| dc.contributor | 政大財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Ihori,Toshihiro; Yang,C.C. | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2011 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 26-Aug-2013 16:10:58 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 26-Aug-2013 16:10:58 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 26-Aug-2013 16:10:58 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59155 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper considers a political contest model wherein self-interested politicians seek rents from the public budget, while general voters make political efforts to protest against politicians’ rent seeking directly (for example, through voting in referendums such as the passage of Proposition 13) or indirectly (for example, through donating money to organized groups such as the National Taxpayer Union). We show that the political contest may ironically lead to the Laffer paradox; that is, rent-seeking politicians may intend to set the tax rate higher than the revenue-maximizing rate. For taming Leviathans, political protests may not be as effective as competition among governments. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Public Choice, 151, 137-148 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Laffer paradox;Leviathan;Political contest;Revenue-maximizing rate | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Laffer Paradox, Leviathan, and Political Contest | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1007/s11127-010-9737-z | en_US |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9737-z | en_US |
