| dc.contributor | 財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 王智賢 ; 林葦杭 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Wang, Jue-Shyan;Lin, Wei-Hang | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2013.07 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 9-Dec-2013 11:47:11 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 9-Dec-2013 11:47:11 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 9-Dec-2013 11:47:11 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/62277 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 為了維護全球經濟的穩定與公平，近年來各國無不致力於反壟斷政策的執行，以期有效打擊卡特爾式的企業聯合行為。然而，一味地使用打擊式的作法，不一定能完全消除廠商違法結盟的意願，甚至可能扼殺了企業的創新性發展。因此，政府在採取查緝手段的同時，需思考如何建構一體質良好的商業環境，並以政策誘因來激勵企業朝合法的創新研發目標發展。本文以一基本模型為出發點，先討論原始經濟環境下，採取聯合行為的廠商和反托拉斯政府之間的互動情況；接著，進一步將經濟環境區分為兩種前提：廠商為合法結盟且判斷正確、政府對創新性的廠商給予租稅優惠，這兩種環境條件，前者為良性競爭的商業環境，後者則為鼓勵性的做法，目的都是降低違法聯合行為發生的機率。透過本研究可發現，無論外在經濟環境如何改變，廠商考量的重點始終以利潤為第一優先，即在成本效益分析下，決定是否採取聯合結盟，以及合法或非法的合作型態。此外，本文並針對三種環境設定下的均衡結果進行效率性的比較，以做為未來政策執行的參考基礎。 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In order to maintain the stability and fairness of global economy, most of the authorities around the world have been fighting to cut down cartels by implementing an Antitrust/Competition Law. Nevertheless, the aforementioned measures may fail to eliminate illegal cartel activity, and even stifle the creativity and innovation of industries. Therefore, the authorities have to provide a sound environment for commercial economy while firmly traking control of industries and, moreover, the incentive schemes such as tax incentives can be introduced to encourage businesses to engage in innovative development in the form of R&D. This article begins with a basic model, which discuss the interaction between joint ventures and antitrust authorities in an initial case of the economic environment. We then divide the economic environment into two different conditions: one consists of legal joint ventures without misjudging their status such as through legal or illegal cooperation agreements, and the other is related to the government which provides tax incentives for innovative industries. The aims of the two conditions are to reduce the probability of illegal cartel activity. More specifically, the former can create positive and healthy competition in the business environment and the latter implies a mechanism for encouraging innovation such as R&D or technical progress. From our research, no matter how changeable the economic environment will be, as profit maximization takes priority in the decision-making process of firms, the firm will then decide whether to form a joint venture or whether the cooperation is going to be legal or illegal. Finally, we compare the efficiency of all equilibria among the three conditions of the economic environment. It provides a reference for implementing policy in the future. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 1812083 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 公平交易季刊, 21(3), 113-142 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 反托拉斯;卡特爾;聯合行為;租稅優惠;創新研發;資訊不對稱 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Antitrust;Cartel;Joint venture;Tax incentives;Innovative development;R&D;Information asymmetry | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 廠商聯合行為與政府反托拉斯之策略互動 | zh_TW |
| dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | Interaction between Joint Ventures and the Antitrust Authority | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
