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題名 民主會影響經濟成長嗎?追蹤資料分量迴歸的應用
Does democracy affect economic growth? a panel quantile analysis
作者 蕭宇翔
貢獻者 林馨怡
蕭宇翔
關鍵詞 民主
經濟成長
經濟波動
分量迴歸
追蹤資料
日期 2010
上傳時間 5-Sep-2013 14:20:53 (UTC+8)
摘要 本論文以分量迴歸估計方法探討民主與經濟發展的關係,
在政治民主對經濟成長的影響上,使用全世界78國1960-2008年的年資料並以追蹤資料分量迴歸方法進行分析,
實證結果發現民主對經濟成長的影響具非線性的關係,
且在經濟成長率高時呈正U型的影響,而在低經濟成長時兩者呈倒U型關係。此結果顯示在經濟繁榮時民主透過競租行為影響經濟較為嚴重,
反之經濟蕭條時,再分配政策產生的負面效果較為明顯。另一方面,本文以動態追蹤資料分量迴歸分法分析民主政治對經濟波動的影響,
分析全世界82國在1960-2008年的追蹤資料,發現民主在經濟波動越劇烈時,穩定經濟的效果愈強且顯著,
而在經濟穩定時,則為不顯著的正向影響。實證結果支持Rodrik (1999a,2000b)的理論,在經濟波動越劇烈的國家,
民主政治越能透過政治和解來穩定經濟波動。
參考文獻 Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A.(2000).
Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 ,1167--1199.

Acemoglu, D. and Zilibotti, F. (1997).
Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification, and Growth.
Journal of Political Economy, 105, 709--751.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. A.(2001).
The Colonial Origin of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.
American Economic Review, 91 ,1369--1401.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. and Thaicharoen, Y. (2003).
Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 50 ,49--123.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., and Yared, P. (2008).
Income and Democracy.
American Economic Review, 98 ,808--842.

Alesina, A. and Rodrik. D. (1994).
Distributive Politics and Economic Growth.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 ,465--490.

Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S. and Wacziarg, R. (2003).
Fractionalization.
Journal of Economic Growth, 8 ,155--194.

Almeida, H. and Ferreira, D. (2002).
Democracy and the Variablity of Economic Performance.
Economics and Politics, 14, 225--257.

Amemiya, T. (1982).
Two Stage Least Absolute Deviations Estimators.
Econometrica, 50, 689--711.

Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991).
Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations.
Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277--297.

Bardhan, P. (1993).
Symposium on Democracy and Development.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7, 45--49.

Barlevy, G. and Tsiddon, D. (2006).
Earnings Inequality and the Business Cycle.
European Economic Review, 50, 55--89.

Barro, R. J. (1996).
Democracy and Growth.
Journal of Economic Growth, 1, 1--27.

Barro, R. J. (1997).
Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study.
Cambridge,MA: MIT Press.

Barro, R. J. (1999).
Determinants of Democracy.
Journal of Political Economy, 107, 158--184.

Barro, R. J. (2000).
Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries.
Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 5--32.

Barro, R. J. and Lee, J.W. (2010).
A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010.
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.15902. (http://www.barrolee.com/)

Baum, M. A. and Lake, D. A. (2003).
The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital.
American Journal of Political Science, 47, 333--347.

Becker, G. S. and Barro, R. J. (1988).
A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility?
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 1--25.

Bluedorn, J. C. (2001).
Can Democracy Help? Growth and Ethnic Division.
Economics Letters, 70, 121--126.

Blundell, R., and Bond, S. (1998).
Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models.
Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115--143.

Bollen, K. A. (1990).
Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps.
Studies in Comparative International Development, 25, 7--24.

Bremmer, I. (2006).
The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall.
New York: Simon and Schuster.

Chernozhukov, V. and Hansen, C. (2005).
An IV Model of Quantile Treatment Effects.
Econometrica, 73, 245--261.

Chernozhukov, V. and Hansen, C. (2006).
Instrumental Quantile Regression Inference for Structural and Treatment Effect Models.
Journal of Econometrics, 132, 491--525.

Chernozhukov, V. and Hansen, C. (2008).
Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression: A Robust Inference Approach.
Journal of Econometrics, 142, 379--398.

Chua, A. (2002).
World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability.
New York: Doubleday.

Cuberes, D. and Jerzmanowski, M. (2009).
Democracy, Diversification and Growth Reversals.
Economic Journal, 119, 1270--1302.

Doucouliagos, H. and Ulubasoglu, M. A. (2008).
Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis.
American Journal of Political Science, 52, 61--83.

Easterly, W. (2001).
Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49, 687--706.

Easterly, W. and Kraay, A. (2000).
Small States, Small Problems? Income, Growth, and Volatility in Small States.
World Development, 28, 2013--2027.

Easterly, W. and Levine, R. (1997).
Africa`s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1203--1250.

Easterly, W., Islam, R., and Stiglitz, J. (2000).
Explaining Growth Volatility.
World Bank Working Paper, 04/13.

Galvao, A. and Mones-Rojas, G. (2010).
Penalized Quantile Regression for Dynamic Panel Data.
Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference, 140, 3476--3497.

Gastil, R. D. (1991).
The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions?
In Alex Inkeles (ed.), On Measuring Democracy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Giavazzi, F. and Tabellini, G. (2005).
Economic and Political Liberalization.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 1297--1330.

Helliwell, J. F. (1994).
Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth.
British Journal of Political Science, 24, 225--248.

Holtz-Dakin, D., Newey, W. and Rosen, H. (1988).
Estimating Vecter Antorefression With Panel Data.
Econometrica, 56, 1371--1395.

Huntington, S. P. (1993).
The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.

Im, K. S., Pesaram, M. H. and Shin, Y. (2003).
Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panels.
Journal of Econometrics, 115, 53--74.

Kaplan, R. D. (2000).
The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War.
New York: Random House.

Klomp, J. and Haan, J. D. (2009).
Political Institutions and Economic Volatility.
European Journal of Political Economy, 25, 311--326.

Koenker, R. (2004).
Quantile Regression for Longitudinal Data.
Journal of Multivariate Analysis, 91, 74--89.

Koenker, R. and Bassett, G.(1978).
Regression Quantiles.
Econometrica, 46, 33--50.

Koenker, R. and Bassett, G.(1982).
Robust Tests for Heteroscedasticity Based on Regression Quantiles.
Econometrica, 50, 43--61.

Lane, P. R. and Tornell, A. (1996).
Power, Growth, and the Voracity Effect.
Journal of Economic Growth, 1, 213--241.

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Recent Advances in Quantile Regression Models: a Practical Guideline for Empirical Research.
Journal of Econometrics, 108, 1--24.

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A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions.
American Economic Review, 82, 942--963.

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Endogeneity in Panel Data Quantile Regression Models: a Fitted Value Approach.
mimeo, National Chengchi University.

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Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.
American Political Science Review, 53, 69--105.

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Democracy, Volatility, and Economic Development.
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Democracy, Rent Seeking, Public Spending and Growth.
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American Economic Review, 84, 600--621.

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American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2, 88--126.

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National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 13150.

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Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009.
College Park: University of Maryland. (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm)

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Econometrica, 51, 1569--1576.

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Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7, 51--69.

Quinn, D. P. and Woolley, J. T. (2001).
Democracy and National Economic Performance: The Preference for Stability.
American Journal of Political Science, 45, 634--657.

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Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses.
Journal of Economic Growth, 4, 385--412.

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Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 707--738.

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Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them.
Studies in Comparative International Development, 35, 1--33.

Rodrik, D. (2000b).
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American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 90, 140--144.

Rodrik, D. and Wacziarg, R. (2005).
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American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95, 50--55.

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Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 67--88.

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Journal of Political Economy, 96, 652--662.

Tavares, T. and Wacziarg, R. (2001).
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European Economic Review, 45, 1341--1378.

Tornell, A. and Lane, P. R. (1999).
The Voracity Effect.
American Economic Review, 89, 22--46.

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Does Democracy Lower Growth Volatility? A Dynamic Panel Analysis.
Journal of Macroeconomics, 30, 562--574.

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New York: Norton.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
98258025
99
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098258025
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 林馨怡zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 蕭宇翔zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 蕭宇翔zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2010en_US
dc.date.accessioned 5-Sep-2013 14:20:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 5-Sep-2013 14:20:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 5-Sep-2013 14:20:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0098258025en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/60336-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 98258025zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 99zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本論文以分量迴歸估計方法探討民主與經濟發展的關係,
在政治民主對經濟成長的影響上,使用全世界78國1960-2008年的年資料並以追蹤資料分量迴歸方法進行分析,
實證結果發現民主對經濟成長的影響具非線性的關係,
且在經濟成長率高時呈正U型的影響,而在低經濟成長時兩者呈倒U型關係。此結果顯示在經濟繁榮時民主透過競租行為影響經濟較為嚴重,
反之經濟蕭條時,再分配政策產生的負面效果較為明顯。另一方面,本文以動態追蹤資料分量迴歸分法分析民主政治對經濟波動的影響,
分析全世界82國在1960-2008年的追蹤資料,發現民主在經濟波動越劇烈時,穩定經濟的效果愈強且顯著,
而在經濟穩定時,則為不顯著的正向影響。實證結果支持Rodrik (1999a,2000b)的理論,在經濟波動越劇烈的國家,
民主政治越能透過政治和解來穩定經濟波動。
zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 1 緒論 1
2 文獻回顧 4
2.1 民主政治影響經濟成長..............................4
2.2 民主政治影響經濟波動.............................10
3 計量方法 17
3.1 分量迴歸.........................................17
3.2 工具變數分量迴歸.................................18
3.3 追蹤資料分量迴歸的內生應問題.....................20
3.4 動態追蹤分量迴歸.................................24
4 民主政治影響經濟成長實證結果 26
4.1 資料.............................................26
4.1.1 樣本資料與敘述統計量...........................26
4.1.2 民主的衡量.....................................32
4.2 基本結果.........................................32
4.3 加入其他變數.....................................37
4.4 考慮內生性問題...................................42
4.5 OECD國家與非OECD國家.............................47
4.6 撒哈拉沙漠以南國家...............................50
4.7 不同時期.........................................52
5 民主政治影響經濟波動實證結果 57
5.1 資料.............................................57
5.2 基本結果.........................................60
5.3 不同工具變數.....................................64
5.4 加入其他變數.....................................66
5.5 OECD國家與非OECD國家.............................71
5.6 撒哈拉沙漠以南國家...............................74
5.7 不同時期.........................................76
6 結論 81
參考文獻.............................................83
A 民主政治影響經濟成長 國家樣本資料..................87
B 民主政治影響經濟成長 依國家性質區分樣本資料........90
C 民主政治影響經濟成長 資料來源及說明................91
D 民主政治影響經濟波動 國家樣本資料..................93
E 民主政治影響經濟波動 依國家性質區分樣本資料........97
F 民主政治影響經濟波動 資料來源及說明................98
zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1668673 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098258025en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 民主zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經濟成長zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經濟波動zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 分量迴歸zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 追蹤資料zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 民主會影響經濟成長嗎?追蹤資料分量迴歸的應用zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Does democracy affect economic growth? a panel quantile analysisen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A.(2000).
Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 ,1167--1199.

Acemoglu, D. and Zilibotti, F. (1997).
Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification, and Growth.
Journal of Political Economy, 105, 709--751.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. A.(2001).
The Colonial Origin of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.
American Economic Review, 91 ,1369--1401.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. and Thaicharoen, Y. (2003).
Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 50 ,49--123.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., and Yared, P. (2008).
Income and Democracy.
American Economic Review, 98 ,808--842.

Alesina, A. and Rodrik. D. (1994).
Distributive Politics and Economic Growth.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 ,465--490.

Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S. and Wacziarg, R. (2003).
Fractionalization.
Journal of Economic Growth, 8 ,155--194.

Almeida, H. and Ferreira, D. (2002).
Democracy and the Variablity of Economic Performance.
Economics and Politics, 14, 225--257.

Amemiya, T. (1982).
Two Stage Least Absolute Deviations Estimators.
Econometrica, 50, 689--711.

Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991).
Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations.
Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277--297.

Bardhan, P. (1993).
Symposium on Democracy and Development.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7, 45--49.

Barlevy, G. and Tsiddon, D. (2006).
Earnings Inequality and the Business Cycle.
European Economic Review, 50, 55--89.

Barro, R. J. (1996).
Democracy and Growth.
Journal of Economic Growth, 1, 1--27.

Barro, R. J. (1997).
Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study.
Cambridge,MA: MIT Press.

Barro, R. J. (1999).
Determinants of Democracy.
Journal of Political Economy, 107, 158--184.

Barro, R. J. (2000).
Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries.
Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 5--32.

Barro, R. J. and Lee, J.W. (2010).
A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010.
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.15902. (http://www.barrolee.com/)

Baum, M. A. and Lake, D. A. (2003).
The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital.
American Journal of Political Science, 47, 333--347.

Becker, G. S. and Barro, R. J. (1988).
A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility?
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 1--25.

Bluedorn, J. C. (2001).
Can Democracy Help? Growth and Ethnic Division.
Economics Letters, 70, 121--126.

Blundell, R., and Bond, S. (1998).
Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models.
Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115--143.

Bollen, K. A. (1990).
Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps.
Studies in Comparative International Development, 25, 7--24.

Bremmer, I. (2006).
The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall.
New York: Simon and Schuster.

Chernozhukov, V. and Hansen, C. (2005).
An IV Model of Quantile Treatment Effects.
Econometrica, 73, 245--261.

Chernozhukov, V. and Hansen, C. (2006).
Instrumental Quantile Regression Inference for Structural and Treatment Effect Models.
Journal of Econometrics, 132, 491--525.

Chernozhukov, V. and Hansen, C. (2008).
Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression: A Robust Inference Approach.
Journal of Econometrics, 142, 379--398.

Chua, A. (2002).
World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability.
New York: Doubleday.

Cuberes, D. and Jerzmanowski, M. (2009).
Democracy, Diversification and Growth Reversals.
Economic Journal, 119, 1270--1302.

Doucouliagos, H. and Ulubasoglu, M. A. (2008).
Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis.
American Journal of Political Science, 52, 61--83.

Easterly, W. (2001).
Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49, 687--706.

Easterly, W. and Kraay, A. (2000).
Small States, Small Problems? Income, Growth, and Volatility in Small States.
World Development, 28, 2013--2027.

Easterly, W. and Levine, R. (1997).
Africa`s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1203--1250.

Easterly, W., Islam, R., and Stiglitz, J. (2000).
Explaining Growth Volatility.
World Bank Working Paper, 04/13.

Galvao, A. and Mones-Rojas, G. (2010).
Penalized Quantile Regression for Dynamic Panel Data.
Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference, 140, 3476--3497.

Gastil, R. D. (1991).
The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions?
In Alex Inkeles (ed.), On Measuring Democracy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Giavazzi, F. and Tabellini, G. (2005).
Economic and Political Liberalization.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 1297--1330.

Helliwell, J. F. (1994).
Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth.
British Journal of Political Science, 24, 225--248.

Holtz-Dakin, D., Newey, W. and Rosen, H. (1988).
Estimating Vecter Antorefression With Panel Data.
Econometrica, 56, 1371--1395.

Huntington, S. P. (1993).
The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.

Im, K. S., Pesaram, M. H. and Shin, Y. (2003).
Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panels.
Journal of Econometrics, 115, 53--74.

Kaplan, R. D. (2000).
The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War.
New York: Random House.

Klomp, J. and Haan, J. D. (2009).
Political Institutions and Economic Volatility.
European Journal of Political Economy, 25, 311--326.

Koenker, R. (2004).
Quantile Regression for Longitudinal Data.
Journal of Multivariate Analysis, 91, 74--89.

Koenker, R. and Bassett, G.(1978).
Regression Quantiles.
Econometrica, 46, 33--50.

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