同一性\r\n3.1 莊子頓的「自我」概念………………………………………47\r\n3.2 自我的同一與人格的同一……………………………………53\r\n3.3 人的本質到底是什麼？………………………………………56\r\n結論…………………………………………………………………62\r\n參考書目……………………………………………………………72zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096154003en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 人格同一性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 進一步事實zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 自我關懷zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 自我同一zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 分腦實驗zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 「我」的重要性──論帕菲特人格同一的主張zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Significance of Self--On Parfit`s Personal Identityen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Ayers, M., 1990, Locke, vol. 2, London: Routledge.\r\nBaker, L. R., 2000, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge University Press.\r\nHume, D., 1978, Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press (original work 1739); partly reprinted in Perry 1975.\r\nJohnston, M., 1987, ‘Human Beings’, Journal of Philosophy 84: 59–83.\r\n───, 1989, ‘Fission and the Facts ’, in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory (1989), Ridgeview Publishing Company.\r\n───, 1992, ‘Reasons and Reductionism’, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review.\r\n───, 1997, ‘Human Concerns without Superlative Selves’, in Reading Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell.\r\n───, 2010, Surviving Death, Princeton University Press.\r\nLewis, D., 1976, ‘Survival and Identity’, in The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley: California, and reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. I, Oxford University Press, 1983.\r\nLocke, J., 1975, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press (original work, 2nd ed., first published 1694); partly reprinted in Perry 1975.\r\nMackie, D., 1999, ‘Personal Identity and Dead People’, Philosophical Studies 95: 219–242.\r\nMcDowell, J., 1997, ‘Reductionism and the First Person’, in Reading Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell.\r\nNoonan, H., 2003, Personal Identity, London: Routledge.\r\nOlson, E., 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology, Oxford University Press.\r\n───, 2002(revised 2007, 2008, 2010), ‘Personal Identity’, Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy.\r\nParfit, D., 1971, ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review 80: 3–27, and reprinted in Perry 1975.\r\n───, 1976, ‘Lewis, Perry, and What Matters’, in The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press.\r\n───, 1984, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\r\n───, 1995, ‘The Unimportance of Identity’, in Identity, H. Harris (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Martin and Barresi 2003.\r\n───, 2007, ‘Is personal identity what matters?’, The Ammonius Foundation, http://www.stafforini.com/txt/parfit_-_is_personal_identity_what_matters.pdf\r\nPerry, J., 1972, ‘Can the Self Divide?’ Journal of Philosophy 69: 463–488.\r\n─── (ed.), 1975, Personal Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press.\r\nShoemaker, S., 1963, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.\r\n───, 1970, ‘Persons and Their Pasts’, American Philosophical Quarterly 7: 269–285.\r\n───, 1984, ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist`s Account’, in Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell.\r\n───, 1997, ‘Self and Substance’, in Philosophical Perspectives 11, J. Tomberlin (ed.): 283–319.\r\n───, 1999, ‘Self, Body, and Coincidence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 73: 287–306.\r\nUnger, P., 1990, Identity, Consciousness, and Value, Oxford University Press.\r\n───, 2000, ‘The Survival of the Sentient’, in Philosophical Perspectives 11, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Malden, MA: Blackwell.\r\nWilliams, B., 1956–7, ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57, and reprinted in his Problems of the Self, Cambridge University Press, 1973.\r\n───, 1970, ‘The Self and the Future’, Philosophical Review 59, and reprinted in his Problems of the Self , Cambridge University Press, 1973.zh_TW