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題名 房屋抵押貸款之資訊不對稱問題 -以台北市和新北市為例
The asymmetric information problems in mortgage lending: the evidence from Taipei City and New Taipei City作者 林耀宗
Lin, Yao Tsung貢獻者 林左裕
Lin, Tso Yu
林耀宗
Lin, Yao Tsung關鍵詞 房屋抵押貸款違約
金融資產證券化
資訊不對稱
次貸危機
二元Logistic迴歸模型
Residential Mortgage Default
Information Asymmetry
Binary Logistic Regression Model日期 2013 上傳時間 10-Feb-2014 15:00:57 (UTC+8) 摘要 2007年美國爆發次級房貸違約潮造成了其經濟、房市和股市的不景氣,也波及到持有美國房貸證券化商品的各國,使其承受重大的損失,因此房屋抵押貸款違約的影響因素和金融資產證券化機制對貸款違約風險的影響又再度成為不動產與金融市場上之重要議題。而以往針對美國次貸危機的研究多指出道德風險是造成此次危機的原因之一,但是較缺乏實證研究的支持。有鑑於此,本研究以我國的台北市和新北市的房屋抵押貸款市場作為研究對象,探討逆選擇和道德風險這兩個資訊不對稱的問題對貸款違約率的影響。研究結果顯示「貸款成數高、貸款利率高、搭配信貸和設定二胎的貸款比較容易違約」,證實逆選擇和道德風險問題確實存在於房屋抵押貸款市場,而且會增加貸款違約的機率。為了降低違約機率,從降低資訊不對稱的角度來看,本研究建議:一、建立全國房貸資料庫;二、將信貸的金額納入房貸的貸款成數中考慮,以降低款人的道德風險。再者,本研究認為造成次貸危機的根本原因是不當政策導致的保證機制浮濫,以及高風險的房貸證券化商品的氾濫。為了避免我國發生類似次貸危機的事件,從減少資訊不對稱的角度切入,本研究建議我國的金融資產證券化機制應該:一、將道德風險內部化,消除創始機構自利的動機以減少道德風險;二、使用外部信用增強的方式,以確實發揮分散證券風險的作用。
The 2007 subprime mortgage crisis has severely struck the stability of the worldwide financial markets. Some researches indicate that moral hazard problems are the main factors causing the crisis. However, few studies support asymmetry problems existing in a mortgage market by empirical evidences. First, using the mortgage samples from Taipei City and New Taipei City this study would like to understand if the mortgage market are information asymmetry problems, adverse selection and moral hazard, and conduct the empirical analysis for these factors’ impact on mortgage default. The results show that mortgage default is influenced significantly by the Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio, contract interest rates, the existence of second liens and credit loans, and jobs. It shows that adverse selection and moral hazard actually exist in the mortgage market. According to the empirical results, secondly, this study proposes suggestions for mortgage lending and financial asset securitization to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems and enhance the regulation environment and market’s stability. It is expected that the results of this study will be applied to avoid the occurrence of similar crisis in Taiwan.參考文獻 中文期刊論文王瑜琳與洪嘉聲,2001,「檢驗「自願投保」存款保險制度下的「逆向選擇」與「道德危機」問題:以台灣區農會信用部為例」,『Journal of Financial Studies』,19(3):71-88。王慧綾,2010,「揭穿金融資產證券化之面紗-二檔民國95年後發行金融資產證券化受益證券架構之分析」,『台灣金融財務季刊』,11(2): 69-98。李桐豪與呂美慧,2000,「金融機構房貸客戶授信評量模式分析─Logistic 迴歸之應用」,『台灣金融財務季刊』,1(1):1-20。李同龢與鄭治明,2002,「自供需面探討資產證券化中信用評等與信用增強角色」,『台灣金融財務季刊』,3(4): 1-14.李曜崇,2008,「美國信用評等機構法制建構之研究-兼論我國法相關規定之檢討」,『法學新論』,No. 2: 119-149。汪琪玲,2006,「台灣車體損失險契約中存在之訊息不對稱問題」,『臺大管理論叢』,16(2):161-186。林左裕,2004,「台灣住宅抵押貸款終止行為之研究」,『農業經濟半年刊』,76:169-195。──,2008,「美國次級房貸風暴對臺灣金融資產證券化及投資者之啟示」,『住宅學報』,17(1):111-123。──,2009,「再論美國次級房貸風暴對我國金融資產證券化、估價制度及投資者之啟示」,『土地問題研究季刊』,8(3): 18-34.楊顯爵、林左裕與陳宗豪.,2008,「住宅抵押貸款違約之研究--影響因素之顯著性分析」,『台灣土地研究』,11:1-36。葉秋南,2009,「美國政府的房屋政策與次貸危機」,『台灣經濟論衡』,7(7)劉代洋與李馨蘋,1994,「購屋貸款與家戶社經特色之實證研究─以台中都會區為例」,『管理科學學報』,11:109-127。中文書籍、研討會論文、新聞報導王濟川與郭志剛,2004,『Logistic 迴歸模型-方法及應用』,台北:五南。林震岩,2007,『多變量分析:SPSS的操作與應用』,台北:智勝。林左裕,2010,『不動產投資管理』四版,台北:智勝。儲蓉,2006,『金融資產證券化理論與案例分析』二版,台北:台灣金融研訓院。林益倍,2011,「台灣不動產抵押貸款市場資訊不對稱問題之研究」,台灣大學管理學院財務金融學系博士論文:台北。楊智富,2003,「資訊不對稱下的銀行授信」,中山大學經濟學研究所碩士論文:高雄。賴宗炘,2011,「追索權價值、負權益與違約房屋抵押貸款關連性在台灣之研究」,國立政治大學地政研究所碩士論文,台北市盧秋玲與郭姿伶,2000,住宅貸款之提前清償與逾期還款,論文發表於〈2000年財務金融學術暨實務研討會〉,輔仁大學:台北,6月2日至3日。經濟日報,「金融資產證券化恐爆違約潮」,李淑慧,2009/3/25。經濟日報,「包裹海外債,美意變噩夢」,李淑慧,2009/3/25。經濟日報,「CBO 頻降等,投資人虧逾百億」林巧雁,2009/7//17。 英文期刊論文Akerlof, G. A., 1970, "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3): 488-500.Agresti, Alan, 2002, “Categorical Data Analysis”, 2nd edition, John Wiley & SonsBester, H., 1985, "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information." The American Economic Review 75(4): 850-855.Boyack, Andrea J., 2011, “Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences : The Role and Control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”, American University Law Review, Vol. 60:1489Deng, Y. H., J. M. Quigley, and R. Van Order, 1996, “Mortgage Default and Low Downpayment Loans: The Costs of Public Subsidy”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 26:263-285.──, 2000, “Mortgage Terminations, Heterogeneity and the Exercise of Mortgage Options”, Econometrica, 68(2):275-307. Danis, Michelle and A. Pennington-Cross, 2005, “A Dynamic Look at Subprime Loan Performance”, The Journal of Fixed Income, 15(1): 28-39.Elul, R., 2011, “Securitization and Mortgage Default”, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Research Department Working Paper No. 09-21/RGardner, M. J. and D. L. Mills, 1989, "Evaluating the Likelihood of Default on Delinquent Loans.", The Journal of the Financial Management Association 18(4): 55-63.Jackson, J. R. and D. L. Kaserman, 1980, "Default Risk on Home Mortgage Loans: A Test of Competing Hypothesis." Journal of Risk & Insurance 47(4): 678-690.Kau, J. B. and D. C. Keenan, 1999, “Patterns of Rational Default”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 29:65- 85.Keys, B., T. Mukherjee, A. Seru, and V. Vig, 2008, “Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(1), 307-362.Kiff, J. and P. Mills, 2007, “Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets” , IMF Working Paper.Lawrence, E. C., L. D. Smith, and R. Rhoades, 1992, “An Analysis of Default Risk in Mobile Home Credit”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 299-312。Mian, A. and A. Sufi, 2008, “The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the 2007 Mortgage Default Crisis”, NBER Working Papers No. 13936.Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, 1976, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(4): 629-649.Shavell, S., 1979, "On Moral Hazard and Insurance." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 93(4): 541-562. Stiglitz, J. E. and A. Weiss, 1981, "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information." The American Economic Review, 71(3):393-410.Von Furstenberg, G. M., 1969, “Default Risk on FHA-Insured Home Mortgages as a Function of the Terms of Financing: A Quantitative Analysis”, Journal of Finance, 24:459-477.Vandell, K. D., 1978, “Default Risk under Alternative Mortgage Instruments”, Journal of Finance, 33(5):1279-1296. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
地政研究所
100257018
102資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1002570181 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 林左裕 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Lin, Tso Yu en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林耀宗 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lin, Yao Tsung en_US dc.creator (作者) 林耀宗 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Lin, Yao Tsung en_US dc.date (日期) 2013 en_US dc.date.accessioned 10-Feb-2014 15:00:57 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 10-Feb-2014 15:00:57 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 10-Feb-2014 15:00:57 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G1002570181 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/63729 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 地政研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 100257018 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 102 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 2007年美國爆發次級房貸違約潮造成了其經濟、房市和股市的不景氣,也波及到持有美國房貸證券化商品的各國,使其承受重大的損失,因此房屋抵押貸款違約的影響因素和金融資產證券化機制對貸款違約風險的影響又再度成為不動產與金融市場上之重要議題。而以往針對美國次貸危機的研究多指出道德風險是造成此次危機的原因之一,但是較缺乏實證研究的支持。有鑑於此,本研究以我國的台北市和新北市的房屋抵押貸款市場作為研究對象,探討逆選擇和道德風險這兩個資訊不對稱的問題對貸款違約率的影響。研究結果顯示「貸款成數高、貸款利率高、搭配信貸和設定二胎的貸款比較容易違約」,證實逆選擇和道德風險問題確實存在於房屋抵押貸款市場,而且會增加貸款違約的機率。為了降低違約機率,從降低資訊不對稱的角度來看,本研究建議:一、建立全國房貸資料庫;二、將信貸的金額納入房貸的貸款成數中考慮,以降低款人的道德風險。再者,本研究認為造成次貸危機的根本原因是不當政策導致的保證機制浮濫,以及高風險的房貸證券化商品的氾濫。為了避免我國發生類似次貸危機的事件,從減少資訊不對稱的角度切入,本研究建議我國的金融資產證券化機制應該:一、將道德風險內部化,消除創始機構自利的動機以減少道德風險;二、使用外部信用增強的方式,以確實發揮分散證券風險的作用。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The 2007 subprime mortgage crisis has severely struck the stability of the worldwide financial markets. Some researches indicate that moral hazard problems are the main factors causing the crisis. However, few studies support asymmetry problems existing in a mortgage market by empirical evidences. First, using the mortgage samples from Taipei City and New Taipei City this study would like to understand if the mortgage market are information asymmetry problems, adverse selection and moral hazard, and conduct the empirical analysis for these factors’ impact on mortgage default. The results show that mortgage default is influenced significantly by the Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio, contract interest rates, the existence of second liens and credit loans, and jobs. It shows that adverse selection and moral hazard actually exist in the mortgage market. According to the empirical results, secondly, this study proposes suggestions for mortgage lending and financial asset securitization to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems and enhance the regulation environment and market’s stability. It is expected that the results of this study will be applied to avoid the occurrence of similar crisis in Taiwan. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 - 1 -第一節 研究動機與目的 - 1 -第二節 研究範圍與方法 - 5 -第三節 研究架構、流程與名詞定義 - 7 -第二章 相關理論與文獻回顧 - 13 -第一節 房貸違約理論與實證 - 13 -第二節 房貸市場中的資訊不對稱問題 - 16 -第三節 浮濫保證制度和金融資產證券化引發的道德風險 - 20 -第三章 金融資產證券化之概述 - 23 -第一節 金融資產證券化的概念 - 23 -第二節 金融資產證券化之效益 - 28 -第三節 金融資產證券化流程 - 30 -第四節 金融資產證券化在美國的起源與發展和次貸危機的肇因 - 33 -第五節 金融資產證券化在我國的起源與發展 - 37 -第四章 樣本分析與研究設計 - 45 -第一節 資料處理與樣本分析 - 45 -第二節 實證研究設計 - 46 -第三節 實證模型 - 51 -第五章 實證結果與分析 - 55 -第一節 自變數敘述統計與顯著性檢定 - 55 -第二節 實證結果分析 - 58 -第六章 結論與建議 - 63 -第一節 結論 - 63 -第二節 建議 - 65 -參考文獻 - 67 -表4-1-1 樣本分析 - 45 -表4-2-2 變數說明與預期符號表 - 50 -表5-1-1 連續自變數敘述統計表 - 55 -表5-1-2 連續自變數T檢定 - 56 -表5-1-3 類別自變數次數分配表 - 57 -表5-2-1 自變數係數估計表 - 61 -圖1-1-1 銀行房貸放款金額與比例 - 2 -圖1-1-2 我國金融機構總體逾放比率 - 2 -圖1-3-1 研究流程圖 - 8 -圖3-1-1 發行負債型證券的資產負債表變動 - 24 -圖3-1-2 發行權益型證券的資產負債表變動 - 24 -圖3-1-3 發行資產型證券的資產負債表變動 - 25 -圖3-1-4 證券化依資產負債表三大科目之分類 - 25 -圖3-1-5 金融資產證券化之概念 - 26 -圖3-3-1 金融資產證券化之創造與發行架構 - 30 -圖3-4-1 美國金融資產證券在外流通金額 - 34 -圖3-4-2 美國房貸相關證券之發行量 - 35 -圖3-5-1 我國金融資產證券化商品2003~2013年核准件數 - 37 -圖3-5-2 我國金融資產證券化商品核准與發行金額 - 38 -圖3-5-3 我國金融資產證券化各類商品核准金額之比較 - 39 -圖3-5-4 我國金融資產證券化各類商品核准總額比例 - 39 -圖3-5-5 金融資產證券化的基本架構 - 40 - zh_TW dc.format.extent 1701824 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1002570181 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 房屋抵押貸款違約 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 金融資產證券化 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊不對稱 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 次貸危機 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 二元Logistic迴歸模型 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Residential Mortgage Default en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Information Asymmetry en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Binary Logistic Regression Model en_US dc.title (題名) 房屋抵押貸款之資訊不對稱問題 -以台北市和新北市為例 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The asymmetric information problems in mortgage lending: the evidence from Taipei City and New Taipei City en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文期刊論文王瑜琳與洪嘉聲,2001,「檢驗「自願投保」存款保險制度下的「逆向選擇」與「道德危機」問題:以台灣區農會信用部為例」,『Journal of Financial Studies』,19(3):71-88。王慧綾,2010,「揭穿金融資產證券化之面紗-二檔民國95年後發行金融資產證券化受益證券架構之分析」,『台灣金融財務季刊』,11(2): 69-98。李桐豪與呂美慧,2000,「金融機構房貸客戶授信評量模式分析─Logistic 迴歸之應用」,『台灣金融財務季刊』,1(1):1-20。李同龢與鄭治明,2002,「自供需面探討資產證券化中信用評等與信用增強角色」,『台灣金融財務季刊』,3(4): 1-14.李曜崇,2008,「美國信用評等機構法制建構之研究-兼論我國法相關規定之檢討」,『法學新論』,No. 2: 119-149。汪琪玲,2006,「台灣車體損失險契約中存在之訊息不對稱問題」,『臺大管理論叢』,16(2):161-186。林左裕,2004,「台灣住宅抵押貸款終止行為之研究」,『農業經濟半年刊』,76:169-195。──,2008,「美國次級房貸風暴對臺灣金融資產證券化及投資者之啟示」,『住宅學報』,17(1):111-123。──,2009,「再論美國次級房貸風暴對我國金融資產證券化、估價制度及投資者之啟示」,『土地問題研究季刊』,8(3): 18-34.楊顯爵、林左裕與陳宗豪.,2008,「住宅抵押貸款違約之研究--影響因素之顯著性分析」,『台灣土地研究』,11:1-36。葉秋南,2009,「美國政府的房屋政策與次貸危機」,『台灣經濟論衡』,7(7)劉代洋與李馨蘋,1994,「購屋貸款與家戶社經特色之實證研究─以台中都會區為例」,『管理科學學報』,11:109-127。中文書籍、研討會論文、新聞報導王濟川與郭志剛,2004,『Logistic 迴歸模型-方法及應用』,台北:五南。林震岩,2007,『多變量分析:SPSS的操作與應用』,台北:智勝。林左裕,2010,『不動產投資管理』四版,台北:智勝。儲蓉,2006,『金融資產證券化理論與案例分析』二版,台北:台灣金融研訓院。林益倍,2011,「台灣不動產抵押貸款市場資訊不對稱問題之研究」,台灣大學管理學院財務金融學系博士論文:台北。楊智富,2003,「資訊不對稱下的銀行授信」,中山大學經濟學研究所碩士論文:高雄。賴宗炘,2011,「追索權價值、負權益與違約房屋抵押貸款關連性在台灣之研究」,國立政治大學地政研究所碩士論文,台北市盧秋玲與郭姿伶,2000,住宅貸款之提前清償與逾期還款,論文發表於〈2000年財務金融學術暨實務研討會〉,輔仁大學:台北,6月2日至3日。經濟日報,「金融資產證券化恐爆違約潮」,李淑慧,2009/3/25。經濟日報,「包裹海外債,美意變噩夢」,李淑慧,2009/3/25。經濟日報,「CBO 頻降等,投資人虧逾百億」林巧雁,2009/7//17。 英文期刊論文Akerlof, G. 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