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題名 行政組際協調之嵌套賽局分析
A nested game analysis of interorganizational coordination in public administration
作者 廖洲棚
Liao, Zhou Peng
貢獻者 吳秀光
Wu, Samuel Shiouh Guang
廖洲棚
Liao, Zhou Peng
關鍵詞 行政組際協調
嵌套賽局
跨域管理
1999市民熱線
理性選擇途徑
賽局理論
Interorganizational coordination
Nested game
Boundary-spanning Management
1999 citizen hotline
rational choice approach
game theory
日期 2010
上傳時間 3-Sep-2013 12:00:57 (UTC+8)
摘要 在當前的治理環境下，公共任務比以往更需要整合政府及各部門組織的行動方能克盡其功。因此，多數的公共管理者應會同意，行政組際協調已成為「治理時代」重要且迫切的議題之一，公共管理者需要擁有全新的能力，從解決民眾問題的角度來回應民眾需求。本文將行政組際協調定義為「藉由兩個或兩個以上行政組織的一致行動，使特定政策或計畫的執行，能達成最少的冗餘、不一致與空隙的執行結果」。在此定義下，本文討論的行政組際協調涉及三個層面：第一個層面為跨行政組織如何產生一致行動的問題；第二個層面為行政組織間的互動關係；第三個層面為跨行政組織執行成果的問題。
本文建構的「行政組際協調嵌套賽局模型」假定官僚制度中的專業分工與獲利轉換機制的制度設計，是造成行政組織分工但不合作的主因。在此前提下，筆者引入「效用損失」的概念，做為發展行政組織行為效用函數的基礎。在行政自主性「效用損失」的概念下，筆者僅保留與行政組織政策或計畫執行最相關的自變項，分別是相依關係、溝通、管轄領域、民意監督、外部課責與內部課責等六種，來解釋行政組織的合作行為以及協調的結果等兩種依變項。由於本文將制度視為對參賽者的限制與機會，在制度陳述概念的輔助下，筆者得以清楚地設定行政組際協調的賽局情境，並將行政責任的思考轉化為外部課責與內部課責等兩種課責參數型態。在此課責制度框架下，筆者建立行政組際協調的空間結構，透過行政組織自主性效用之簡單損失函數以及制度空間模型的運用，成功建立起一個階層管理者、兩個行政組織的行政組際協調嵌套賽局模型。這個模型依據外部課責是否一致，以及內部課責是否存有共識等兩個面向，將行政組際協調賽局情境區分為四種類型，並在分別推演參賽者的行為變化後，提出十項理論命題。為詮釋這些命題在現實環境中的意義，筆者在臺北市政府研考會的同意下，引用該會於2010年10月辦理之1999跨機關陳情案件問卷調查資料，進行次級資料分析。
綜合而言，本文建構的「行政組際協調嵌套賽局模型」，是建立在一個嚴格的假定條件之上的，因此其理論的解釋力與預測能力都僅能限縮在一定的範圍內，特別是一階層管理者、兩行政組織的三人完全訊息賽局。換言之，超出這個範圍之外的行政組際協調現象，就不適合使用本模型進行解釋。本文雖然只使用極精簡的相關研究變項，卻也足以展現一個理論模型應具備的解釋與預測能力。當然，本文的研究僅是一個開端，不論在模型的廣博性以及適用性都還有極大的待改善空間。筆者也鼓勵後繼的學者，能持續地擴展與修改本文提出之理論模型，讓行政組際協調研究領域能朝向更正面的發展。
Under the present governance environment, the government would need more efforts to coordinate different organizations’ actions than before to make sure the public services would be provided successfully. Thus, most public managers would not only agree that the interorganizational coordination has become one of the important and urgent issues in the governance era, but also they need to learn new abilities to response the citizens’ needs. The author defined the concept of interorganizational coordination as “The end-state of a public policy or program which is implemented by two or more organizations in a consistent way is characterized by minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae.” Under this definition, the author discussed three different questions of interorganization coordination in public administration. The first question is How can we formulate a set of consistent actions for implementing a public policy or program? The second question is “How can we explain the interactive relationship between the organizations in public administration?” The third question is “What kind of results would be produced by multi-organizational implementation?”
The nested game model of this dissertation has been assumed that the specification and unique side payment system of bureaucracy are the fundamental institution of interorganizational coordination. Under this assumption, the author introduced the concept of simple loss function and structure-induced equilibrium to create an utility function of public organizations and a spatial model for deducing propositions of interorganizational coordination in public administration. In order to verify the propositions of the nested game model of this dissertation, the author did a case study which was including 52 appealed cases of 1999 Citizen Hotline of Taipei City Government and tested the hypothesis derived from the propositions. Finally, the author concluded that there are six independent variables, including interdependency, communication, territory, supervision, outside accountability and inside accountability which can be used to explain two dependent variables, including cooperative behaviors and the result of interorganizational coordination.
The author admitted that the interorganizational coordination is a contingent process and should be carefully defined its game rules before discussing what happened in this process. This dissertation has provided a simplicity model for explaining interorganizational coordination with one hierarchical organization and two horizontal organizations within four different situations. The author hoped that other researchers can modify this simple model to explain more complex situations of interorganizational coordination. Thus, this field could be continually developed in a positive way.
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描述 博士
國立政治大學
公共行政研究所
92256501
99
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0922565011
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 吳秀光zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Wu, Samuel Shiouh Guangen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 廖洲棚zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Liao, Zhou Pengen_US
dc.creator (作者) 廖洲棚zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Liao, Zhou Pengen_US
dc.date (日期) 2010en_US
dc.date.accessioned 3-Sep-2013 12:00:57 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 3-Sep-2013 12:00:57 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 3-Sep-2013 12:00:57 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0922565011en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59686-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 公共行政研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 92256501zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 99zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在當前的治理環境下，公共任務比以往更需要整合政府及各部門組織的行動方能克盡其功。因此，多數的公共管理者應會同意，行政組際協調已成為「治理時代」重要且迫切的議題之一，公共管理者需要擁有全新的能力，從解決民眾問題的角度來回應民眾需求。本文將行政組際協調定義為「藉由兩個或兩個以上行政組織的一致行動，使特定政策或計畫的執行，能達成最少的冗餘、不一致與空隙的執行結果」。在此定義下，本文討論的行政組際協調涉及三個層面：第一個層面為跨行政組織如何產生一致行動的問題；第二個層面為行政組織間的互動關係；第三個層面為跨行政組織執行成果的問題。
本文建構的「行政組際協調嵌套賽局模型」假定官僚制度中的專業分工與獲利轉換機制的制度設計，是造成行政組織分工但不合作的主因。在此前提下，筆者引入「效用損失」的概念，做為發展行政組織行為效用函數的基礎。在行政自主性「效用損失」的概念下，筆者僅保留與行政組織政策或計畫執行最相關的自變項，分別是相依關係、溝通、管轄領域、民意監督、外部課責與內部課責等六種，來解釋行政組織的合作行為以及協調的結果等兩種依變項。由於本文將制度視為對參賽者的限制與機會，在制度陳述概念的輔助下，筆者得以清楚地設定行政組際協調的賽局情境，並將行政責任的思考轉化為外部課責與內部課責等兩種課責參數型態。在此課責制度框架下，筆者建立行政組際協調的空間結構，透過行政組織自主性效用之簡單損失函數以及制度空間模型的運用，成功建立起一個階層管理者、兩個行政組織的行政組際協調嵌套賽局模型。這個模型依據外部課責是否一致，以及內部課責是否存有共識等兩個面向，將行政組際協調賽局情境區分為四種類型，並在分別推演參賽者的行為變化後，提出十項理論命題。為詮釋這些命題在現實環境中的意義，筆者在臺北市政府研考會的同意下，引用該會於2010年10月辦理之1999跨機關陳情案件問卷調查資料，進行次級資料分析。
綜合而言，本文建構的「行政組際協調嵌套賽局模型」，是建立在一個嚴格的假定條件之上的，因此其理論的解釋力與預測能力都僅能限縮在一定的範圍內，特別是一階層管理者、兩行政組織的三人完全訊息賽局。換言之，超出這個範圍之外的行政組際協調現象，就不適合使用本模型進行解釋。本文雖然只使用極精簡的相關研究變項，卻也足以展現一個理論模型應具備的解釋與預測能力。當然，本文的研究僅是一個開端，不論在模型的廣博性以及適用性都還有極大的待改善空間。筆者也鼓勵後繼的學者，能持續地擴展與修改本文提出之理論模型，讓行政組際協調研究領域能朝向更正面的發展。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Under the present governance environment, the government would need more efforts to coordinate different organizations’ actions than before to make sure the public services would be provided successfully. Thus, most public managers would not only agree that the interorganizational coordination has become one of the important and urgent issues in the governance era, but also they need to learn new abilities to response the citizens’ needs. The author defined the concept of interorganizational coordination as “The end-state of a public policy or program which is implemented by two or more organizations in a consistent way is characterized by minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae.” Under this definition, the author discussed three different questions of interorganization coordination in public administration. The first question is How can we formulate a set of consistent actions for implementing a public policy or program? The second question is “How can we explain the interactive relationship between the organizations in public administration?” The third question is “What kind of results would be produced by multi-organizational implementation?”
The nested game model of this dissertation has been assumed that the specification and unique side payment system of bureaucracy are the fundamental institution of interorganizational coordination. Under this assumption, the author introduced the concept of simple loss function and structure-induced equilibrium to create an utility function of public organizations and a spatial model for deducing propositions of interorganizational coordination in public administration. In order to verify the propositions of the nested game model of this dissertation, the author did a case study which was including 52 appealed cases of 1999 Citizen Hotline of Taipei City Government and tested the hypothesis derived from the propositions. Finally, the author concluded that there are six independent variables, including interdependency, communication, territory, supervision, outside accountability and inside accountability which can be used to explain two dependent variables, including cooperative behaviors and the result of interorganizational coordination.
The author admitted that the interorganizational coordination is a contingent process and should be carefully defined its game rules before discussing what happened in this process. This dissertation has provided a simplicity model for explaining interorganizational coordination with one hierarchical organization and two horizontal organizations within four different situations. The author hoped that other researchers can modify this simple model to explain more complex situations of interorganizational coordination. Thus, this field could be continually developed in a positive way.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章　緒論 6
第一節、研究動機與目的 6
第二節、研究問題 12
第三節、研究方法 19
第四節 本文重要名詞解釋 28
第五節 論文章節安排 30
第二章　文獻回顧 31
第一節、行政組際協調問題的挑戰 31
第二節、行政組織研究途徑與組際協調研究 46
第三節、行政組際協調研究成果的審視與檢討 65
第四節、本章小結 86
第三章　行政組際協調的邏輯與限制 91
第一節、行政決策邏輯、制度與協調 92
第二節、行政組織的行為動機與協調 112
第三節、行政組際協調賽局分析 127
第四節 本章小結 145
第四章　個案研究 150
第一節、個案介紹 150
第二節、個案研究設計 159
第三節、研究發現與推論 173
第四節、本章小結 187
第五章 結論 191
第一節、研究的回顧與總結 191
第二節、研究的反思與評論 198
第三節、後續的研究建議 199
附 錄 202
附錄一 行政組際協調賽局符號及定義一覽表 202
附錄二 1999陳情案件處理情形調查問卷 204
附錄三 1999陳情案件處理情形調查樣本一覽表 210
附錄四 臺北市政府各機關處理1999陳情案件法令規定一覽表 214
參考書目 217
一、英文文獻 217
二、中文文獻 225

圖　目　次
圖1-1行政組際協調問題 16
圖2-1 組織環境面向間的關係 53
圖2-2 組際協調關係架構 75
圖2-3 研究系統性組際網絡的概念架構 76
圖2-4 協調的「前提-過程-產出」架構 80
圖3-1 效率性與分配性制度 101
圖3-2 行政組際協調的空間結構 111
圖3-3 行政組際協調賽局情境一 133
圖3-4 行政組際協調情境一的變化（一） 133
圖3-5 行政組際協調情境一的變化（二）之一 134
圖3-6 行政組際協調情境一的變化（二）之二 134
圖3-7 行政組際協調賽局情境二 136
圖3-8 行政組際協調情境二的變化（一） 137
圖3-9 行政組際協調賽局情境三 140
圖3-10 行政組際協調情境三的變化（一） 140
圖3-11 行政組際協調情境三的變化（二） 141
圖3-12 行政組際協調賽局情境四之一 144
圖3-13 行政組際協調賽局情境四之二 144
圖4-1 臺北市1999陳情案件之跨機關協調研究架構 161


表　目　次
表2-1 傳統公共行政、新公共管理與治理的比較 42
表2-2 現代與後現代組織形式 47
表2-3 網絡研究的三種傳統比較表 54
表2-5 階層、市場與網絡模式之比較 73
表2-6 行政組際協調的促進與（妨礙因素） 77
表2-7 權變協調的面向 79
表2-8 行政組際協調機制、構面與相關變項彙整表 83
表3-1 集體行動賽局的報酬矩陣與定義 119
表3-2 集體行動賽局的理論特性 122
表3-3 行政組際協調的賽局情境 127
表4-1 臺北市1999市民熱線各發展階段服務內容比較表 151
表4-2 理論命題與研究假設對照表 166
表4-3 研究變項與操作化定義一覽表 167
表4-4 臺北市1999陳情案件調查個案敘述統計表 174
表4-5 情境一：外部課責與行政組織合作行為交叉表 175
表4-6 情境一：內部課責與行政組織合作行為交叉表 176
表4-7 情境一：內部課責與行政組織合作行為交叉表 176
表4-8 情境一：非零合賽局、內部課責與行政組織合作行為交叉表 178
表4-9 情境一：零合賽局、內部課責與行政組織合作行為交叉表 178
表4-10 情境一：合作行為與協調結果交叉表 180
表4-11 情境一：內部課責較低承諾、合作行為與協調結果交叉表 180
表4-12 情境一：內部課責較高承諾、合作行為與協調結果交叉表 181
表4-13 情境三：內部課責與合作行為交叉表 183
表4-14 情境三：階層監督與合作行為交叉表 184
表4-16 情境三：非零和賽局情境下，低度溝通、內部課責與合作行為交叉表 185
表4-17 情境三：非零和賽局情境下，高度溝通、內部課責與合作行為交叉表 186
表4-18 情境三：零和賽局情境下，低度溝通、內部課責與合作行為交叉表 187
表4-19 情境三：零和賽局情境下，高度溝通、內部課責與合作行為交叉表 187		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1456232 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0922565011en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 行政組際協調zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 嵌套賽局zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 跨域管理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 1999市民熱線zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 理性選擇途徑zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 賽局理論zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Interorganizational coordinationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Nested gameen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Boundary-spanning Managementen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 1999 citizen hotlineen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) rational choice approachen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) game theoryen_US
dc.title (題名) 行政組際協調之嵌套賽局分析zh_TW
dc.title (題名) A nested game analysis of interorganizational coordination in public administrationen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
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