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題名 貨幣聯盟中最適的財政政策合作
The optimal coordination of fiscal policy in a monetary union
作者 朱詩閔
Chu, Shih Min
貢獻者 黃俞寧
Hwang, Yu Ning
朱詩閔
Chu, Shih Min
關鍵詞 DSGE
貨幣聯盟
財政合作
DSGE
monetary union
fiscal coordination
日期 2011
上傳時間 5-Sep-2013 14:19:42 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究目的是在動態隨機一般均衡模型中,討論在貨幣聯盟中,一個中央的財政政府面對衝擊時如何反應。我們根據Gali and Monacelli (2008)的架構並加入一個基金機制來模擬會員國間的財政合作。此基金機制設定為有一中央財政政府向各會員國收取固定的基金費用並將此基金費用全部重新分配給各會員國,故基金在每一期都會結清。在這樣的設定下,聯盟的財政合作和個別國家政府面對波動時的反應相同。
The objective of this paper is to investigate how the central fiscal authority copes with shocks in a monetary union with a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We follow the framework of Gali and Monacelli (2008) and set a fund mechanism to simulate one cast of fiscal coordination among member countries. The central fiscal authority raises the constant fund payment from all member countries and redistributes it to member states, so the budget of the transfer is balanced in each period. Under our design of fund mechanism, we find that this cast of fiscal coordination plays the same rule as the government sector.
參考文獻 Bajo-Rubio, O. and C. Díaz-Roldán (2003). Insurance mechanisms against asymmetric shocks in a monetary union a proposal with an application to EMU. Recherches économiques de Louvain, 69, 73-96.\n\nBeetsma, R.M.W.J. and H. Jensen (2005). Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union. Journal of International Economics, 320-352\n\nCalvo, G. (1983). Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(3), 383-398\n\nChatterjee, S. and S.J. Turnovsky (2005). Financing public investment through foreign aid: Consequences for economic growth and welfare. Review of International Economics, 13(1), 20-44\n\nGali, J. and T. Monacelli (2008). Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union. Journal of International Economics, 76(1), 116-32\n\nGali, J. and T. Monacelli (2005). Monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy. Review of Economic Studies 72 (3), 707-734\n\nKirsanova, T., M. Satchi and D. Vines (2004). Monetary union: Fiscal stabilization in the face of asymmetric shocks. CEPR Discussion Paper (4433)\n\nOros, C. (2008). Macroeconomic stabilization in a heterogeneous monetary union: some insights into the effects of fiscal policy coordination". Economics Bulletin, 5(34), 1-12\n\nTraficante, G. (2010). Fiscal issues in a monetary union. Rivista Bancaria-Minerva Bancaria, 66(3), 5-27\n\nValeria, D.B. and D.P. Pompeo (2010). On the coordination of national fiscal policies in a monetary union. Economia Internazionale/International Economics, 63(3), 273-96
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
98258004
100
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098258004
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 黃俞寧zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Hwang, Yu Ningen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 朱詩閔zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chu, Shih Minen_US
dc.creator (作者) 朱詩閔zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chu, Shih Minen_US
dc.date (日期) 2011en_US
dc.date.accessioned 5-Sep-2013 14:19:42 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 5-Sep-2013 14:19:42 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 5-Sep-2013 14:19:42 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0098258004en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=68013-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 98258004zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 100zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究目的是在動態隨機一般均衡模型中,討論在貨幣聯盟中,一個中央的財政政府面對衝擊時如何反應。我們根據Gali and Monacelli (2008)的架構並加入一個基金機制來模擬會員國間的財政合作。此基金機制設定為有一中央財政政府向各會員國收取固定的基金費用並將此基金費用全部重新分配給各會員國,故基金在每一期都會結清。在這樣的設定下,聯盟的財政合作和個別國家政府面對波動時的反應相同。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The objective of this paper is to investigate how the central fiscal authority copes with shocks in a monetary union with a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We follow the framework of Gali and Monacelli (2008) and set a fund mechanism to simulate one cast of fiscal coordination among member countries. The central fiscal authority raises the constant fund payment from all member countries and redistributes it to member states, so the budget of the transfer is balanced in each period. Under our design of fund mechanism, we find that this cast of fiscal coordination plays the same rule as the government sector.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………1\n 1.1. Motivation…………………………………………………………………..1\n 1.2. Literature review……………………………………………………………2\n2. The model………………………………………………………………………...4\n 2.1. Goods market……………………………………………………………….4\n 2.2. Household…………………………………………………………………...6\n 2.3. Firm…………………………………………………………………………9\n 2.3.1. Technology……………………………………………………….9\n 2.3.2. Price setting……………………………………………………10\n 2.4. Government and fiscal coordination………………………………………10\n3. Equilibrium dynamics…………………………………………………………..12\n 3.1. Market clearing condition…………………………………………………12\n 3.2. Inflation dynamics………………………………………………………....14\n4. The social planner’s problem…………………………………………………...15\n5. The policy tradeoffs in the currency union under sticky prices………………...17\n 5.1. Union member’s tradeoffs…………………………………………………18\n 5.2. Union-wide tradeoffs………………………………………………………19\n6. The optimal monetary and fiscal policies in the currency union……………….20\n7. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………23\nReference……………………………………………………………………………..24\nAppendix……………………………………………………………………………..25zh_TW
dc.format.extent 549714 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098258004en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) DSGEzh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 貨幣聯盟zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 財政合作zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) DSGEen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) monetary unionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) fiscal coordinationen_US
dc.title (題名) 貨幣聯盟中最適的財政政策合作zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The optimal coordination of fiscal policy in a monetary unionen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bajo-Rubio, O. and C. Díaz-Roldán (2003). Insurance mechanisms against asymmetric shocks in a monetary union a proposal with an application to EMU. Recherches économiques de Louvain, 69, 73-96.\n\nBeetsma, R.M.W.J. and H. Jensen (2005). Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union. Journal of International Economics, 320-352\n\nCalvo, G. (1983). Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(3), 383-398\n\nChatterjee, S. and S.J. Turnovsky (2005). Financing public investment through foreign aid: Consequences for economic growth and welfare. Review of International Economics, 13(1), 20-44\n\nGali, J. and T. Monacelli (2008). Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union. Journal of International Economics, 76(1), 116-32\n\nGali, J. and T. Monacelli (2005). Monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy. Review of Economic Studies 72 (3), 707-734\n\nKirsanova, T., M. Satchi and D. Vines (2004). Monetary union: Fiscal stabilization in the face of asymmetric shocks. CEPR Discussion Paper (4433)\n\nOros, C. (2008). Macroeconomic stabilization in a heterogeneous monetary union: some insights into the effects of fiscal policy coordination". Economics Bulletin, 5(34), 1-12\n\nTraficante, G. (2010). Fiscal issues in a monetary union. Rivista Bancaria-Minerva Bancaria, 66(3), 5-27\n\nValeria, D.B. and D.P. Pompeo (2010). On the coordination of national fiscal policies in a monetary union. Economia Internazionale/International Economics, 63(3), 273-96zh_TW