1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. Publications
  3. College of Commerce
  4. Theses
  5. Item

Publications-Theses

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

NCCU Library

Citation Infomation

Related Publications in TAIR

題名 不完全契約下外國供給者的研發行為
Foreign supplier`s R&D activities under incomplete contracts
作者 褚泓毅
Chu, Hong Yi
貢獻者 徐則謙
Hsu, Tse-Chien
褚泓毅
Chu, Hong Yi
關鍵詞 跨國外包
財產權理論
研發行為
Foreign Outsourcing
Property-right Theory
R&D
日期 2010
上傳時間 5-Sep-2013 16:53:35 (UTC+8)
摘要 過去的文獻成功地運用不完全契約，解釋低資本密集的產業偏向採用外包合作而非垂直整合。然而，不完全契約理論卻忽略外包接單廠商自身的研發行為，尤其是在接單競爭被強化時。因此，我們延伸不完全契約模型，發現若接單廠商身處越資本密集的產業，越能從上游廠商奪取利潤，因此有更強的誘因從事研發活動。當接單競爭強化時，我們發現低資本密集的產業較不願意從事研發活動，甚至被市場淘汰，所以可以看到生產活動逐漸高資本密集的廠商或產業集中。另外我們利用計量模型驗證文章中的結論，並得到一致的結果。
Previous study utilizes incomplete contracts theory to explains why industries with lower capital intensity adopt outsourcing policy instead of vertical integration. However, incomplete contracts is silent in explaining foreign supplier`s R&D activities, especially when the competition is intensified. We extend the incomplete-contracting model, and discover that foreign supplier of higher capital intensity producer has a higher profit extracted from final-good producers. Such excess profit gives foreign supplier more incentive to engage in R&D activities. When competition is intensified, we also show that suppliers of less capital intensive producer spend less in R&D or may leave the market; therefore within an industry, factors are reallocated to suppliers of capital-intensive producers or toward suppliers in capital intensive
industries. Econometric evidence we provide supports the prediction of the model.
參考文獻 Acs, Z. J., and D. B. Audretsch (1987): “Innovation, Market Structure, and Firm Size,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(4), pp. 567–574.
Antras, P. (2003): “Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1375–1418.
Antras, P., and E. Helpman (2004): “Global Sourcing,” Journal of Political Economy, 112.
Bound, J., C. Cummins, Z. Griliches, B. H. Hall, and A. B. Jaffe (1982): “Who Does R&D and Who Patents?,” Working Paper 908, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bustos, P. (February 2011): “Trade Liberalization, Exports, and Technology Upgrading: Evidence on the Impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinian Firms,” The American Economic Review, 101, 304–340(37).
Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart (1986): “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” The Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), pp. 691–719.
Liu, M.-C., and S.-H. Chen (2003): “International R&D Deployment and Locational Advantage: A Case Study of Taiwan,” Working Paper 10169, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Piga, C. A., and M. Vivarelli (2004): “Internal and External RD: A Sample Selection Approach” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 66(4), 457–482.
Veugelers, R., and B. Cassiman (1999): “Make and buy in innovation strategies: evidence from Belgian manufacturing firms,” Research Policy, 28(1), 63–80.
Williamson, O. E. (1971): “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations,” The American Economic Review, 61(2), pp. 112–123.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易研究所
98351017
99
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0983510171
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 徐則謙zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Hsu, Tse-Chienen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 褚泓毅zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chu, Hong Yien_US
dc.creator (作者) 褚泓毅zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chu, Hong Yien_US
dc.date (日期) 2010en_US
dc.date.accessioned 5-Sep-2013 16:53:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 5-Sep-2013 16:53:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 5-Sep-2013 16:53:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0983510171en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/60545-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國際經營與貿易研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 98351017zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 99zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 過去的文獻成功地運用不完全契約，解釋低資本密集的產業偏向採用外包合作而非垂直整合。然而，不完全契約理論卻忽略外包接單廠商自身的研發行為，尤其是在接單競爭被強化時。因此，我們延伸不完全契約模型，發現若接單廠商身處越資本密集的產業，越能從上游廠商奪取利潤，因此有更強的誘因從事研發活動。當接單競爭強化時，我們發現低資本密集的產業較不願意從事研發活動，甚至被市場淘汰，所以可以看到生產活動逐漸高資本密集的廠商或產業集中。另外我們利用計量模型驗證文章中的結論，並得到一致的結果。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Previous study utilizes incomplete contracts theory to explains why industries with lower capital intensity adopt outsourcing policy instead of vertical integration. However, incomplete contracts is silent in explaining foreign supplier`s R&D activities, especially when the competition is intensified. We extend the incomplete-contracting model, and discover that foreign supplier of higher capital intensity producer has a higher profit extracted from final-good producers. Such excess profit gives foreign supplier more incentive to engage in R&D activities. When competition is intensified, we also show that suppliers of less capital intensive producer spend less in R&D or may leave the market; therefore within an industry, factors are reallocated to suppliers of capital-intensive producers or toward suppliers in capital intensive
industries. Econometric evidence we provide supports the prediction of the model.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1. Introduction---------------------------1
2. Theoretical Model----------------------5
2.1 Producing in Home Country-------------7
2.2 Outsourcing to Another Country--------7
2.3 R&D Activities-----------------------11
3. Empirical Evidence--------------------17
3.1 Data---------------------------------17
3.2 Result-------------------------------22
4. Conclusion----------------------------25		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 347619 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0983510171en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 跨國外包zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 財產權理論zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 研發行為zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Foreign Outsourcingen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Property-right Theoryen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) R&Den_US
dc.title (題名) 不完全契約下外國供給者的研發行為zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Foreign supplier`s R&D activities under incomplete contractsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Acs, Z. J., and D. B. Audretsch (1987): “Innovation, Market Structure, and Firm Size,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(4), pp. 567–574.
Antras, P. (2003): “Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1375–1418.
Antras, P., and E. Helpman (2004): “Global Sourcing,” Journal of Political Economy, 112.
Bound, J., C. Cummins, Z. Griliches, B. H. Hall, and A. B. Jaffe (1982): “Who Does R&D and Who Patents?,” Working Paper 908, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bustos, P. (February 2011): “Trade Liberalization, Exports, and Technology Upgrading: Evidence on the Impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinian Firms,” The American Economic Review, 101, 304–340(37).
Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart (1986): “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” The Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), pp. 691–719.
Liu, M.-C., and S.-H. Chen (2003): “International R&D Deployment and Locational Advantage: A Case Study of Taiwan,” Working Paper 10169, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Piga, C. A., and M. Vivarelli (2004): “Internal and External RD: A Sample Selection Approach” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 66(4), 457–482.
Veugelers, R., and B. Cassiman (1999): “Make and buy in innovation strategies: evidence from Belgian manufacturing firms,” Research Policy, 28(1), 63–80.
Williamson, O. E. (1971): “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations,” The American Economic Review, 61(2), pp. 112–123.		zh_TW