Tax Auditing as a Public Good Game: An Experimental Study on Punishment and Compliance

Title	Tax Auditing as a Public Good Game: An Experimental Study on Punishment and Compliance
Creator	徐麗振 Hsu, Li-Chen
Contributor	財政系
Date	2013-10
Date Issued	22-Nov-2013 15:17:58 (UTC+8)
Summary	Prior experimental studies on tax evasion generally assume that the budget and the probability of audit are exogenously given, and ignore taxpayers` incentives to detect evasion and their compliance behaviour under such incentives. The experimental evidence of the present paper shows that, on average, subjects are willing to spend 20 to 30% of their tax revenue on auditing. Compliance is also greatly improved if subjects can determine the budget and, hence, the probability of audit. These findings suggest that taking taxpayers` incentives to detect evasion into consideration is important for the design of compliance-improvement audit schemes.
Relation	Pacific Economic Review, 18(4), 475-501
Type	article
DOI	http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12034

dc.contributor	財政系	en_US
dc.creator (作者)	徐麗振	zh_TW
dc.creator (作者)	Hsu, Li-Chen	en_US
dc.date (日期)	2013-10	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	22-Nov-2013 15:17:58 (UTC+8)	-
dc.date.available	22-Nov-2013 15:17:58 (UTC+8)	-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間)	22-Nov-2013 15:17:58 (UTC+8)	-
dc.identifier.uri (URI)	http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/61797	-
dc.description.abstract (摘要)	Prior experimental studies on tax evasion generally assume that the budget and the probability of audit are exogenously given, and ignore taxpayers` incentives to detect evasion and their compliance behaviour under such incentives. The experimental evidence of the present paper shows that, on average, subjects are willing to spend 20 to 30% of their tax revenue on auditing. Compliance is also greatly improved if subjects can determine the budget and, hence, the probability of audit. These findings suggest that taking taxpayers` incentives to detect evasion into consideration is important for the design of compliance-improvement audit schemes.	-
dc.format.extent	441413 bytes	-
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	-
dc.language.iso	en_US	-
dc.relation (關聯)	Pacific Economic Review, 18(4), 475-501	en_US
dc.title (題名)	Tax Auditing as a Public Good Game: An Experimental Study on Punishment and Compliance	en_US
dc.type (資料類型)	article	en
dc.identifier.doi (DOI)	10.1111/1468-0106.12034	en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI)	http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12034	en_US