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題名 Game-Theoretic Analysis of Renouncing Membership of a Party to Announce Candidacy
作者 Wang,Jue-Shyan; Lin, Mei-Yin
貢獻者 政大財政系
關鍵詞 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium;Sequential Equilibrium
日期 2012-09
上傳時間 22-Aug-2013 13:44:09 (UTC+8)
摘要 A game model is established to analyze the interaction in strategy when there is a candidate who renounces membership of a party to run for a position. We use the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss two models in which the candidate without nominations moves first or the decision maker of the other party moves first respectively. The main finding is that the equilibrium strategy of the decision maker of the other party is identical when the opponent runs for a position, regardless of who moving first. However, the probability of the candidate without nomination to run for a position is larger when he moves first.
關聯 Modern Economy, 3(5), 653-657
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/me.2012.35084
dc.contributor 政大財政系-
dc.creator (作者) Wang,Jue-Shyan; Lin, Mei-Yinen_US
dc.date (日期) 2012-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned 22-Aug-2013 13:44:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 22-Aug-2013 13:44:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 22-Aug-2013 13:44:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59077-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) A game model is established to analyze the interaction in strategy when there is a candidate who renounces membership of a party to run for a position. We use the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss two models in which the candidate without nominations moves first or the decision maker of the other party moves first respectively. The main finding is that the equilibrium strategy of the decision maker of the other party is identical when the opponent runs for a position, regardless of who moving first. However, the probability of the candidate without nomination to run for a position is larger when he moves first.en_US
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Modern Economy, 3(5), 653-657en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Bayesian Nash Equilibrium;Sequential Equilibriumen_US
dc.title (題名) Game-Theoretic Analysis of Renouncing Membership of a Party to Announce Candidacyen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.4236/me.2012.35084en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/me.2012.35084en_US