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題名 家族企業與財務分析師盈餘預測
Family Firms and Financial Analysts` Earnings Forecasts作者 楊凱傑 貢獻者 詹凌菁
楊凱傑關鍵詞 家族企業
分析師盈餘預測
控制股東
公司治理
Family firms
Analysts’ earnings forecast
Controlling shareholder
Corporate governance日期 2010 上傳時間 5-Sep-2013 14:28:26 (UTC+8) 摘要 研究顯示，家族企業之數量與經濟影響力在全球企業環境中迅速成長並占有一席之地，成為具競爭力的存在，本研究以我國2001至2008年的上市（櫃）公司為樣本，探討財務分析師針對家族與非家族企業在預測行為上之差異，本研究之迴歸模型以分析師預測誤差、追蹤意願及預測離散程度三種特性分析財務分析師的預測行為，研究顯示相較於非家族企業，分析師對家族企業之預測意願較低，追蹤數量明顯較少，在預測結果上，家族企業會使分析師的預測產生較大的誤差，且各分析師間預測結果的差異程度也較大，本研究藉此結果推論家族企業中控制股東與其他股東代理問題的存在，及家族成員擔任管理者或董事等重要職位導致董事會喪失監督職能，在資訊揭露的數量與品質上表現較差。
Prior research shows that family firms have grown rapidly and played an important role in the global corporate environment. This study examines the relation between family firms and financial analysts’ earnings forecast behaviors in Taiwan from year 2001 to 2008. I use several analysts forecast attributes: forecasts error, number of analysts following, and forecast dispersion. The results indicate that family firms generally have less analysts following, greater analysts’ forecast errors and greater forecast dispersion. These findings support the argument that the existence of conflict between majority and minority shareholders and that family members serving as managers or members of the board may weaken the disclosure of the quantity and quality of firm-specific information.參考文獻 一、 中文部分周行一、陳錦村與陳坤宏，1996，家族企業、聯屬持股與公司價值之研究，中國財務學刊，第4卷第1期（7月）：115-139。金成隆、蘇淑慧與呂倩如，2009，家族公司與盈餘品質關係之研究：所有權、管理權與控制權，臺大管理論叢，第19卷第S2期（9月）：35-70。林宛瑩與許崇源，2008，台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議，交大管理學報，第28卷第1期（6月）：269-312。林明謙，2001，股權結構、董事組成對大股東介入股市行為影響之研究，私立輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。林美鳳、金成隆與林良楓，2009，股權結構、會計保守性與信用評等關係之研究，臺大管理論叢，第20卷第1期（12月）：289-330。林嬋娟與張哲嘉，2009，董監事異常變動、家族企業與企業舞弊之關聯性，會計評論，第48期（1月）：1-33。倉科敏材，2007，家族企業，張同林、楊理亞譯，上海：上海財經大學出版社。 翁淑育，2000，台灣上市公司股權結構、核心代理問題與公司價值之研究，私立輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。馬黛與李永全，2006，台灣家族公司負債融資成本之研究，管理評論，第25卷第3期（7月）：69-91。馬黛與李永全，2008，家族控制對負債融資決策的影響－－以台灣為例，臺大管理論叢，第18卷第2期（6月）：133-170。葉銀華，1999，家族控股集團、核心企業與報酬互動之研究－－台灣與香港證券市場之比較，管理評論，第18卷第2期（5月）：59-86。廖秀梅、李建然與吳祥華，2006，董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究－－兼論台灣家族企業因素的影響，東吳經濟商學學報，第54期（9月）：117-160。二、 英文部分Ali, A., T. 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Journal of Accounting Research 46 (3): 499-536.Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58 (1-2): 81-112.Cubbin, J., and D. Leech. 1983. The effect of shareholding dispersion on the degree of control in British companies: Theory and measurement. The Economic Journal 93 (370): 351-369.DeAngelo, H., and L. DeAngelo. 1985. Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock. Journal of Financial Economics 14 (1): 33-69.DeChow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. Sweeney. 1996. Cause and consequence of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions be the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (1): 1-36.Demsetz, H. 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (2): 375-390.Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. 1985. 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Analysts’ decisions as products of a multi-task environment. Journal of Accounting Research 31 (2): 216-230.Gomez-Mejia, L., M. Nuñez-Nickel, and I. Gutierrez. 2001. The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal 44 (1): 81-95.Gul, F. A., and S. Leung. 2004. Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary corporate disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 23 (5): 351-379.Hansen, R., and A. Sarin. 1998. Are analysts overoptimistic around seasoned equity offerings? Working paper, Santa Clara University.Herrmann, D. R., O. K. Hope, and W. B. Thomas. 2008. International diversification and forecast optimism: The effects of Reg FD. Accounting Horizons 22 (2): 179-197.Holderness, C. G. and D. P. Sheehan. 1988. The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations: An exploratory analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1-2): 317-346.Holderness, C. G., R. Kroszner, and D. P. Sheehan. 1999. Were the good old days that good? 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Founding family ownership and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting Research 44 (3): 619-656.Wiwattanakantang, Y. 1999. An empirical study on the determinants of the capital structure of Thai firms. Pacific Basin Finance Journal 7 (3-4): 371-403.Yeh, Y. H., T. S. Lee, and T. Woidtke. 2001. Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan. International Review of Finance 2 (1-2): 21-48. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
98353039
99資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098353039 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 詹凌菁 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 楊凱傑 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 楊凱傑 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2010 en_US dc.date.accessioned 5-Sep-2013 14:28:26 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 5-Sep-2013 14:28:26 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 5-Sep-2013 14:28:26 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0098353039 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/60357 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 98353039 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 99 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 研究顯示，家族企業之數量與經濟影響力在全球企業環境中迅速成長並占有一席之地，成為具競爭力的存在，本研究以我國2001至2008年的上市（櫃）公司為樣本，探討財務分析師針對家族與非家族企業在預測行為上之差異，本研究之迴歸模型以分析師預測誤差、追蹤意願及預測離散程度三種特性分析財務分析師的預測行為，研究顯示相較於非家族企業，分析師對家族企業之預測意願較低，追蹤數量明顯較少，在預測結果上，家族企業會使分析師的預測產生較大的誤差，且各分析師間預測結果的差異程度也較大，本研究藉此結果推論家族企業中控制股東與其他股東代理問題的存在，及家族成員擔任管理者或董事等重要職位導致董事會喪失監督職能，在資訊揭露的數量與品質上表現較差。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Prior research shows that family firms have grown rapidly and played an important role in the global corporate environment. This study examines the relation between family firms and financial analysts’ earnings forecast behaviors in Taiwan from year 2001 to 2008. I use several analysts forecast attributes: forecasts error, number of analysts following, and forecast dispersion. The results indicate that family firms generally have less analysts following, greater analysts’ forecast errors and greater forecast dispersion. These findings support the argument that the existence of conflict between majority and minority shareholders and that family members serving as managers or members of the board may weaken the disclosure of the quantity and quality of firm-specific information. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究架構與流程 4第二章 文獻探討 6 第一節 家族企業 6 第二節 財務分析師預測行為 16第三章 研究方法 22 第一節 研究假說 22 第二節 研究變數 24 第三節 樣本資料 28 第四節 實證模型 29第四章 研究結果 31 第一節 樣本選擇與敘述統計量 31 第二節 家族企業對財務分析師預測行為之影響 40 一、家族企業與財務分析師盈餘預測誤差 40 二、家族企業與財務分析師追蹤預測 43 三、家族企業與財務分析師間預測離散程度 46 第三節 額外測試 49第五章 結論與研究限制 51 第一節 結論 51 第二節 研究限制與建議 52參考文獻 54 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1685370 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098353039 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 家族企業 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 分析師盈餘預測 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 控制股東 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Family firms en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Analysts’ earnings forecast en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Controlling shareholder en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate governance en_US dc.title (題名) 家族企業與財務分析師盈餘預測 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Family Firms and Financial Analysts` Earnings Forecasts en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、 中文部分周行一、陳錦村與陳坤宏，1996，家族企業、聯屬持股與公司價值之研究，中國財務學刊，第4卷第1期（7月）：115-139。金成隆、蘇淑慧與呂倩如，2009，家族公司與盈餘品質關係之研究：所有權、管理權與控制權，臺大管理論叢，第19卷第S2期（9月）：35-70。林宛瑩與許崇源，2008，台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議，交大管理學報，第28卷第1期（6月）：269-312。林明謙，2001，股權結構、董事組成對大股東介入股市行為影響之研究，私立輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。林美鳳、金成隆與林良楓，2009，股權結構、會計保守性與信用評等關係之研究，臺大管理論叢，第20卷第1期（12月）：289-330。林嬋娟與張哲嘉，2009，董監事異常變動、家族企業與企業舞弊之關聯性，會計評論，第48期（1月）：1-33。倉科敏材，2007，家族企業，張同林、楊理亞譯，上海：上海財經大學出版社。 翁淑育，2000，台灣上市公司股權結構、核心代理問題與公司價值之研究，私立輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。馬黛與李永全，2006，台灣家族公司負債融資成本之研究，管理評論，第25卷第3期（7月）：69-91。馬黛與李永全，2008，家族控制對負債融資決策的影響－－以台灣為例，臺大管理論叢，第18卷第2期（6月）：133-170。葉銀華，1999，家族控股集團、核心企業與報酬互動之研究－－台灣與香港證券市場之比較，管理評論，第18卷第2期（5月）：59-86。廖秀梅、李建然與吳祥華，2006，董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究－－兼論台灣家族企業因素的影響，東吳經濟商學學報，第54期（9月）：117-160。二、 英文部分Ali, A., T. Y. Chen, and S. Radhakrishnan. 2007. Corporate disclosures by family firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics 44 (1-2): 238-286.Anderson, R., and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance 58 (3): 1301-1328.Astrachan, J. H. and M. C. Shanker. 2003. Family businesses’ contribution to the U.S. economy: A closer look. Family Business Review 16 (3): 211-219.Bhushan, R. 1989. Firm characteristics and analyst following. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11 (2-3): 255-274.Bushman, R., J. Piotroski, and A. Smith. 2003. Insider trading restriction and analysts’ incentives to follow firms. Working paper, University of North Carolina and University of Chicago.Byard, D., Y. Li, and J. Weintrop. 2006. Corporate governance and the quality of financial analysts’ information. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 25 (5): 609-625.Chen, S., X. Chen, and Q. Cheng. 2008. Do family firms provide more or less voluntary disclosure? Journal of Accounting Research 46 (3): 499-536.Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58 (1-2): 81-112.Cubbin, J., and D. Leech. 1983. The effect of shareholding dispersion on the degree of control in British companies: Theory and measurement. The Economic Journal 93 (370): 351-369.DeAngelo, H., and L. DeAngelo. 1985. Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock. Journal of Financial Economics 14 (1): 33-69.DeChow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. Sweeney. 1996. Cause and consequence of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions be the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (1): 1-36.Demsetz, H. 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (2): 375-390.Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. 1985. 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