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題名 員工分紅費用化與盈餘管理之關聯性
The relationship between employees bonus expense and earnings management作者 林韋妘 貢獻者 梁嘉紋
林韋妘關鍵詞 員工分紅費用化
盈餘管理
裁決性應計項目
代理理論
Employee bonus expense
Earnings Mangement
Discretionary accruals
Agency Theory日期 2009 上傳時間 5-Sep-2013 14:26:32 (UTC+8) 摘要 財務會計準則公報第39 號「股份基礎給付之會計處理準則」於2008 年起正式實施，強制規定公司所發放之員工分紅必須認列為費用而非視為盈餘之分配，如此一來，公司管理階層是否會因此考量其盈餘報導之美觀性，導致減少發放員工分紅，以及員工分紅費用化後，是否仍會造成公司管理階層採行盈餘管理。此外，本研究以員工分紅費用化作為一重大事件，深入研究經理人對其分紅之行為模式是否會因而受到改變並趨向利益掠奪假說，並探討經理人持股與獎酬分紅兩者間之關係是否因公司治理程度不同以及發放對象為經理人與一般員工時是否有所不同。實證結果發現，不論有無排除費用化前一年之影響，員工分紅費用化後公司確實會考量其盈餘之美觀性而傾向減少發放員工紅利，另雖然過去研究指出，於費用化前，資本市場早已認知員工紅利為公司費用，但公司管理階層仍會考慮投資者間仍存在的功能固著現象，針對員工分紅費用化此一事件進行盈餘管理；然而，若以未預期盈餘將樣本公司加以劃分，則在未預期負盈餘之樣本公司中，無法證實其會利用負向之裁決性應計項目進行洗大澡；最後，在分紅費用化之後，經理人持股比例與分紅金額呈正比，顯示經理人在代理問題上從利益收斂趨向利益掠奪公司，並且在公司治理較差的公司中尤為明顯；此外，經理人會同時增加對於經理人與一般員工之分紅金額。
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No.39 has beening implemented since year 2008, and it is a mandatory requirement for the company to recognizedemployee bonus as an expense rather than as a surplus of assignment. Therefore, the management might consider company’s earnings performance and result in payingless employee bonus, as well as adopt the earnings management. In addition, this paper apply the employee bonus expense as a major event to study whether the patterns of managers’ behavior on their dividends will be affected and correspond to entrenchment hypothesis. Also, this paper investigates the relationship between manerger’s ownership and bouns under the different levels of corporate governance as well as different payment objectives (e.g. managers and staff).The empirical results indicate that whether excluding the effect of the previous non-expnsing year or not, the company did consider its earnings performance andtend to pay less employee bonus after expensing employee bonus. Although other studies point out the capital market has already seen employee bonus as an expense, the company will manage earnings due to functional fixation hypothesis. However, it can’t be verified that taking big bath would exist by using negative discretionary accruals. Finally, after expensing employee bonus, managers’ ownership is directlyproportional to the amount of bonus and the companies with poor corporate governance is particularly significant. In addition, managers will also increase their own and staff’s dividend amount as well and it implies the angency problem towards entrenchment hypothesis from convergence of interest hypothesis.參考文獻 中文部份1.工商時報，2006.06.16，員工分紅費用化 友達、台積電淨利降二成居冠。2.王萬成、高祥恒，2002，裁決性應計項目、衍生性金融商品與盈餘平穩化，2002 財務金融學術研討會，台中：國立中興大學財務金融學系主辦。3.何佩錚，2003，公司避險政策與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，交通大學經營管理研究所碩士論文。4.何典諭、蔡文雄，2006，會計及稅制改變對權益型獎酬制度的衝擊：兼論企業之員工激勵工具選擇，會計研究月刊，第251 期：40-64。5.李建然、高惠松，2007，會計師事務所人力資本與審計品質之關聯性研究，人力資源管理學報，第7 卷第3 期：45- 64.6.林嬋娟、洪櫻芬、薛敏正，1997，財務困難公司之盈餘管理實證研究，管理學報，第14 卷第1 期：15-38。7.林嬋娟，2001，高科技產業之盈餘管理行為與資訊內涵研究，行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫成果報告。8.林玲蘭，2006，獨立董事之專業性、獨立性及勤勉度與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，輔仁大學會計學系碩士論文。9.林維衍、陳如慧，2009，員工分紅制度與經營績效，會計與公司治理，第6卷第2 期：31-62。10.范宏書、陳慶隆，2006，強制揭露員工紅利對盈餘影響資訊之政策效果評估，會計評論，第42 期：115-150。11.馬秀如，2003，員工分紅配股既是股東的成本，也是公司的費用，會計研究月刊，第214 期：62-70。12.許崇源，2002，員工分紅會計處理之探討—兼論相關之每股盈餘計算，會計研究月刊，第202 期：59-64。8113.張文瀞、周玲臺、林修葳，2003，內部人持股連續變動公司之盈餘管理行為特性，會計評論，第37 期：53-83。14.張培真，2003，員工分紅入股與公司特質之關係及其對公司績效之影響，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。15.陳靜香，2005，公司經營績效、所有權結構與總經理酬勞間之內生性關係，國立中山大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。16.陳淑華，2008，機構投資人對員工分紅政策之影響，國立中正大學會計與資訊科技研究所碩士論文。17.黃科瑋，2008，員工分紅費用化對於公司價值、經營績效及盈餘管理之影響以台灣企業為例，國立成功大學會計學系碩博士班論文。18.曾玉潔，2000，我國高階主管薪酬決定因素之實証研究，國立中正大學會計學系碩士班論文。19.曾偉倫，2006，企業實施員工認股權制度與公司治理機制之關聯性研究，國立政治大學會計學系碩士班論文。20.葉疏、王瑄，2009，員工分紅配股會計處理之價值攸關性探討，Review of Securities and Futures Markets，第21 期：163-194。21.楊禮全，2009，盈餘管理工具關聯性之研究：以交易目的衍生性金融商品與裁決性應計項目為例，中興大學會計學研究所碩士論文。22.趙志浩，2007，股份基礎給付與盈餘管理之關聯性研究，國立中興大學高階經理人碩士在職專班論文。23.劉嘉雯、王泰昌、方珮璇，2009，員工分紅費用化之市場效應——功能固著假說之檢驗，中華管理評論國際學報，第12(3)期：1-24。24.蔡宛蓉，2007，資產減損與營運績效及股利發放之關聯性，國立台灣大學會計學系碩士班論文。25.賴倩婷，2001，高階管理人薪酬與其持股率、企業績效之關連性研究，國立成功大學企業管理所碩士論文。26.簡依萍，2009，員工分紅費用化對公司績效影響之研究，國立台北大學企業管理學系碩士論文。英文部份1.Aboody, D. 1996. 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國立政治大學
會計研究所
97353025
98資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097353025 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 梁嘉紋 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林韋妘 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 林韋妘 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2009 en_US dc.date.accessioned 5-Sep-2013 14:26:32 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 5-Sep-2013 14:26:32 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 5-Sep-2013 14:26:32 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0097353025 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/60347 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 97353025 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 98 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 財務會計準則公報第39 號「股份基礎給付之會計處理準則」於2008 年起正式實施，強制規定公司所發放之員工分紅必須認列為費用而非視為盈餘之分配，如此一來，公司管理階層是否會因此考量其盈餘報導之美觀性，導致減少發放員工分紅，以及員工分紅費用化後，是否仍會造成公司管理階層採行盈餘管理。此外，本研究以員工分紅費用化作為一重大事件，深入研究經理人對其分紅之行為模式是否會因而受到改變並趨向利益掠奪假說，並探討經理人持股與獎酬分紅兩者間之關係是否因公司治理程度不同以及發放對象為經理人與一般員工時是否有所不同。實證結果發現，不論有無排除費用化前一年之影響，員工分紅費用化後公司確實會考量其盈餘之美觀性而傾向減少發放員工紅利，另雖然過去研究指出，於費用化前，資本市場早已認知員工紅利為公司費用，但公司管理階層仍會考慮投資者間仍存在的功能固著現象，針對員工分紅費用化此一事件進行盈餘管理；然而，若以未預期盈餘將樣本公司加以劃分，則在未預期負盈餘之樣本公司中，無法證實其會利用負向之裁決性應計項目進行洗大澡；最後，在分紅費用化之後，經理人持股比例與分紅金額呈正比，顯示經理人在代理問題上從利益收斂趨向利益掠奪公司，並且在公司治理較差的公司中尤為明顯；此外，經理人會同時增加對於經理人與一般員工之分紅金額。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No.39 has beening implemented since year 2008, and it is a mandatory requirement for the company to recognizedemployee bonus as an expense rather than as a surplus of assignment. Therefore, the management might consider company’s earnings performance and result in payingless employee bonus, as well as adopt the earnings management. In addition, this paper apply the employee bonus expense as a major event to study whether the patterns of managers’ behavior on their dividends will be affected and correspond to entrenchment hypothesis. Also, this paper investigates the relationship between manerger’s ownership and bouns under the different levels of corporate governance as well as different payment objectives (e.g. managers and staff).The empirical results indicate that whether excluding the effect of the previous non-expnsing year or not, the company did consider its earnings performance andtend to pay less employee bonus after expensing employee bonus. Although other studies point out the capital market has already seen employee bonus as an expense, the company will manage earnings due to functional fixation hypothesis. However, it can’t be verified that taking big bath would exist by using negative discretionary accruals. Finally, after expensing employee bonus, managers’ ownership is directlyproportional to the amount of bonus and the companies with poor corporate governance is particularly significant. In addition, managers will also increase their own and staff’s dividend amount as well and it implies the angency problem towards entrenchment hypothesis from convergence of interest hypothesis. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論.................................1第一節 研究動機..............................1第二節 研究目的..............................2第三節 研究架構..............................6第四節 研究問題..............................8第貳章 文獻探討..............................9第一節 員工分紅入股費用化.....................9第二節 員工分紅之效果........................10第三節 員工分紅費用化與盈餘管理...............13第四節 洗大澡理論(The Big Bath Theory)......14第五節 員工獎酬與經理人持股..................16第參章 研究設計.............................18第一節 研究假說.............................18第二節 變數定義與衡量........................21第三節 研究模型.............................33第四節 資料來源與處理........................38第肆章 實證結果.............................41第一節 敘述性統計分析........................41第二節 相關性分析...........................46第三節 單變量檢定...........................50第四節 多元迴歸分析..........................51第五節 額外測試.............................62第伍章 結論與建議...........................76第一節 研究結論.............................76第二節 研究建議.............................79參考文獻...................................80中文部份...................................80英文部份...................................82 zh_TW dc.format.extent 5989942 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097353025 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 員工分紅費用化 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 盈餘管理 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 裁決性應計項目 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 代理理論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Employee bonus expense en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Earnings Mangement en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Discretionary accruals en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Agency Theory en_US dc.title (題名) 員工分紅費用化與盈餘管理之關聯性 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The relationship between employees bonus expense and earnings management en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部份1.工商時報，2006.06.16，員工分紅費用化 友達、台積電淨利降二成居冠。2.王萬成、高祥恒，2002，裁決性應計項目、衍生性金融商品與盈餘平穩化，2002 財務金融學術研討會，台中：國立中興大學財務金融學系主辦。3.何佩錚，2003，公司避險政策與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，交通大學經營管理研究所碩士論文。4.何典諭、蔡文雄，2006，會計及稅制改變對權益型獎酬制度的衝擊：兼論企業之員工激勵工具選擇，會計研究月刊，第251 期：40-64。5.李建然、高惠松，2007，會計師事務所人力資本與審計品質之關聯性研究，人力資源管理學報，第7 卷第3 期：45- 64.6.林嬋娟、洪櫻芬、薛敏正，1997，財務困難公司之盈餘管理實證研究，管理學報，第14 卷第1 期：15-38。7.林嬋娟，2001，高科技產業之盈餘管理行為與資訊內涵研究，行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫成果報告。8.林玲蘭，2006，獨立董事之專業性、獨立性及勤勉度與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，輔仁大學會計學系碩士論文。9.林維衍、陳如慧，2009，員工分紅制度與經營績效，會計與公司治理，第6卷第2 期：31-62。10.范宏書、陳慶隆，2006，強制揭露員工紅利對盈餘影響資訊之政策效果評估，會計評論，第42 期：115-150。11.馬秀如，2003，員工分紅配股既是股東的成本，也是公司的費用，會計研究月刊，第214 期：62-70。12.許崇源，2002，員工分紅會計處理之探討—兼論相關之每股盈餘計算，會計研究月刊，第202 期：59-64。8113.張文瀞、周玲臺、林修葳，2003，內部人持股連續變動公司之盈餘管理行為特性，會計評論，第37 期：53-83。14.張培真，2003，員工分紅入股與公司特質之關係及其對公司績效之影響，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。15.陳靜香，2005，公司經營績效、所有權結構與總經理酬勞間之內生性關係，國立中山大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。16.陳淑華，2008，機構投資人對員工分紅政策之影響，國立中正大學會計與資訊科技研究所碩士論文。17.黃科瑋，2008，員工分紅費用化對於公司價值、經營績效及盈餘管理之影響以台灣企業為例，國立成功大學會計學系碩博士班論文。18.曾玉潔，2000，我國高階主管薪酬決定因素之實証研究，國立中正大學會計學系碩士班論文。19.曾偉倫，2006，企業實施員工認股權制度與公司治理機制之關聯性研究，國立政治大學會計學系碩士班論文。20.葉疏、王瑄，2009，員工分紅配股會計處理之價值攸關性探討，Review of Securities and Futures Markets，第21 期：163-194。21.楊禮全，2009，盈餘管理工具關聯性之研究：以交易目的衍生性金融商品與裁決性應計項目為例，中興大學會計學研究所碩士論文。22.趙志浩，2007，股份基礎給付與盈餘管理之關聯性研究，國立中興大學高階經理人碩士在職專班論文。23.劉嘉雯、王泰昌、方珮璇，2009，員工分紅費用化之市場效應——功能固著假說之檢驗，中華管理評論國際學報，第12(3)期：1-24。24.蔡宛蓉，2007，資產減損與營運績效及股利發放之關聯性，國立台灣大學會計學系碩士班論文。25.賴倩婷，2001，高階管理人薪酬與其持股率、企業績效之關連性研究，國立成功大學企業管理所碩士論文。26.簡依萍，2009，員工分紅費用化對公司績效影響之研究，國立台北大學企業管理學系碩士論文。英文部份1.Aboody, D. 1996. 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