1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. 學術產出
  3. College of Informatics
  4. Periodical Articles
  5. Item

學術產出-Periodical Articles

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

政大圖書館

Citation Infomation

題名 Stackelberg solution in a vendor-buyer supply chain model with permissible delay in payments.
作者 陳聖智
Chen, Sheng-Chih
貢獻者 新聞系
關鍵詞 Inventory;Finance;Stackelbergequilibrium;Tradecredits
日期 2013.03
上傳時間 6-Dec-2013 14:29:49 (UTC+8)
摘要 In practice, vendors (or sellers) often offer their buyers a fixed credit period to settle the account. The benefits of trade credit are not only to attract new buyers but also to avoid lasting price competition. On the other hand, the policy of granting a permissible delay adds not only an additional cost but also an additional dimension of default risk to vendors. In this paper, we will incorporate the fact that granting a permissible delay has a positive impact on demand but negative impacts on both costs and default risks to establish vendor–buyer supply chain models. Then we will derive the necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain the optimal solution for both the vendor and the buyer under non-cooperative Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, we will use two numerical examples to show that (1) granting a permissible delay may significantly improve profits for both the vendor and the buyer, (2) the sensitivity analysis on the optimal solution with respect to each parameter, and (3) the comparisons between Nash and Stackelberg solutions.
關聯 International Journal of Production Economics, 144(1), 397-404
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.03.008
dc.contributor 新聞系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 陳聖智zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Sheng-Chihen_US
dc.date (日期) 2013.03en_US
dc.date.accessioned 6-Dec-2013 14:29:49 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 6-Dec-2013 14:29:49 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 6-Dec-2013 14:29:49 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/62213-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In practice, vendors (or sellers) often offer their buyers a fixed credit period to settle the account. The benefits of trade credit are not only to attract new buyers but also to avoid lasting price competition. On the other hand, the policy of granting a permissible delay adds not only an additional cost but also an additional dimension of default risk to vendors. In this paper, we will incorporate the fact that granting a permissible delay has a positive impact on demand but negative impacts on both costs and default risks to establish vendor–buyer supply chain models. Then we will derive the necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain the optimal solution for both the vendor and the buyer under non-cooperative Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, we will use two numerical examples to show that (1) granting a permissible delay may significantly improve profits for both the vendor and the buyer, (2) the sensitivity analysis on the optimal solution with respect to each parameter, and (3) the comparisons between Nash and Stackelberg solutions.en_US
dc.format.extent 276707 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) International Journal of Production Economics, 144(1), 397-404en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Inventory;Finance;Stackelbergequilibrium;Tradecreditsen_US
dc.title (題名) Stackelberg solution in a vendor-buyer supply chain model with permissible delay in payments.en_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.03.008en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.03.008en_US