| dc.contributor.advisor | 王智賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 林宛萱 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 林宛萱 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2012 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2-Sep-2013 17:22:09 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 2-Sep-2013 17:22:09 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 2-Sep-2013 17:22:09 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0100255016 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59530 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 100255016 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 101 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 在贓物所有權歸屬問題之下，本文承繼 Rose (2010) 的設定，使用賽局模型分析贓物不適用善意取得 (即無條件歸還原持有者) 及適用善意取得的法律規定，並討論我國實際贓物所有權的制度，並比較三種制度下的參賽者的聯合效用大小。透過本研究可發現，原持有者擁有物品所有權的效用相對較高時，社會上應偏向贓物不適用善意取得較有效率；當潛在買方擁有物品所有權的效用相對較高時，社會上應偏向贓物適用善意取得較有效率。而我國現有制度不管在何種情況之下，皆不是最有效率的，故我國對贓物所有權歸屬的法律從效率面而言有重新檢討之必要。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper which continues the study from Rose (2010) focuses on the question whether a buyer of a stolen good should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. We use game model to analyze three different regulations - a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant, a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer, and the real regulation in Taiwan. Finally, in discussing social utility, we compare efficiency among the three regulations, and reach our conclusion that when the potential buyer’s utilities of having the ownership are higher than the owner’s, a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant is the most efficient. On the contrary, when the potential buyer’s utilities of having the ownership are lower than the original owner’s, a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer is the most efficient. Considering efficiency, the regulation in Taiwan is not the best to the society so the government may amend the regulation. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 前言 1第二章 文獻回顧 4第三章 模型設定 7第一節 制度一：物品所有權屬於原有者 7第二節 制度二：物品所有權屬於善意買方 11第三節 制度三：原有者付出價金才可從善意買方處買回物權 19第四章 制度比較 28第五章 結論 32參考文獻 34附錄一 35圖目錄圖 1：模型1的賽局樹 8圖 2：模型1參賽者2預期效用數線 10圖 3：模型2的賽局樹 12圖 4：模型2參賽者2預期效用數線 15圖 5：模型3的賽局樹 19圖 6：模型3參賽者2預期效用數線 22表目錄表 1：制度一的子賽局完全均衡結果 11表 2a：當 ，制度二的子賽局完全均衡結果 18表 2b：當 ，制度二的子賽局完全均衡結果 18表 3a：當 ，制度三的子賽局完全均衡結果 26表 3b：當 ，制度三的子賽局完全均衡結果 27 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 603840 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100255016 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 贓物 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 善意取得 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 子賽局完全均衡 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Stolen goods | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Good faith | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Subgame perfect equilibrium | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 贓物所有權歸屬之賽局分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | A game theoretic analysis of property rights by theft | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 參考文獻張永健 (2001)，「論『動產所有權善意取得』之若干問題」，《台灣本土法學》，27 期， 105-20。陳榮隆 (2004)，〈盜贓物之善意取得與時效取得〉，《台灣本土法學》，58 期， 146-153。胡馨勻 (2006)，「占有人對盜贓遺失物之民事救濟─以民法第 949 條及第 962 條為中心」，私立東吳大學法律學研究所碩士論文。馬莉 (2011)，「論贓物的善意取得」，中國大陸西北大學法學系碩士論文。Ben-Shahar, O. and Harel, A. (1995), “ Blaming the victim: Optimal incentives for private precautions against crime,” Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 11, 434–455.Cooter, R. and Ulen, T. (2000), Law and economics, Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc..Landes, W. M. and Posner, R. A. (1996), “The economics of legal disputes over the ownership of works of arts and other collectibles,” in V. A. Ginsburgh and P.-M., Menger (Eds.), The economics of arts in selected essays, 177-219, Elsevier.Levmore, S. (1987), “Variety and uniformity in the treatment of the good faith purchaser,” Journal of Legal Studies, 16, 43–65.Rasmusen, E. (2004), “The economics of agency law and contract formation,” American Law and Economics Review, 6, 369–409.Rose, C. (2010), “The transfer of property rights by theft: an economic analysis,” European Journal of Law Economics, 30, 247-266. | zh_TW |
