| dc.contributor | 政大經濟系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Ho,Shirley J.;Sung,Hao-Chang | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2012-10 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 16-Sep-2013 16:06:48 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 16-Sep-2013 16:06:48 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 16-Sep-2013 16:06:48 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/60922 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | We address the informational and strategic impacts of real earnings management (REM) in a two-period oligopoly model with one-sided information. For the strategic impacts of REM, once the demand falls short of expectation, a firm should raise the price instead of cutting it to reach the earnings target. For the informational impacts, to maintain opponents` uncertainty, the privately informed firm could conceal its identity by taking a mixed strategy and setting the first period price to be higher than in the separating equilibrium. Finally, the presence of tunnelling from cross-shareholding firm will enhance the price cut in the second period. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 376606 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Annals of Economics and Finance, 13(2), 363-387 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Real earnings management;Incomplete information;Price manipulation;Cross-shareholding;Tunnelling | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | The informational and Strategic Impacts of Real Earnings Management | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
