| dc.contributor | 政大經濟系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Ho,Shirley J. | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2009-08 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 16-Sep-2013 17:26:59 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 16-Sep-2013 17:26:59 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 16-Sep-2013 17:26:59 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/60938 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper studies an R&D outsourcing contract between a firm and a contractor, considering the possibility that in the interim stage, the contractor might sell the innovation to a rival firm. Our result points out that due to the competition in the interim stage, the reward needed to prevent leakage will be pushed up to the extent that a profitable leakage-free contract does not exist. This result will also apply to cases considering revenue-sharing schemes and a disclosure punishment for commercial theft. Then, we demonstrate that in a competitive mechanism where the R&D firm hires two contractors together with a relative performance scheme, the disclosure punishment might help and there exists a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the probability of information leakage is lower and the equilibrium reward is also cheaper than hiring one contractor. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 231189 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | R&D Management, 39(5), 431-443 | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Information Leakage in Innovation Outsourcing | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00574.x | en_US |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00574.x | en_US |
