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題名 法人說明會資訊內涵與資金成本-以高科技產業為對象
The Content of Conference Call and Cost of Capital: Evidence from High-Technology Firms 指導教授：詹凌菁 博士 研 究 生：林珮華 撰 中 華作者 林珮華
Lin, Pei Hua貢獻者 詹凌菁
Chan, Ling Ching
林珮華
Lin, Pei Hua關鍵詞 法人說明會
資金成本
智慧資本
Conference calls
Cost of capital
Intellectual capital日期 2012 上傳時間 22-Jul-2013 10:19:02 (UTC+8) 摘要 法人說明會為企業揭露資訊的管道，不僅提供投資者最新的資訊，更能降低雙方資訊不對稱的情況。而高科技產業較注重其創新活動之發展，其所自願揭露的資訊內涵都較其他產業更為豐富。故本研究以臺灣高科技產業上市（櫃）公司為研究對象，欲探討其在資訊揭露之豐富程度與揭露特定資訊對資金成本造成之影響。研究結果發現當企業揭露越多越完整之資訊給投資人時，將增加投資人之信心並降低權益資金成本，但卻提升其債權資金成本。若僅研究揭露特定資訊的部分，可發現企業揭露其創新策略與人力資本皆有助降低其權益資金成本，且當這些資訊於法人說明會揭露之頻率越高，越有助其降低權益資金成本。然而揭露創新策略與擴廠、融資之資訊將提升其債權資金成本。
Firms often voluntary disclose company-specific information by holding conference calls, which could alleviate information asymmetry between management and investors. High-technology firms focus on innovation activities, and they tend to provide more information than firms in other industry sectors. Using a sample of publicly listed firms in Taiwan, we explore the extent to which the richness of the content and the type of information disclosed affects the cost of capital. We find that when high-technology firms disclose more company-specific information to the public, they enjoy lower costs of equity capital while incur higher costs of debt. Specifically, we find that information related to innovation strategy and human capital is negatively associated with costs of equity capital. This result is more evident if firms disclose such information more frequently in conference calls. However, the disclosures of information on innovation strategy, expansion and financing are positively associated with costs of debt capital.參考文獻 一、中文文獻毛治國，1985，高科技企業及其戰略面與管理面之特性，現代管理月刊，第96期（1月）：64-66。王品文，2003，法人說明會與會計性資訊不對稱關係之研究，國立中正大學會計與資訊科技學系碩士論文。李建然，2000，影響上市公司自願性盈餘預測頻率之研究，會計評論，第32期（4月）：49-79。林淑莉，2004，管理當局盈餘預測態度與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵的關係，當代會計期刊，第5卷第2期（11月）：175-206。林毓亭，2010，管理階層召開法人說明會因素之探究，國立臺灣大學會計學系碩士論文。金成隆、林美鳳與梁嘉紋，2008，公司治理結構和法人說明會之關聯性研究，管理學報，第25卷第2期：221-243。金成隆、紀信義與林裕凱，2005，強制性財務預測與法人說明會之關聯性研究，管理學報，第22卷第5期：629-651。胡嘉杰，2003，臺灣高科技產業新產品上市之整合性行銷溝通─產品、品牌及產業影響因素之探討，國立政治大學國際經營與貿易研究所碩士論文。陳俊逸，2009，法人說明會與自願性盈餘預測對減緩資訊不對稱之探討，私立淡江大學會計學系碩士論文。陳振家，2004，公司特性與法人說明會資訊內涵關聯性之研究，私立元智大學管理學研究學系碩士論文。陳瑞斌，2005，公司治理與權益資金成本之關聯性研究，國立政治大學會計學系博士論文。陳瑞斌、翁慈青、朱全斌，2009，揭露水準對於信用評等與負債資金成本之影響，財務金融學刊，第17卷第2期（6月）：71-110。陳瑞斌與許崇源，2008，資訊揭露水準對於權益資金成本之影響，東吳經濟商學學報，第61期（6月）：67-108。楊朝祥，2007，高科技產業與人才創新－臺灣模式與經驗，國家政策研究報告，第094-017號。楊開煌，1998，中共研究中的內容分析法及其爭議與反省，東亞季刊，第20卷（10月）：2-28。廖秀梅、李建然、賴柏錚，2005，法人說明會之資訊內涵及公平性，中華管理評論國際學報，第8卷第3期：1-18。蔡其諭，2002，揭露程度與負債資金成本之關係，國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文。賴柏錚，2003，不同型態法人說明會資訊內涵之差異及法人說明會之資訊公平性研究，國立台北大學會計學研究學系碩士論文。戴文琦，2007，法人說明會資訊內涵之探討，長庚大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。二、英文文獻Ajinkya, B. and M. J. Gift. 1984. Corporate managers` earnings forecasts and symmetrical adjustments of market expectations. Journal of Accounting Research 22 (2): 425-444.Alves, H., A. M. Rodrigues., and N. Canadas. 2012. Factors influencing the different categories of voluntary disclosure in annual reports: An analysis for Iberian Peninsula listed companies. Review of Applied Management Studies 10: 15-26.Balkin, D. B., G. D. Markman, and L. R. Gomez-Mejia. 2000. Is CEO pay in high-technology firms related to innovation? Academy of Management Journal 43 (6): 1118-1129.Barth, M. E., and R. Kasznik. 1999. Share repurchase and intangible assets. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28: 211-241.Botosan, C. A. 1997. Disclosure Level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review 72 (3): 323-349.Bowen, R., A. Davis., and D. Matsumoto. 2002. Do conference calls affect analysts’ forecasts. The Accounting Review 77 (April): 285-316.Bowers, J. W. 1970. Content analysis In P. Emment and W. Brooks (eds.). Methods of Research in Communication. Boston: Hougton Miffinco Press.Brown, S., S. A. Hillegeist, and K. Lo. 2004. Conference calls and information asymmetry. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37 (3): 343-366.Bushee, J. B., D. A. Matsumoto, and G. S. Miller. 2003. Open versus closed conference calls: The determinants and effects of broadening access to disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 34: 149-180.Bushee, J. B., D. A. Matsumoto, and G. S. Miller, 2004. Managerial and investor responses to disclosure regulation: The case of reg FD and conference calls. The Accounting Review 79 (3): 617-643.Chan, L. C., W. J. Lin, and N. Strong. 2009. Accounting conservatism and the cost of equity capital: UK evidence. Managerial Finance 35 (4): 325-345.Chan, S. H., J. Martin, and J. Kensinger. 1990. Corporate research and development expenditures and share value. Journal of Financial Economics. Volume 26 (2): 255-276Chen, K. C. W., Chen, Z. H., and J. K. C. Wei. 2004. 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Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360.Kasznik, R., and B. Lev. 1995. To warn or not to warn: management disclosures in the face of an earnings surprise. Accounting Review 70 (January): 113-134.Hou, K., M. A. van Dijk, and Y. Zhang. 2012. The implied cost of capital: A new approach. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53 (3): 504-526Kimbrough, M. D. 2005. The effect of conference calls on analyst and market underreaction to earnings announcements. The Accounting Review 80 (1): 189-219.Kimbrough, M. D. 2011. Voluntary disclosure to influence investor reaction to merger announcements: an examination of conference calls. The Accounting Review 86 (2): 637-667.King, R., G. Pownall, and G. Waymire. 1990. Expectations adjustment via timely management forecasts: Review, synthesis, and suggestions for future research. Journal of Accounting Literature 9 (1): 113-144.Lev, B., and T. Sougiannis. 1996. 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Expected EPS and EPS growth as determinants of value. Review of Accounting Studies 10: 349-365.Penman, S. H. 1980. An empirical investigation of the voluntary disclosure of corporate corporate earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 18 (January): 132-160.Petersen, C., and T. Plenborg. 2006. Voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry in Denmark. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 15 (2): 127-149.Ruland, W., S. Tung, and N. George. 1990. Factors associated with the disclosure of managers` forecasts. The Accounting Review 65 (July): 710-721.Skinner, D. 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting Research 32 (1): 38-59.Spence, M. 1974. Job market signalling. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87 (3): 355-374.Sengupta, P. 1998. Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. The Accounting Review 73 (4): 459-474Tasker, S. 1998. Technology company conference calls: A small sample study. Journal of Financial Statement Analysis 4 (1): 6-14.Tasker, S. 1998. Bridging the information gap: Quarterly conference calls as a medium for voluntary disclosure. Review of Accounting Studies 3 (1-2): 137-167. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
100353003
101資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100353003 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 詹凌菁 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Chan, Ling Ching en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林珮華 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lin, Pei Hua en_US dc.creator (作者) 林珮華 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Lin, Pei Hua en_US dc.date (日期) 2012 en_US dc.date.accessioned 22-Jul-2013 10:19:02 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 22-Jul-2013 10:19:02 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 22-Jul-2013 10:19:02 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0100353003 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/58917 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 100353003 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 101 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 法人說明會為企業揭露資訊的管道，不僅提供投資者最新的資訊，更能降低雙方資訊不對稱的情況。而高科技產業較注重其創新活動之發展，其所自願揭露的資訊內涵都較其他產業更為豐富。故本研究以臺灣高科技產業上市（櫃）公司為研究對象，欲探討其在資訊揭露之豐富程度與揭露特定資訊對資金成本造成之影響。研究結果發現當企業揭露越多越完整之資訊給投資人時，將增加投資人之信心並降低權益資金成本，但卻提升其債權資金成本。若僅研究揭露特定資訊的部分，可發現企業揭露其創新策略與人力資本皆有助降低其權益資金成本，且當這些資訊於法人說明會揭露之頻率越高，越有助其降低權益資金成本。然而揭露創新策略與擴廠、融資之資訊將提升其債權資金成本。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Firms often voluntary disclose company-specific information by holding conference calls, which could alleviate information asymmetry between management and investors. High-technology firms focus on innovation activities, and they tend to provide more information than firms in other industry sectors. Using a sample of publicly listed firms in Taiwan, we explore the extent to which the richness of the content and the type of information disclosed affects the cost of capital. We find that when high-technology firms disclose more company-specific information to the public, they enjoy lower costs of equity capital while incur higher costs of debt. Specifically, we find that information related to innovation strategy and human capital is negatively associated with costs of equity capital. This result is more evident if firms disclose such information more frequently in conference calls. However, the disclosures of information on innovation strategy, expansion and financing are positively associated with costs of debt capital. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 表目錄............................................................. II第一章 緒論......................................................... 1第一節 研究背景................................................. 1第二節 研究動機與目的........................................... 2第二章 文獻探討..................................................... 4第一節 自願性揭露............................................... 4一、自願性揭露四種基本假說.................................. 4二、自願性揭露與資金成本之影響.............................. 7第二節 法人說明會召開之相關因素................................ 11第三節 探討法人說明會資訊內涵.................................. 14第四節 高科技產業與法人說明會之研究............................ 17一、高科技產業的定義與特性................................. 17二、高科技產業與法人說明會資訊內涵之關聯................... 18第三章 研究設計.................................................... 20第一節 研究假說................................................ 20第二節 樣本選取與資料來源...................................... 23第三節 研究變數之設計.......................................... 28一、應變數................................................. 28二、自變數................................................. 29三、其他控制變數........................................... 32第四節 實證模型與研究方法...................................... 33一、實證模型............................................... 33二、研究方法............................................... 35第四章 實證結果與分析.............................................. 36第一節 敘述性統計分析.......................................... 36第二節 相關係數分析............................................ 42第三節 迴歸結果分析............................................ 47第四節 額外測試................................................ 61第五章 研究結論與建議.............................................. 69第一節 研究結論................................................ 69第二節 研究建議與限制.......................................... 71參考文獻........................................................... 72 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1372442 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100353003 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 法人說明會 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資金成本 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 智慧資本 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Conference calls en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Cost of capital en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Intellectual capital en_US dc.title (題名) 法人說明會資訊內涵與資金成本-以高科技產業為對象 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Content of Conference Call and Cost of Capital: Evidence from High-Technology Firms 指導教授：詹凌菁 博士 研 究 生：林珮華 撰 中 華 en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文文獻毛治國，1985，高科技企業及其戰略面與管理面之特性，現代管理月刊，第96期（1月）：64-66。王品文，2003，法人說明會與會計性資訊不對稱關係之研究，國立中正大學會計與資訊科技學系碩士論文。李建然，2000，影響上市公司自願性盈餘預測頻率之研究，會計評論，第32期（4月）：49-79。林淑莉，2004，管理當局盈餘預測態度與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵的關係，當代會計期刊，第5卷第2期（11月）：175-206。林毓亭，2010，管理階層召開法人說明會因素之探究，國立臺灣大學會計學系碩士論文。金成隆、林美鳳與梁嘉紋，2008，公司治理結構和法人說明會之關聯性研究，管理學報，第25卷第2期：221-243。金成隆、紀信義與林裕凱，2005，強制性財務預測與法人說明會之關聯性研究，管理學報，第22卷第5期：629-651。胡嘉杰，2003，臺灣高科技產業新產品上市之整合性行銷溝通─產品、品牌及產業影響因素之探討，國立政治大學國際經營與貿易研究所碩士論文。陳俊逸，2009，法人說明會與自願性盈餘預測對減緩資訊不對稱之探討，私立淡江大學會計學系碩士論文。陳振家，2004，公司特性與法人說明會資訊內涵關聯性之研究，私立元智大學管理學研究學系碩士論文。陳瑞斌，2005，公司治理與權益資金成本之關聯性研究，國立政治大學會計學系博士論文。陳瑞斌、翁慈青、朱全斌，2009，揭露水準對於信用評等與負債資金成本之影響，財務金融學刊，第17卷第2期（6月）：71-110。陳瑞斌與許崇源，2008，資訊揭露水準對於權益資金成本之影響，東吳經濟商學學報，第61期（6月）：67-108。楊朝祥，2007，高科技產業與人才創新－臺灣模式與經驗，國家政策研究報告，第094-017號。楊開煌，1998，中共研究中的內容分析法及其爭議與反省，東亞季刊，第20卷（10月）：2-28。廖秀梅、李建然、賴柏錚，2005，法人說明會之資訊內涵及公平性，中華管理評論國際學報，第8卷第3期：1-18。蔡其諭，2002，揭露程度與負債資金成本之關係，國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文。賴柏錚，2003，不同型態法人說明會資訊內涵之差異及法人說明會之資訊公平性研究，國立台北大學會計學研究學系碩士論文。戴文琦，2007，法人說明會資訊內涵之探討，長庚大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。二、英文文獻Ajinkya, B. and M. 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