| dc.contributor | 政大財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Wang,Jue-Shyan;Liao,Yen-Chen | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2012-01 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-08-26 | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-08-26 | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 2013-08-26 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59082 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Because of intense international trade, infringement of intellectual property has caught the persistent attentions. This paper analyzes how domestic government decides the optimal enforcement rate through tariff link when the intellectual property is held by a foreign company. We find the domestic government would set the enforcement rate to zero when the foreign market size is small. On the contrary, when the foreign market size is large, the domestic government would raise the enforcement rate to the upper limit. Besides, when the foreign market size is moderate, the enforcement rate would be zero or at the upper limit. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | International Journal of Business and Social Science, 3(1), 173-182 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Intellectual Property;Tariff | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | The Tariff Link between Enforcement Rate and Foreign Market Size | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
