| dc.contributor | 政大財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Cheng,Chu-Chuan; Lai,Yu-Bong | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2012-11 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 26-Aug-2013 16:11:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 26-Aug-2013 16:11:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 26-Aug-2013 16:11:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59165 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The conventional wisdom suggests that a stricter enforcement policy can reduce pollution emissions. Nevertheless, this present paper argues that this assertion does not necessarily hold if the stringency of environmental regulation is subject to the influence of lobbying. A stricter enforcement policy increases the polluters’ expected financial burden, and induces them to exert greater political pressure on reducing the stringency of environmental regulation, thereby resulting in a larger amount of pollution emissions. We also show that tightening the enforcement policy can reduce efficiency. We highlight the possibility of policymaking being misguided due to overlooking the political effect of enforcement policy. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Resource and Energy Economics, 34(4), 431-441 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Asymmetric information;Compliance;Enforcement policy;Environmental policy;Interest groups;Lobbying;Political economy | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Does a stricter enforcement policy protect the environment? A political economy perspective | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.04.003 | - |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.04.003 | - |
