| dc.contributor | 政大財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Tsai,Tsung-Sheng ; Yang,C. C. | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2010-11 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 26-Aug-2013 16:11:01 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 26-Aug-2013 16:11:01 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 26-Aug-2013 16:11:01 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59156 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This article studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohn`s (American Political Science Review 83 (1989), 1181–206) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information. Of many findings, we show that (i) allowing for delay can be optimal for a proposer; (ii) the revelation of a type depends on two conflicting concerns, the “offer” concern à la Spence`s signaling (the higher the type the better) and the “coalition inclusion” concern in a majority consent (the lower the type the better); and (iii) players take actions to distinguish themselves via delay, but separating equilibria often fail to exist due to incapability or unprofitability of exercising delay. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | International Economic Review, 51(4), 959-979 | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | On Majoritarian Bargaining with Incomplete Information | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00607.x | en_US |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00607.x | en_US |
