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題名 Asset Write-Offs Discretion and Accruals Management in Taiwan: The Role of Corporate Governance
作者 洪叔民
Chao,Chia-Ling;Horng,Shwu-Min
貢獻者 企管系
關鍵詞 Impairments;Discretionary accruals;Earnings management;Corporate governance;M41
日期 2013.01
上傳時間 6-Jan-2014 14:15:41 (UTC+8)
摘要 Using a sample of Taiwan’s public firms, this paper examines whether managers use discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals jointly to reach earnings targets and how corporate governance mechanisms react to such opportunistic behavior. We develop a set of simultaneous equations that capture executives’ incentives to manage earnings through write-offs and accrual management. These incentives include the existence and tightness of accounting-based covenants, “big bath,” income smoothing, and changes in senior management. The empirical results show that firms with larger discretionary write-offs also have lower discretionary accruals. In addition, we find that these earnings management tools are endogenous, suggesting that discretionary write-offs and discretionary accruals are partial complements for earnings manipulation and that their magnitudes are determined jointly. These findings contrast sharply with the tenor of discussion in the U.S. literature concerning the potential for using asset write-offs and discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings, which documents that managers use their discretion over accruals to signal economic realities rather than to obfuscate. Moreover, the results reveal that the empirical association between discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals is more pronounced in weakly governed firms, suggesting that a strong governance setting is likely to constrain management’s discretionary behavior. The above implications are robust to a number of alternative specifications and variables definitions.
關聯 Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,40(1),41-74
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11156-011-0269-5
dc.contributor 企管系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 洪叔民zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chao,Chia-Ling;Horng,Shwu-Minen_US
dc.date (日期) 2013.01en_US
dc.date.accessioned 6-Jan-2014 14:15:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 6-Jan-2014 14:15:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 6-Jan-2014 14:15:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/63275-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Using a sample of Taiwan’s public firms, this paper examines whether managers use discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals jointly to reach earnings targets and how corporate governance mechanisms react to such opportunistic behavior. We develop a set of simultaneous equations that capture executives’ incentives to manage earnings through write-offs and accrual management. These incentives include the existence and tightness of accounting-based covenants, “big bath,” income smoothing, and changes in senior management. The empirical results show that firms with larger discretionary write-offs also have lower discretionary accruals. In addition, we find that these earnings management tools are endogenous, suggesting that discretionary write-offs and discretionary accruals are partial complements for earnings manipulation and that their magnitudes are determined jointly. These findings contrast sharply with the tenor of discussion in the U.S. literature concerning the potential for using asset write-offs and discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings, which documents that managers use their discretion over accruals to signal economic realities rather than to obfuscate. Moreover, the results reveal that the empirical association between discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals is more pronounced in weakly governed firms, suggesting that a strong governance setting is likely to constrain management’s discretionary behavior. The above implications are robust to a number of alternative specifications and variables definitions.en_US
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,40(1),41-74en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Impairments;Discretionary accruals;Earnings management;Corporate governance;M41en_US
dc.title (題名) Asset Write-Offs Discretion and Accruals Management in Taiwan: The Role of Corporate Governanceen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1007/s11156-011-0269-5en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11156-011-0269-5en_US