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題名 政治連結與併購上市和未上市公司之績效影響－以中國上市為例
Political connection and Public&Private target companies: evidence from China listed companies
作者 何佳諭
貢獻者 吳啟銘
何佳諭
關鍵詞 政治連結
上市和未上市併購績效
日期 2012
上傳時間 11-Jul-2013 16:47:37 (UTC+8)
摘要 過去有許多文獻探討開發中國家的政治連結因素對企業價值的影響，但並無特別著重併購事件的探討；隨著中國大陸經濟市場逐漸走向開放，讓中國大陸併購事件也隨著增加，也因中國政治經濟背景特殊，具有政治連結的企業併購決策常會受到政府的干預，因此本論文利用事件研究法對2000年到2012年中國上市進行國內併購的企業共2067家做實證分析與研究，藉由對累積異常報酬的統計檢定與迴歸分析的結果去觀察政治連結與併購未上市和上市公司對主併公司的併購績效影響，本研究的立論在於存在政治連結的企業進行併購會受到中國政府的介入影響，其目的是達到中國政府本身利益的考量而非股東的利益，而本論文主要結果分為三部分，第一、主併公司和雙方都有政治連結的宣告效果為不顯著，此外在無政治連結企業的宣告效果顯著的大於主併公司和任一方有政治連結企業的宣告效果，不管在併購上市或是未上市公司時的效果都為一樣，也就是併購事件對於有政治連結公司股價並不會產生顯著正向或是負向反應，但是市場投資人在無政治連結公司的併購案中，認為併購績效應優於有政治連結的公司。第二、有政治連結的企業在併購上市的宣告效果與有政治連結的企業併購未上市宣告效果差異不顯著，反映出在有政治連結的企業併購上市或未上市對主併公司的併購績效並無差異。第三、在迴歸模型方面，有政治連結的主併公司係數為顯著為負，且主併方有政治連結併購上市公司係數在部分的事件窗口都顯著為負，但是有政治連結的企業併購未上市和被併方有政治連結的係數上則無顯著，因此得知政治連結會對併購的宣告效果帶來負向影響，尤其在主併公司併購上市公司的情況下，不過在併購未上市公司時政治連結就無明顯的影響，因此最後實證結果也符合本論文提出有政治連結的企業進併購會產生代理人的問題，使得併購績效較差。
參考文獻 Andrade G, Mitchell M, Stafford E. 2001. New evidence and perspectives on mergers, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(2): 103–120.
Anusha, C., Paige, P.O., L. T., 2010. The Value of Control in Emerging Markets, Review of Finance Study,23(4): 1741-1770.
Barth, J., Caprio Jr., G., Levine, R., 1999. Banking systems around the globe: do regulation and ownership affect performance and stability. In: Litan, R.E., Herring, R. (Eds.), Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 2001. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC.
Barney JB. 1988. Returns to bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions: reconsidering the relatedness hypothesis. Strategic Management Journal, Summer Special Issue 9: 71–78.
Beatty, C.A., 1994. Wanted: the Perfect Tiny Acquisition, Business Quarterly, 51-59.
Becchetti L, Trovato G. 2002. The determinants of growth for small and medium sized firms: the role of the availability of external finance. Small Business Economics 19(4): 291–306.
Bunkanwanicha, P., Wiwattanakantang, Y., 2008. Big business owners in politics, Review of Financial Studies, RFS Advance Access.
Campa, J.M. and Kedia, S., 2002. Explaining the Diversification Discount, Journal of Finance,57(4): 1731-1762.
Caprio Jr., G., Peria, S.M., 2000. Avoiding disaster: policies to reduce the risk of banking crises. In: Cardoso, E., Galal, A. (Eds.), Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Regimes: Options for the Middle East. The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, Cairo, Egypt.
Capron, Laurence and Jung-Chin Shen, 2007. Acquisitions of Private vs. Public Firms: Private Information, Target Selection, and Acquirer Returns. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 891-911.
Charumilind, C., Kali, R., Wiwattanakantang, Y., 2006. Connected lending: Thailand before the financial crisis. Journal of Business 79, 181–217.
Cheung, Y.L, Jing, L., Raghavendra, R.P., Stouraitis, A., 2005. Guanxi, political connections, and expropriation: the dark side of State ownership in Chinese listed companies. Working Paper, City University of Hong Kong.
Corhay, A. AND Rad,A. T., 2000. International Acquisitions and Shareholder Wealth Evidence from The Netherlands, International Review of Financial Analysis, 9(2), 163-174.
Elazar Berkovitch and M. P. Narayanan, 1993. Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28(3), 347-362.
Faccio, M., 2004. Politically connected firms, Working paper, Vanderbilt University.
Faccio, M., 2010. Differences between Politically-Connected Firms and Non-Connected Firms: A Cross Country Analysis, Financial Management, 39(3), 905-925.
Fan, J.P.H., Wong, T.J., Zhang, Tianyu, 2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics 84, 330–357.
Fisman, R., 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review 91,1095–1102.
G.Andrew Karolyi and Rose C. Liao,2009. What is Different about Government Controlled Acquirers in Cross-Border Acquisitions?, Institutions and markets series .
Healy, P., K.G. Palepu, and R.S. Ruback,1992. Does Corporate Performance Improve after Mergers?, Journal of Financial Economics,31: 135-175.
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., McMillan, J., Woodruff, C., 2000. Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism. Journal of Political Economy 76, 495-520.
Koeplin J, Sarin A, Shapiro AC. 2000. The private company discount. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 12(4): 94–101.
Kooli M, Kortas M, L’Her JF. 2003. A new examination of the private company discount. Journal of Private Equity 6(3): 48–55.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2002. Government ownership of banks, Journal of Finance57 (1): 256–301.
Mark, L. Mitchell, Kenneth Lehn. 1990. Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets? The Journal of Political Economy 98(2): 372-398.
Markids, C.C., Iltter, C.D.,1994. Shareholder benefits from corporate international diversification: evidence from U.S. international acquisitions. Journal of International Business Studies 25(2):343-366.
McWilliams, A. and Siegel, D. 1999. Issues in the use of event study methodology: a critical analysis of corporate social responsibility studies, Organizational Research Method, 2:340-365.
Milgrom PR. 1987. Auction theory. In Advances　in Economic Theory, Bewley TF (ed). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, U.K.:1–31.
Moeller, S.B., Schlingemann,F.P., Stulz,R.M., 2004. Firm size and the gains from acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics 73: 201-228.
Peterson,P., 1989. Event Studies: A Review of Issues and Methodology. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics 28:36-67.
Richard Roll, 1986. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. Journal of Business, 59(2).
Serdar Dinc, 2005. Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 77: 453–479.
Sapienza, P., 2004. The Effect of Government Ownership on Bank Lending, Journal of Financial Economies, 72(2), 357-384.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, r., 1994. Politicians and firms. Q. J. Econ. 109, 995-1025.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, r., 1998. The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Varaiya, 1985. A Test of Roll’s Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. Working paper. Dallas.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
100357035
101
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1003570351
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 吳啟銘zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 何佳諭zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 何佳諭zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2012en_US
dc.date.accessioned 11-Jul-2013 16:47:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-Jul-2013 16:47:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Jul-2013 16:47:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G1003570351en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/58796-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 100357035zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 101zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 過去有許多文獻探討開發中國家的政治連結因素對企業價值的影響，但並無特別著重併購事件的探討；隨著中國大陸經濟市場逐漸走向開放，讓中國大陸併購事件也隨著增加，也因中國政治經濟背景特殊，具有政治連結的企業併購決策常會受到政府的干預，因此本論文利用事件研究法對2000年到2012年中國上市進行國內併購的企業共2067家做實證分析與研究，藉由對累積異常報酬的統計檢定與迴歸分析的結果去觀察政治連結與併購未上市和上市公司對主併公司的併購績效影響，本研究的立論在於存在政治連結的企業進行併購會受到中國政府的介入影響，其目的是達到中國政府本身利益的考量而非股東的利益，而本論文主要結果分為三部分，第一、主併公司和雙方都有政治連結的宣告效果為不顯著，此外在無政治連結企業的宣告效果顯著的大於主併公司和任一方有政治連結企業的宣告效果，不管在併購上市或是未上市公司時的效果都為一樣，也就是併購事件對於有政治連結公司股價並不會產生顯著正向或是負向反應，但是市場投資人在無政治連結公司的併購案中，認為併購績效應優於有政治連結的公司。第二、有政治連結的企業在併購上市的宣告效果與有政治連結的企業併購未上市宣告效果差異不顯著，反映出在有政治連結的企業併購上市或未上市對主併公司的併購績效並無差異。第三、在迴歸模型方面，有政治連結的主併公司係數為顯著為負，且主併方有政治連結併購上市公司係數在部分的事件窗口都顯著為負，但是有政治連結的企業併購未上市和被併方有政治連結的係數上則無顯著，因此得知政治連結會對併購的宣告效果帶來負向影響，尤其在主併公司併購上市公司的情況下，不過在併購未上市公司時政治連結就無明顯的影響，因此最後實證結果也符合本論文提出有政治連結的企業進併購會產生代理人的問題，使得併購績效較差。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 5
第一節 研究背景及動機 5
第二節 研究方法與架構 6
第三節 研究問題與目的 8
第二章 文獻回顧 9
第一節 政治連結與政府持有的企業對公司價值的影響 9
第二節 具政治連結的公司併購上市與未上市公司之影響 11
第三章 研究設計 15
第一節 樣本資料來源與選取標準 15
第二節 變數定義 18
第三節 事件研究法 25
第四節 假設檢定 26
第五節 複迴歸分析 28
第四章 實證結果 31
第一節 敘述統計 31
第二節 累積異常報酬率檢定 36
第三節 複迴歸模型 44
第五章 結論與建議 59
第一節 研究結論 59
第二節 研究限制 60
第三節 後續研究建議 61
參考文獻 74		zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1003570351en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政治連結zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 上市和未上市併購績效zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 政治連結與併購上市和未上市公司之績效影響－以中國上市為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Political connection and Public&Private target companies: evidence from China listed companiesen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Andrade G, Mitchell M, Stafford E. 2001. New evidence and perspectives on mergers, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(2): 103–120.
Anusha, C., Paige, P.O., L. T., 2010. The Value of Control in Emerging Markets, Review of Finance Study,23(4): 1741-1770.
Barth, J., Caprio Jr., G., Levine, R., 1999. Banking systems around the globe: do regulation and ownership affect performance and stability. In: Litan, R.E., Herring, R. (Eds.), Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 2001. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC.
Barney JB. 1988. Returns to bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions: reconsidering the relatedness hypothesis. Strategic Management Journal, Summer Special Issue 9: 71–78.
Beatty, C.A., 1994. Wanted: the Perfect Tiny Acquisition, Business Quarterly, 51-59.
Becchetti L, Trovato G. 2002. The determinants of growth for small and medium sized firms: the role of the availability of external finance. Small Business Economics 19(4): 291–306.
Bunkanwanicha, P., Wiwattanakantang, Y., 2008. Big business owners in politics, Review of Financial Studies, RFS Advance Access.
Campa, J.M. and Kedia, S., 2002. Explaining the Diversification Discount, Journal of Finance,57(4): 1731-1762.
Caprio Jr., G., Peria, S.M., 2000. Avoiding disaster: policies to reduce the risk of banking crises. In: Cardoso, E., Galal, A. (Eds.), Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Regimes: Options for the Middle East. The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, Cairo, Egypt.
Capron, Laurence and Jung-Chin Shen, 2007. Acquisitions of Private vs. Public Firms: Private Information, Target Selection, and Acquirer Returns. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 891-911.
Charumilind, C., Kali, R., Wiwattanakantang, Y., 2006. Connected lending: Thailand before the financial crisis. Journal of Business 79, 181–217.
Cheung, Y.L, Jing, L., Raghavendra, R.P., Stouraitis, A., 2005. Guanxi, political connections, and expropriation: the dark side of State ownership in Chinese listed companies. Working Paper, City University of Hong Kong.
Corhay, A. AND Rad,A. T., 2000. International Acquisitions and Shareholder Wealth Evidence from The Netherlands, International Review of Financial Analysis, 9(2), 163-174.
Elazar Berkovitch and M. P. Narayanan, 1993. Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28(3), 347-362.
Faccio, M., 2004. Politically connected firms, Working paper, Vanderbilt University.
Faccio, M., 2010. Differences between Politically-Connected Firms and Non-Connected Firms: A Cross Country Analysis, Financial Management, 39(3), 905-925.
Fan, J.P.H., Wong, T.J., Zhang, Tianyu, 2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics 84, 330–357.
Fisman, R., 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review 91,1095–1102.
G.Andrew Karolyi and Rose C. Liao,2009. What is Different about Government Controlled Acquirers in Cross-Border Acquisitions?, Institutions and markets series .
Healy, P., K.G. Palepu, and R.S. Ruback,1992. Does Corporate Performance Improve after Mergers?, Journal of Financial Economics,31: 135-175.
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., McMillan, J., Woodruff, C., 2000. Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism. Journal of Political Economy 76, 495-520.
Koeplin J, Sarin A, Shapiro AC. 2000. The private company discount. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 12(4): 94–101.
Kooli M, Kortas M, L’Her JF. 2003. A new examination of the private company discount. Journal of Private Equity 6(3): 48–55.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2002. Government ownership of banks, Journal of Finance57 (1): 256–301.
Mark, L. Mitchell, Kenneth Lehn. 1990. Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets? The Journal of Political Economy 98(2): 372-398.
Markids, C.C., Iltter, C.D.,1994. Shareholder benefits from corporate international diversification: evidence from U.S. international acquisitions. Journal of International Business Studies 25(2):343-366.
McWilliams, A. and Siegel, D. 1999. Issues in the use of event study methodology: a critical analysis of corporate social responsibility studies, Organizational Research Method, 2:340-365.
Milgrom PR. 1987. Auction theory. In Advances　in Economic Theory, Bewley TF (ed). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, U.K.:1–31.
Moeller, S.B., Schlingemann,F.P., Stulz,R.M., 2004. Firm size and the gains from acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics 73: 201-228.
Peterson,P., 1989. Event Studies: A Review of Issues and Methodology. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics 28:36-67.
Richard Roll, 1986. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. Journal of Business, 59(2).
Serdar Dinc, 2005. Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 77: 453–479.
Sapienza, P., 2004. The Effect of Government Ownership on Bank Lending, Journal of Financial Economies, 72(2), 357-384.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, r., 1994. Politicians and firms. Q. J. Econ. 109, 995-1025.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, r., 1998. The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Varaiya, 1985. A Test of Roll’s Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. Working paper. Dallas.		zh_TW