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題名 Corporate ownership structure and innovation: Evidence from Taiwan`s electronics industry
作者 Chin, Chen-Lung ; Chen, Yu-Ju ; Kleinman, Gary ; Lee, Picheng
金成隆;陳俞如;G. Kleinman;李丕正
貢獻者 會計系
關鍵詞 Ownership structure;innovation;intellectual capital;patent;voting rights;cash flow rights
日期 2009-02
上傳時間 18-Feb-2014 16:37:14 (UTC+8)
摘要 The agency problem of listed companies in East Asia is closely related to their typically concentrated ownership structures. Tight control creates an entrenchment problem that allows the controlling owners` self-interested behaviors to go unchallenged internally by the boards of directors or externally by takeover markets. The primary objective of this paper is to explore the association between the ownership and control structure and innovation. The ownership and control structure is measured first as the divergence between the ultimate owner`s voting rights and the ultimate owner`s cash flow rights, and second by the presence of ultimately controlling shareholder`s family member as CEO or Chairman of the board, or both. Innovation is measured by patent quantity and patent quality. This paper uses patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to measure innovation activities. We find that innovation is significantly and negatively related to the level of agency problems. We further find that innovation is lower for firms whose controlling owner is also either the chief executive officer or the chair of the board of directors. Our findings appear to be robust with respect to examining patent count and patent quality variables.
關聯 Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 24(1), 145-175
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0148558X0902400108
dc.contributor 會計系en_US
dc.creator (作者) Chin, Chen-Lung ; Chen, Yu-Ju ; Kleinman, Gary ; Lee, Pichengen_US
dc.creator (作者) 金成隆;陳俞如;G. Kleinman;李丕正zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2009-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-Feb-2014 16:37:14 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-Feb-2014 16:37:14 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-Feb-2014 16:37:14 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/63973-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The agency problem of listed companies in East Asia is closely related to their typically concentrated ownership structures. Tight control creates an entrenchment problem that allows the controlling owners` self-interested behaviors to go unchallenged internally by the boards of directors or externally by takeover markets. The primary objective of this paper is to explore the association between the ownership and control structure and innovation. The ownership and control structure is measured first as the divergence between the ultimate owner`s voting rights and the ultimate owner`s cash flow rights, and second by the presence of ultimately controlling shareholder`s family member as CEO or Chairman of the board, or both. Innovation is measured by patent quantity and patent quality. This paper uses patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to measure innovation activities. We find that innovation is significantly and negatively related to the level of agency problems. We further find that innovation is lower for firms whose controlling owner is also either the chief executive officer or the chair of the board of directors. Our findings appear to be robust with respect to examining patent count and patent quality variables.-
dc.format.extent 1153415 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 24(1), 145-175en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Ownership structure;innovation;intellectual capital;patent;voting rights;cash flow rightsen_US
dc.title (題名) Corporate ownership structure and innovation: Evidence from Taiwan`s electronics industryen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1177/0148558X0902400108en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0148558X0902400108en_US