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題名 投資性不動產續後衡量模式之選擇與盈餘管理之關聯性研究
The Association between the Choice of the Measurement Subsequent to Initial Recognition of Investment Property and Earnings Management作者 傅文亭 貢獻者 郭弘卿
傅文亭關鍵詞 投資性不動產
盈餘管理
會計選擇
評價人員
Investment property
Earnings management
Accounting choice
Appraiser日期 2012 上傳時間 22-Jul-2013 10:19:48 (UTC+8) 摘要 本研究旨在探討投資性不動產續後衡量模式之選擇與盈餘管理動機之關聯性，並進一步檢視在公允價值模式之下，採用外部評價人員評價投資性不動產，是否較能抑制管理階層藉操縱公允價值評估以從事盈餘管理之行為。實證結果如下：1.管理當局在選擇投資性不動產之續後衡量模式時，會受到政治成本及債務契約等盈餘管理動機之影響。亦即公司規模大者傾向選擇成本模式；負債比率高者傾向選擇公允價值模式。2.由外部評價人員對投資性不動產之公允價值進行評價，確實較能有效抑制管理階層盈餘管理之行為，然而此抑制效果係當管理當局欲提高盈餘時才顯現，欲降低盈餘時則沒有。此外實證結果亦發現不同評價人員型態間，其抑制效果存在差異且具有排序性，分別是獨自外部評價人員之抑制效果最佳，內外部評價人員組合次之，獨自內部評價人員最差。
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between the choice of the measurement subsequent to initial recognition of investment property and earnings management, and further examine that when the firms chose the fair value model to report their investment property, whether using the external appraisers to appraise investment property can inhibit management from manipulating fair value estimations. The empirical results are as follows:1.When firms chose the measurement subsequent to initial recognition of investment property, the choices are affected by earnings management incentives, such as political cost and debt covenant. Firms are more likely to choose the cost model when its size is larger, and are more likely to choose the fair value model when it has a high leverage ratio level.2.The investment property was appraised by external appraisers can indeed inhibit management’s discretionary behaviors, however, it shows only when the firms intend to report larger earnings. In addition, the findings indicate that the different appraiser types have different supervision effects. The supervision effects of the solely external appraisers are the best, the combination of both external and internal appraisers are the second, and the solely internal appraisers are the worst.參考文獻 一、中文部分王蕾、于鵬、楊雙與邱建龍，2008，從2007年年報談投資性房地產公允價值模式的選擇，國際商務財會月刊，8月號：40-42。江美艷與陳怡婷，2006，正視2007年歐盟全面適用IFRS（國際財務報告準則）之影響，勤業眾信通訊，9月號：7-9。李靜，2001，公允價值計量屬性下我國上市公司盈餘管理實證研究，西安科技大學企業管理學系碩士論文。財團法人中華民國會計研究發展基金會，2011，國際會計準則第40號正體中文版(2011年版)。楊世鑒、孫鑫、謝剛，2009，我國公允價值應用中盈餘管理問題研究-基於資本市場動因視角的分析，北華航天工業學院學報，第19卷，第6期：38-40。廖雅芬，2010，我國保險業未來適用IAS 40號公報續後評價方法之選擇及原因之探討，國立政治大學經營管理碩士學程碩士論文。謝國松，2011，我國不動產評價應採成本法模式，會計研究月刊，第309期(8 月)：56-59。鍾玓珍，2010，國際會計準則－不動產相關規範，會計研究月刊，第299期(10月)：66-73。韓冬梅、王敬玲，2008，公允價值與盈餘管理，會計之友，2008卷，第5B期：88 -89。二、英文部分Beidleman, C. R. 1973. Income smoothing: the role of management. The Accounting Review 48(4):653-667.Coase, R. H. 1937. The nature of the firm. Accounting Horizons 4(16):386-405.Collins, D. W., and S. P. Kothari. 1989. An analysis of intertemporal and cross-sectional determinants of earnings response coefficients. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11(2-3): 143-181.Davidson, D.C. Stickney, and R. Weil. 1987. Accounting: The Language of Business. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.Dechow, P., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review 70(1):193-225.DeFond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt covenant violation and the manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17(1-2):145-176.Dhaliwal, D.S. 1980. The effect of the firm`s capital structure on the choice of accounting methods. The Accounting Review 55(1):78-84.Dietrich J. R., Harris M. S., and K. A. Muller III. 2001. The reliability of investment property fair value estimates. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30(2):125- 158.Hagerman, R. L., and M. E. Zmijewski. 1979. Some economic determinants of accounting policy choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 1(2):141-161.Healy, P. M. 1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(1-3):85-107.Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13(4):365-383.Hepworth, S. R. 1953. Smoothing periodic income. The Accounting Review 28(1), 32-39.Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4):305-360.Kinney, M., and R. Trezevant. 1997. The use of special items to manage earnings and perceptions. Journal of Financial Statement Analysis 3(1):45-53.McNichols, M. F. 2000. Research design issues in earnings management studies. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 19(4-5):313-345.Miller, M. H., and F. Modigliani. 1961. Dividend policy, growth, and the value of shares. The Journal of Business 34(4):411-433.Muller III, K. A., and E. J. Riedl. 2002. External monitoring of property appraisal estimates and information asymmetry. Journal of Accounting Research 40(3):865-881.Muller III, K. A., E. J. Riedl, and T. Sellhorn. 2008. Causes and consequences of choosing historical cost versus fair value. Harvard Business School.Quagli, A. and Avallone, F. 2010. Fair value or cost model? drivers of choice for IAS 40 in the real estate industry. European Accounting Review 19(3):461-493.Riedl, E. J. 2004. An examination of long-lived asset impairments. The Accounting Review 79(3):823-852.Schipper, K. 1989. Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons 3(4):91-102.Scott, W. R. 1997. Financial Accounting Theory. New York: Prentice-Hall. Skinner, D. J., and R. G. Sloan. 2002. Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies 7(2-3): 289-31.Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1978. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review 53(1):112-134. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
100353031
101資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100353031 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 郭弘卿 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 傅文亭 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 傅文亭 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2012 en_US dc.date.accessioned 22-Jul-2013 10:19:48 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 22-Jul-2013 10:19:48 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 22-Jul-2013 10:19:48 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0100353031 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/58923 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 100353031 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 101 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究旨在探討投資性不動產續後衡量模式之選擇與盈餘管理動機之關聯性，並進一步檢視在公允價值模式之下，採用外部評價人員評價投資性不動產，是否較能抑制管理階層藉操縱公允價值評估以從事盈餘管理之行為。實證結果如下：1.管理當局在選擇投資性不動產之續後衡量模式時，會受到政治成本及債務契約等盈餘管理動機之影響。亦即公司規模大者傾向選擇成本模式；負債比率高者傾向選擇公允價值模式。2.由外部評價人員對投資性不動產之公允價值進行評價，確實較能有效抑制管理階層盈餘管理之行為，然而此抑制效果係當管理當局欲提高盈餘時才顯現，欲降低盈餘時則沒有。此外實證結果亦發現不同評價人員型態間，其抑制效果存在差異且具有排序性，分別是獨自外部評價人員之抑制效果最佳，內外部評價人員組合次之，獨自內部評價人員最差。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between the choice of the measurement subsequent to initial recognition of investment property and earnings management, and further examine that when the firms chose the fair value model to report their investment property, whether using the external appraisers to appraise investment property can inhibit management from manipulating fair value estimations. The empirical results are as follows:1.When firms chose the measurement subsequent to initial recognition of investment property, the choices are affected by earnings management incentives, such as political cost and debt covenant. Firms are more likely to choose the cost model when its size is larger, and are more likely to choose the fair value model when it has a high leverage ratio level.2.The investment property was appraised by external appraisers can indeed inhibit management’s discretionary behaviors, however, it shows only when the firms intend to report larger earnings. In addition, the findings indicate that the different appraiser types have different supervision effects. The supervision effects of the solely external appraisers are the best, the combination of both external and internal appraisers are the second, and the solely internal appraisers are the worst. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 目錄 I圖目錄 II表目錄 III第壹章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機與目的 1第二節 研究問題 5第三節 研究架構 6第貳章 文獻探討 8第一節 IAS 40「投資性不動產」續後衡量模式之簡介 8第二節 盈餘管理的基本架構 13第三節 投資性不動產續後衡量模式之選擇相關文獻 21第四節 不動產公允價值衡量之外部監督相關文獻 24第參章 研究方法 25第一節 研究假說 25第二節 變數衡量與定義 28第三節 實證模型 38第四節 研究期間、樣本選取與資料來源 40第五節 資料分析方法 45第肆章 實證結果與分析 46第一節 續後衡量模式之選擇與盈餘管理動機之關聯性 46第二節 外部評價人員之監督效果 54第伍章 研究結論與建議 62第一節 研究結論 62第二節 研究限制與建議 63參考文獻 65 zh_TW dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100353031 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 投資性不動產 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 盈餘管理 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 會計選擇 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 評價人員 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Investment property en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Earnings management en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Accounting choice en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Appraiser en_US dc.title (題名) 投資性不動產續後衡量模式之選擇與盈餘管理之關聯性研究 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Association between the Choice of the Measurement Subsequent to Initial Recognition of Investment Property and Earnings Management en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文部分王蕾、于鵬、楊雙與邱建龍，2008，從2007年年報談投資性房地產公允價值模式的選擇，國際商務財會月刊，8月號：40-42。江美艷與陳怡婷，2006，正視2007年歐盟全面適用IFRS（國際財務報告準則）之影響，勤業眾信通訊，9月號：7-9。李靜，2001，公允價值計量屬性下我國上市公司盈餘管理實證研究，西安科技大學企業管理學系碩士論文。財團法人中華民國會計研究發展基金會，2011，國際會計準則第40號正體中文版(2011年版)。楊世鑒、孫鑫、謝剛，2009，我國公允價值應用中盈餘管理問題研究-基於資本市場動因視角的分析，北華航天工業學院學報，第19卷，第6期：38-40。廖雅芬，2010，我國保險業未來適用IAS 40號公報續後評價方法之選擇及原因之探討，國立政治大學經營管理碩士學程碩士論文。謝國松，2011，我國不動產評價應採成本法模式，會計研究月刊，第309期(8 月)：56-59。鍾玓珍，2010，國際會計準則－不動產相關規範，會計研究月刊，第299期(10月)：66-73。韓冬梅、王敬玲，2008，公允價值與盈餘管理，會計之友，2008卷，第5B期：88 -89。二、英文部分Beidleman, C. R. 1973. Income smoothing: the role of management. The Accounting Review 48(4):653-667.Coase, R. H. 1937. The nature of the firm. Accounting Horizons 4(16):386-405.Collins, D. W., and S. P. Kothari. 1989. An analysis of intertemporal and cross-sectional determinants of earnings response coefficients. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11(2-3): 143-181.Davidson, D.C. Stickney, and R. Weil. 1987. Accounting: The Language of Business. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.Dechow, P., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review 70(1):193-225.DeFond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt covenant violation and the manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17(1-2):145-176.Dhaliwal, D.S. 1980. The effect of the firm`s capital structure on the choice of accounting methods. The Accounting Review 55(1):78-84.Dietrich J. R., Harris M. S., and K. A. Muller III. 2001. The reliability of investment property fair value estimates. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30(2):125- 158.Hagerman, R. L., and M. E. Zmijewski. 1979. Some economic determinants of accounting policy choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 1(2):141-161.Healy, P. M. 1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(1-3):85-107.Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13(4):365-383.Hepworth, S. R. 1953. Smoothing periodic income. The Accounting Review 28(1), 32-39.Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4):305-360.Kinney, M., and R. Trezevant. 1997. The use of special items to manage earnings and perceptions. Journal of Financial Statement Analysis 3(1):45-53.McNichols, M. F. 2000. Research design issues in earnings management studies. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 19(4-5):313-345.Miller, M. H., and F. Modigliani. 1961. Dividend policy, growth, and the value of shares. The Journal of Business 34(4):411-433.Muller III, K. A., and E. J. Riedl. 2002. External monitoring of property appraisal estimates and information asymmetry. Journal of Accounting Research 40(3):865-881.Muller III, K. A., E. J. Riedl, and T. Sellhorn. 2008. Causes and consequences of choosing historical cost versus fair value. Harvard Business School.Quagli, A. and Avallone, F. 2010. Fair value or cost model? drivers of choice for IAS 40 in the real estate industry. European Accounting Review 19(3):461-493.Riedl, E. J. 2004. An examination of long-lived asset impairments. The Accounting Review 79(3):823-852.Schipper, K. 1989. Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons 3(4):91-102.Scott, W. R. 1997. Financial Accounting Theory. New York: Prentice-Hall. Skinner, D. J., and R. G. Sloan. 2002. Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies 7(2-3): 289-31.Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1978. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review 53(1):112-134. zh_TW
