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題名 多數決最後通牒賽局中最小勝利聯盟與全體聯盟的實驗研究
其他題名 An Experimental Examination of Minimum Winning Coalition
     and Universal Coalition in Majoritarian Ultimatum Games
作者 徐麗振
Hsu,Li-Chen
貢獻者 國立政治大學財政系
關鍵詞 最小勝利聯盟;全體聯盟;多數決最後通牒賽局;實驗
ultimatum game; market game; minimum winning coalition; status quo
日期 2007
上傳時間 11-Oct-2013 13:50:13 (UTC+8)
摘要 在立法賽局或委員會賽局模型中,有兩個均衡解普遍被討論。一是最早由Riker (1962) 與Buchanan and Tullock (1962) 所提出的最小勝利聯盟,另一是 Weingast (1979) 所提出的全體聯盟。最小勝利聯盟均衡是指,在議會或國會的運作中,若利 益與成本的分配係由多數決決定,只要剛好過半數的成員被包含在聯盟內,則聯盟 內成員的淨利益最大,故勝利聯盟只要包含剛好過半數的成員即可。全體聯盟均衡 則是指當全體成員都被包含在聯盟內時,聯盟內成員的預期報酬才是最大,故聯盟 應包含所有成員。這兩種理論預期皆為實驗研究所檢驗,但結論並不一致。 在本實驗研究中,我們試圖用一簡單的多數決最後通牒賽局檢驗最小勝利聯盟 均衡與全體聯盟均衡。在實驗中我們設計三種不同的隨機配對條件,分別是陌生人 條件,合夥人條件,與合夥人成為陌生人條件,並在每一條件中考量三種不同的status quo allocations。我們的目的在觀察最小勝利聯盟均衡與全體聯盟均衡的出現是否與 隨機配對條件及status quo allocations 有關。
Experiments on three-person ultimatum games are conducted to explore whether the experimental results conform to the theoretical predictions of the market and ultimatum games. Our experimental evidence shows that the market game equilibrium that everyone should choose the lowest status quo does not appear. Furthermore, the ultimatum game equilibrium that the proposer will offer the responder with the lower status quo slightly more than his (her) status quo and retain the rest of money for himself (herself) does not hold, either. We also test the two commonly discussed equilibria in legislative games, namely, the minimum winning coalition and universal coalition, and find that the experimental data conform more to the minimum winning coalition.
關聯 執行期間:9408-9601
資料類型 report
dc.contributor 國立政治大學財政系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 徐麗振zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Hsu,Li-Chen-
dc.date (日期) 2007en_US
dc.date.accessioned 11-Oct-2013 13:50:13 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-Oct-2013 13:50:13 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Oct-2013 13:50:13 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/61299-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在立法賽局或委員會賽局模型中,有兩個均衡解普遍被討論。一是最早由Riker (1962) 與Buchanan and Tullock (1962) 所提出的最小勝利聯盟,另一是 Weingast (1979) 所提出的全體聯盟。最小勝利聯盟均衡是指,在議會或國會的運作中,若利 益與成本的分配係由多數決決定,只要剛好過半數的成員被包含在聯盟內,則聯盟 內成員的淨利益最大,故勝利聯盟只要包含剛好過半數的成員即可。全體聯盟均衡 則是指當全體成員都被包含在聯盟內時,聯盟內成員的預期報酬才是最大,故聯盟 應包含所有成員。這兩種理論預期皆為實驗研究所檢驗,但結論並不一致。 在本實驗研究中,我們試圖用一簡單的多數決最後通牒賽局檢驗最小勝利聯盟 均衡與全體聯盟均衡。在實驗中我們設計三種不同的隨機配對條件,分別是陌生人 條件,合夥人條件,與合夥人成為陌生人條件,並在每一條件中考量三種不同的status quo allocations。我們的目的在觀察最小勝利聯盟均衡與全體聯盟均衡的出現是否與 隨機配對條件及status quo allocations 有關。-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Experiments on three-person ultimatum games are conducted to explore whether the experimental results conform to the theoretical predictions of the market and ultimatum games. Our experimental evidence shows that the market game equilibrium that everyone should choose the lowest status quo does not appear. Furthermore, the ultimatum game equilibrium that the proposer will offer the responder with the lower status quo slightly more than his (her) status quo and retain the rest of money for himself (herself) does not hold, either. We also test the two commonly discussed equilibria in legislative games, namely, the minimum winning coalition and universal coalition, and find that the experimental data conform more to the minimum winning coalition.-
dc.format.extent 132725 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) 執行期間:9408-9601en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 最小勝利聯盟;全體聯盟;多數決最後通牒賽局;實驗en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) ultimatum game; market game; minimum winning coalition; status quo-
dc.title (題名) 多數決最後通牒賽局中最小勝利聯盟與全體聯盟的實驗研究zh_TW
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) An Experimental Examination of Minimum Winning Coalition
     and Universal Coalition in Majoritarian Ultimatum Games
-
dc.type (資料類型) reporten