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題名 商品的不可分割性與最適的租稅結構 作者 呂俊慧 貢獻者 翁堃嵐
呂俊慧關鍵詞 不可分割性
工資門檻
最適租稅結構
商品稅
所得稅
混合稅日期 2010 上傳時間 4-Sep-2013 15:11:37 (UTC+8) 摘要 傳統租稅理論忽略了商品的不可分割性對租稅設計造成的影響。有鑑於此，本論文在商品具有不可分割性的情況下，探討各種租稅政策工具 (商品稅制、所得稅制與混合稅制) 下的最適租稅設計問題。第二章在傳統Ramsey (1927) 架構 (代表性消費者) 的經濟體系下，探討引進不可分割財後對最適商品租稅設計的影響，並與傳統Corlett and Hague (1953) 課稅法則、逆彈性法則以及Sandmo (1974) 單一商品稅率的結果作一對照。研究顯示： (1) 給定稅後消費者會購買不可分割財下，最適商品稅的訂定取決於門檻限制式是否產生作用。當門檻未受限時，最適商品稅的課徵將以不可分割財的課稅為優先，而且對該財的課稅將使得以政府稅收衡量的所得淨社會邊際效用水準等於一，進而使傳統可分割財的租稅工具沒有存在的必要；當門檻受限時，最適稅制應使得工資門檻值受限在代表性個人的工資水準上，因而不可分割財的最適課稅將使得以政府稅收衡量的所得淨社會邊際效用水準小於一，進而使傳統可分割財的課稅會對受補償最適門檻的受限產生放寬的效果，存在福利增進的空間，因此傳統可分割財的租稅工具有存在的必要。 (2) 不可分割財的最適課稅優先於Corlett and Hague (1953) 課稅法則的考量，而當門檻受限時，則需額外考量門檻受限與休閒互補性的相對效果；逆彈性法則仍舊成立；而Sandmo (1974) 最適單一商品稅制模型的穩固性值得商榷。第三章在連續多人體系的架構下，探討傳統可分割財及不可分割財之商品稅制與消費多寡、消費與否等決策間的交互作用，並決定出最適的商品租稅結構。此外，進一步探討當不可分割財存在兩種品質時對最適商品租稅結構的影響。研究顯示： (1) 最適商品稅制會受門檻消費者的行為反應效果 (同時涵蓋傳統可分割財消費數量多寡與不可分割財消費與否的反應) 的影響，當門檻消費者的行為反應效果為零時，不可分割財的最適課稅應使消費該財的高能力族群之所得淨社會邊際效用的平均水準等於一；當門檻消費者的行為反應效果為負 (正) 時，不可分割財的最適課稅應使消費該財的高能力族群之所得淨社會邊際效用的平均水準小 (大) 於一。換言之，不可分割財的最適課稅只受門檻消費者的行為反應效果的影響，然而傳統可分割財的最適課稅除了會受門檻消費者的行為反應效果的影響外，還包含傳統稅制對可分割財的消費扭曲效果及所得重分配效果之考量。 (2) 當不可分割財存在兩種品質的差異時，消費者購買高、低品質的不可分割財將分別對應高、低品質的工資門檻，除了高品質不可分割財的最適稅制 (只取決於高品質門檻消費者的行為反應效果) 之外，低品質不可分割財與傳統可分割財的最適稅制均會同時受到低品質門檻消費者與高品質門檻消費者之行為反應效果的影響。第四章係在傳統Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) 線性商品稅與線性所得稅之混合稅制的架構下，探討引進不可分割財後對最適混合性租稅結構的影響，並重新檢驗商品稅存在的價值性。研究顯示： (1) 假若稅後消費者間對不可分割財存在消費差異性，則最適混合性租稅的課稅法則與工資門檻限制式是否產生作用有關。當門檻未受限時，最適稅制的課徵將以定額移轉性支付政策與不可分割財的課稅為優先，而且該兩種租稅工具的最適水準可將所得重分配到極致，使得傳統可分割財的租稅工具沒有存在的必要，因此最適商品稅制不會是單一稅率；當門檻受限時，最適稅制應使得工資門檻值受限在高能力者的工資水準上，因而使得最適線性所得稅及不可分割財的最適課稅無法達到最佳租稅政策的目標，然而此時傳統可分割財的課稅會對受補償最適門檻的受限產生放寬的效果，存在福利增進的空間，使得傳統可分割財的租稅工具有存在的必要，即使如此最適商品稅制不必然是單一稅率。據此可得，Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) 最適單一商品稅率的結論未必成立，換言之，差異性的商品稅有存在的必要；傳統可分割財的最適課稅對該財消費抑制指數之決定均與Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) 所指的所得重分配效果無關。 (2) 假若兩類型消費者稅後均購買不可分割財，且當門檻受限時，最適稅制應使得工資門檻值受限在低能力者的工資水準上，給定最適線性所得稅，傳統可分割財的最適課稅對該財消費抑制指數之決定，除了取決於傳統所得重分配效果外，還受到消費者所得淨社會邊際效用的平均水準與受補償最適門檻的邊界效果之影響，該結果迥異於Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) 只取決於所得重分配的結論。第五章係在傳統線性商品稅與非線性所得稅之混合稅制的架構下，先探討引進不可分割財對純粹最適非線性所得稅結構的影響，然後再重新檢驗商品稅存在的價值。研究顯示： (1) 在最適非線性所得稅制以及稅後消費者間對不可分割財的消費存在差異性的情況下，當工資門檻受限時，將得到高能力者所面對的邊際稅率為負的結果，此一結果有別於傳統理論認為高能力者面對的邊際稅率為零的觀念。 (2) 給定最適非線性所得稅制以及稅後消費者間對不可分割財存在消費差異性的情況下，當工資門檻受限時，對不可分割財進行微量補貼，雖然無法放寬模仿者自我選擇的誘因限制，但卻可透過對高能力門檻限制式的放寬，進一步改善柏拉圖效率，因此商品稅有存在的必要；該結果不僅異於傳統『商品稅無用論』的觀點，亦與傳統上商品稅的價值建立在其能夠放寬模仿者誘因限制的功能之結果截然不同。 參考文獻 參考文獻翁堃嵐與吳家恩 (2011)，「最適差別通路稅之分析」，《經濟研究》，47(1)，1-26。Atkinson, A. 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財政研究所
91255501
99資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0912555011 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 翁堃嵐 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 呂俊慧 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 呂俊慧 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2010 en_US dc.date.accessioned 4-Sep-2013 15:11:37 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 4-Sep-2013 15:11:37 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Sep-2013 15:11:37 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0912555011 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/60071 - dc.description (描述) 博士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 91255501 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 99 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 傳統租稅理論忽略了商品的不可分割性對租稅設計造成的影響。有鑑於此，本論文在商品具有不可分割性的情況下，探討各種租稅政策工具 (商品稅制、所得稅制與混合稅制) 下的最適租稅設計問題。第二章在傳統Ramsey (1927) 架構 (代表性消費者) 的經濟體系下，探討引進不可分割財後對最適商品租稅設計的影響，並與傳統Corlett and Hague (1953) 課稅法則、逆彈性法則以及Sandmo (1974) 單一商品稅率的結果作一對照。研究顯示： (1) 給定稅後消費者會購買不可分割財下，最適商品稅的訂定取決於門檻限制式是否產生作用。當門檻未受限時，最適商品稅的課徵將以不可分割財的課稅為優先，而且對該財的課稅將使得以政府稅收衡量的所得淨社會邊際效用水準等於一，進而使傳統可分割財的租稅工具沒有存在的必要；當門檻受限時，最適稅制應使得工資門檻值受限在代表性個人的工資水準上，因而不可分割財的最適課稅將使得以政府稅收衡量的所得淨社會邊際效用水準小於一，進而使傳統可分割財的課稅會對受補償最適門檻的受限產生放寬的效果，存在福利增進的空間，因此傳統可分割財的租稅工具有存在的必要。 (2) 不可分割財的最適課稅優先於Corlett and Hague (1953) 課稅法則的考量，而當門檻受限時，則需額外考量門檻受限與休閒互補性的相對效果；逆彈性法則仍舊成立；而Sandmo (1974) 最適單一商品稅制模型的穩固性值得商榷。第三章在連續多人體系的架構下，探討傳統可分割財及不可分割財之商品稅制與消費多寡、消費與否等決策間的交互作用，並決定出最適的商品租稅結構。此外，進一步探討當不可分割財存在兩種品質時對最適商品租稅結構的影響。研究顯示： (1) 最適商品稅制會受門檻消費者的行為反應效果 (同時涵蓋傳統可分割財消費數量多寡與不可分割財消費與否的反應) 的影響，當門檻消費者的行為反應效果為零時，不可分割財的最適課稅應使消費該財的高能力族群之所得淨社會邊際效用的平均水準等於一；當門檻消費者的行為反應效果為負 (正) 時，不可分割財的最適課稅應使消費該財的高能力族群之所得淨社會邊際效用的平均水準小 (大) 於一。換言之，不可分割財的最適課稅只受門檻消費者的行為反應效果的影響，然而傳統可分割財的最適課稅除了會受門檻消費者的行為反應效果的影響外，還包含傳統稅制對可分割財的消費扭曲效果及所得重分配效果之考量。 (2) 當不可分割財存在兩種品質的差異時，消費者購買高、低品質的不可分割財將分別對應高、低品質的工資門檻，除了高品質不可分割財的最適稅制 (只取決於高品質門檻消費者的行為反應效果) 之外，低品質不可分割財與傳統可分割財的最適稅制均會同時受到低品質門檻消費者與高品質門檻消費者之行為反應效果的影響。第四章係在傳統Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) 線性商品稅與線性所得稅之混合稅制的架構下，探討引進不可分割財後對最適混合性租稅結構的影響，並重新檢驗商品稅存在的價值性。研究顯示： (1) 假若稅後消費者間對不可分割財存在消費差異性，則最適混合性租稅的課稅法則與工資門檻限制式是否產生作用有關。當門檻未受限時，最適稅制的課徵將以定額移轉性支付政策與不可分割財的課稅為優先，而且該兩種租稅工具的最適水準可將所得重分配到極致，使得傳統可分割財的租稅工具沒有存在的必要，因此最適商品稅制不會是單一稅率；當門檻受限時，最適稅制應使得工資門檻值受限在高能力者的工資水準上，因而使得最適線性所得稅及不可分割財的最適課稅無法達到最佳租稅政策的目標，然而此時傳統可分割財的課稅會對受補償最適門檻的受限產生放寬的效果，存在福利增進的空間，使得傳統可分割財的租稅工具有存在的必要，即使如此最適商品稅制不必然是單一稅率。據此可得，Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) 最適單一商品稅率的結論未必成立，換言之，差異性的商品稅有存在的必要；傳統可分割財的最適課稅對該財消費抑制指數之決定均與Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) 所指的所得重分配效果無關。 (2) 假若兩類型消費者稅後均購買不可分割財，且當門檻受限時，最適稅制應使得工資門檻值受限在低能力者的工資水準上，給定最適線性所得稅，傳統可分割財的最適課稅對該財消費抑制指數之決定，除了取決於傳統所得重分配效果外，還受到消費者所得淨社會邊際效用的平均水準與受補償最適門檻的邊界效果之影響，該結果迥異於Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) 只取決於所得重分配的結論。第五章係在傳統線性商品稅與非線性所得稅之混合稅制的架構下，先探討引進不可分割財對純粹最適非線性所得稅結構的影響，然後再重新檢驗商品稅存在的價值。研究顯示： (1) 在最適非線性所得稅制以及稅後消費者間對不可分割財的消費存在差異性的情況下，當工資門檻受限時，將得到高能力者所面對的邊際稅率為負的結果，此一結果有別於傳統理論認為高能力者面對的邊際稅率為零的觀念。 (2) 給定最適非線性所得稅制以及稅後消費者間對不可分割財存在消費差異性的情況下，當工資門檻受限時，對不可分割財進行微量補貼，雖然無法放寬模仿者自我選擇的誘因限制，但卻可透過對高能力門檻限制式的放寬，進一步改善柏拉圖效率，因此商品稅有存在的必要；該結果不僅異於傳統『商品稅無用論』的觀點，亦與傳統上商品稅的價值建立在其能夠放寬模仿者誘因限制的功能之結果截然不同。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒 論 1 1.1 研究背景 1 1.2 研究目的 6本章附錄1 10第二章 代表性個人經濟體系下的最適商品稅制 12 2.1 基本模型與設定 12 2.2 消費者的決策 14 2.3 政府最適商品稅制 17 2.4 與傳統Ramsey (1927) 架構下的其他相關文獻作一比較 23 2.4.1 Corlett and Hague (1953) 法則 23 2.4.2 逆彈性法則 24 2.4.3 單一稅制 27 2.5 本章結論 28本章數學附錄1 30第三章 連續(異質)個人經濟體系下的最適商品稅制 31 3.1 不可分割財為單一品質的情形 32 3.1.1 模型與設定 32 3.1.2 消費者的決策 33 3.1.3 政府最適商品稅制 33 3.2 不可分割財存在品質差異的情形 41 3.2.1 模型與設定 41 3.2.2 消費者的決策 41 3.2.3 政府最適商品稅制 44 3.3 本章結論 51本章數學附錄1 52第四章 異質個人經濟體系下的最適混合性稅制 (壹) 53 -- 線性商品稅與線性所得稅 4.1模型與設定 54 4.2消費者的決策 55 4.3政府最適混合性稅制 56 4.4準線性偏好的例子 67 4.5本章結論 73本章數學附錄1 76本章數學附錄2 77第五章 異質個人經濟體系下的混合性稅制 (貳) 79 -- 線性商品稅與非線性所得稅 5.1 模型與設定 80 5.2 消費者的決策 81 5.3 政府最適租稅政策 84 5.3.1 不存在商品稅的情況 (純粹最適非線性所得稅制) 87 5.3.2 對不可分割財引進微量商品稅的情況 91 5.4 不可分割財的消費為可觀察的情況 92 5.5 本章結論 93本章數學附錄1 95第六章 結論 96參考文獻 99 zh_TW dc.format.extent 159994 bytes - dc.format.extent 723974 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0912555011 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 不可分割性 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 工資門檻 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 最適租稅結構 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 商品稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 所得稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 混合稅 zh_TW dc.title (題名) 商品的不可分割性與最適的租稅結構 zh_TW dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 參考文獻翁堃嵐與吳家恩 (2011)，「最適差別通路稅之分析」，《經濟研究》，47(1)，1-26。Atkinson, A. 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