1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. 學術產出
  3. College of Commerce
  4. Periodical Articles
  5. Item

學術產出-Periodical Articles

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

政大圖書館

Citation Infomation

題名 Directors` & Officers` Insurance, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
作者 Li,Shu-Hsing ;Chen,Tsai-Jyh
陳彩稚;李書行
貢獻者 風管系
關鍵詞 directors` and officers` liability insurance ; corporate governance ; agency conflict ; firm performance
日期 2010-08
上傳時間 27-Feb-2014 16:18:56 (UTC+8)
摘要 The purpose of this article is to investigate the effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O) on corporate governance and firm performance. D&O insurance demand reflects the firm’s internal evaluation of its exposure to litigation risk. From the investors’ point of view, the D&O insurance purchase data can provide valuable information to assess the underlying risk of the firm, corporate governance quality and its future performance. Thus, this article studies the information implications of D&O insurance on the following questions. (1) Does D&O insurance demand reflect the litigation risk and corporate governance? (2) Does D&O insurance create moral hazard or provide incentives of care to directors and officers, which subsequently affect the firm’s performance? We empirically test the data by using companies listed in Taiwan Security Exchanges and find that (1) the demand for D&O insurance is positively related to the firm’s litigation risk and the motivation of its board of directors; (2) there is no evidence supporting that D&O insurance does have a significant impact on the directors’ care incentives and the subsequent firm’s performance. We further provide some suggestions for corporate governance based on these empirical results.
關聯 International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 7(3), 244-261
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jdg.2010.9
dc.contributor 風管系en_US
dc.creator (作者) Li,Shu-Hsing ;Chen,Tsai-Jyhen_US
dc.creator (作者) 陳彩稚;李書行zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2010-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned 27-Feb-2014 16:18:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 27-Feb-2014 16:18:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 27-Feb-2014 16:18:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/64283-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The purpose of this article is to investigate the effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O) on corporate governance and firm performance. D&O insurance demand reflects the firm’s internal evaluation of its exposure to litigation risk. From the investors’ point of view, the D&O insurance purchase data can provide valuable information to assess the underlying risk of the firm, corporate governance quality and its future performance. Thus, this article studies the information implications of D&O insurance on the following questions. (1) Does D&O insurance demand reflect the litigation risk and corporate governance? (2) Does D&O insurance create moral hazard or provide incentives of care to directors and officers, which subsequently affect the firm’s performance? We empirically test the data by using companies listed in Taiwan Security Exchanges and find that (1) the demand for D&O insurance is positively related to the firm’s litigation risk and the motivation of its board of directors; (2) there is no evidence supporting that D&O insurance does have a significant impact on the directors’ care incentives and the subsequent firm’s performance. We further provide some suggestions for corporate governance based on these empirical results.en_US
dc.format.extent 184663 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 7(3), 244-261en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) directors` and officers` liability insurance ; corporate governance ; agency conflict ; firm performanceen_US
dc.title (題名) Directors` & Officers` Insurance, Corporate Governance and Firm Performanceen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1057/jdg.2010.9en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jdg.2010.9en_US