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題名 董事會組成與我國IPO電子產業盈餘管理之關聯性──兼論家族企業因素之影響
Board composition and Real Earnings Management of Initial Public Offerings,electronics industry in Taiwan.──with analysis of the effect of family business
作者 張雅涵
貢獻者 郭弘卿
張雅涵
關鍵詞 實質盈餘管理
董事會組成
初次上市櫃
Real Earnings Management
Board composition
Initial Public Offerings
日期 2012
上傳時間 3-Mar-2014 15:30:30 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究旨在探討家族企業及非家族企業兩種不同的公司治理型態，其董事會各組成區塊與企業進行實質盈餘管理之間的關聯性。實質盈餘管理係以異常營運活動現金流量、異常生產成本及異常裁決性費用為衡量指標，並以2004年至2011年間我國初次上市櫃(IPO)的電子產業為樣本範圍。\n 實證結果發現，在家族企業中：(1)最終控制者控制席次過半及經理人董事席次比率愈高，愈可顯著抑制企業進行實質盈餘管理。(2)外部董事席次比率愈高，對企業進行實質盈餘管理有反向助長之傾向。(3)獨立董事席次愈多，愈能顯著監督企業進行實質盈餘管理，唯在企業以裁決性支出方式操弄盈餘方面較無監督能力。在非家族企業中：(1)最終控制者控制席次過半及外部董事席次比率的增加，對抑制企業從事實質盈餘管理無顯著效果。(2)獨立董事席次的增加可顯著抑制企業操弄盈餘。(3)經理人董事席次比率愈高，愈顯著助長企業進行實質盈餘管理。
This thesis aims to discuss the relationship between board composition and real earnings management (hereafter, REM) under family business and non-family business. This study uses abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses as a measure of real earnings management. Data is collected from electronics industry in Taiwan which applied for Initial Public Offerings (IPO) from 2004 to 2011. \n The empirical results show that in family business: (1) If the ratio of board seat-control of ultimate controller is over 50 percents, or the ratio of board seats of manager is higher, it is helpful to restrain firms from manipulating earnings by REM.(2) Once the ratio of board seats of outside directors is higher, it is prone to promote firms to do REM.(3) Once the board seats of independent directors are more, it is significant to reduce the degree of REM. However, they seem to have no abilities to restrain firms from manipulating earnings by varying discretionary expenses. In non-family business: (1) The board seat-control of ultimate controller over 50 has nothing to do with decreasing the degree of REM. Also,the increase of the ratio of board seats of outside directors is not significantly to suppress the degree of REM. (2)The increase of board seats of independent directors is effectively to reduce the extent of REM. (3) If the ratio of board seats of manager is higher, it will push firms to manipulate earnings by REM.
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J. Lin, and M. Loeb. 1993. Initial public \n offering, accounting choices and earnings management. \n Contemporary Accounting Research 10:61-81.\nAmihud, Y., Kamin, J. Y., and Ronen. 1983. J. \n Managerialism, ownerism and risk. Journal of Banking \n and Finance 7: 189-196.\nAnderson, R. and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding family \n ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P \n 500. Journal of Finance 58: 1301–1329.\nBaber, W.R., P.M., Fairfield, and J.A., Haggard. 1991. The \n effect of concern about reported income on \n discretionary spending decisions：the case of research \n and development. The Accounting Review 66：818-829.\nBarnes, L.B. and Hershon, S. A., 1976. Transferring power \n in the family business. Harvard Business Review 53:105-\n 114.\nBartholomeusz, S and Tanewski, GA 2006. The relation \n between family firms and corporate governance. \n Journal of Small Business Management 44: 245-267.\nBartov, E. 1993. The timing of asset sales and earnings \n manipulation. The Accounting Review 68: 840-855.\nBaysinger, B. and R. E. Hoskisson. 1990,The composition of \n boards of directors and strategic control: effects on \n corporate strategy. Academy of Management Review 15: 72-\n 87.\nBens, D. A., V. Nagar, and M. H. F. Wong. 2003. Employee \n stock options, EPS dilution, and stock repurchase. \n Journal of Accounting and Economics 36(1-3): 51-\n 90.\nBerle, A.A. and Means, G.C. 1932. The modern corporation \n and private property. New York：Macmillan.\nBushee, B.J. 1998. The influence of institutional investors \n on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting \n Review 73:305-333.\nChung, R., M. Firth, and J. B. Kim. 2002. Institutional \n monitoring and opportunistic earnings management. \n Journal of Corporate Finance 8:29-48.\nClaessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. Lang, 2000. The \n separation of ownership and control in East Asia \n corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58: 81-112.\nClaessens, S., S. Djankov, L. Lang, and H. P. Lang. 2002. \n Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects \n of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57:2741- \n 2772.\nCohen, D. A., Dey, A., and Lys, T. Z. 2008. Real and \n accrual-based earnings management in the Pre- and Post-\n Sarbanes-Oxley periods. The Accointing Review 83:757-\n 787.\nCohen,D. A., and Zarowin, P. 2010. Accrual-based and real \n earnings management activities around seasoned equity \n offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50:2-19.\nDavis, P. 1983. Realizing the potential of the family \n business. Organizational Dynamics12: 47-56.\nDechow, P. M., and Sloan, R. G. 1991. Executive incentives \n and the horizon problem: An empirical investigation. \n Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14:51-89.\nDechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. \n Detecting earnings management. The Accounting review \n 70: 193-225.\nDechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. 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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
100353046
101
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100353046
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 郭弘卿zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 張雅涵zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 張雅涵zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2012en_US
dc.date.accessioned 3-Mar-2014 15:30:30 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 3-Mar-2014 15:30:30 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 3-Mar-2014 15:30:30 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0100353046en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=72495-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 100353046zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 101zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究旨在探討家族企業及非家族企業兩種不同的公司治理型態，其董事會各組成區塊與企業進行實質盈餘管理之間的關聯性。實質盈餘管理係以異常營運活動現金流量、異常生產成本及異常裁決性費用為衡量指標，並以2004年至2011年間我國初次上市櫃(IPO)的電子產業為樣本範圍。\n 實證結果發現，在家族企業中：(1)最終控制者控制席次過半及經理人董事席次比率愈高，愈可顯著抑制企業進行實質盈餘管理。(2)外部董事席次比率愈高，對企業進行實質盈餘管理有反向助長之傾向。(3)獨立董事席次愈多，愈能顯著監督企業進行實質盈餘管理，唯在企業以裁決性支出方式操弄盈餘方面較無監督能力。在非家族企業中：(1)最終控制者控制席次過半及外部董事席次比率的增加，對抑制企業從事實質盈餘管理無顯著效果。(2)獨立董事席次的增加可顯著抑制企業操弄盈餘。(3)經理人董事席次比率愈高，愈顯著助長企業進行實質盈餘管理。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This thesis aims to discuss the relationship between board composition and real earnings management (hereafter, REM) under family business and non-family business. This study uses abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses as a measure of real earnings management. Data is collected from electronics industry in Taiwan which applied for Initial Public Offerings (IPO) from 2004 to 2011. \n The empirical results show that in family business: (1) If the ratio of board seat-control of ultimate controller is over 50 percents, or the ratio of board seats of manager is higher, it is helpful to restrain firms from manipulating earnings by REM.(2) Once the ratio of board seats of outside directors is higher, it is prone to promote firms to do REM.(3) Once the board seats of independent directors are more, it is significant to reduce the degree of REM. However, they seem to have no abilities to restrain firms from manipulating earnings by varying discretionary expenses. In non-family business: (1) The board seat-control of ultimate controller over 50 has nothing to do with decreasing the degree of REM. Also,the increase of the ratio of board seats of outside directors is not significantly to suppress the degree of REM. (2)The increase of board seats of independent directors is effectively to reduce the extent of REM. (3) If the ratio of board seats of manager is higher, it will push firms to manipulate earnings by REM.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 摘要 i\nAbstract ii\n謝辭 iii\n目錄 iv\n圖目錄 vi\n表目錄 vi\n第壹章 緒論 1\n第一節 研究動機與目的 1\n第二節 研究問題 3\n第三節 研究架構與流程 5\n第貳章 文獻回顧與假說建立 6\n第一節 實質盈餘管理 6\n第二節 家族企業 10\n第三節 董事會組成與實質盈餘管理 14\n第參章 研究方法 18\n第一節 樣本選取、資料來源及研究期間 18\n第二節 變數衡量及實證模型 19\n第肆章 實證結果分析 26\n第一節 敘述性分析 26\n第二節 相關性分析 31\n第三節 迴歸分析 33\n第四節 敏感性分析 49\n第伍章 結論與建議 58\n第一節 研究結論 58\n第二節 研究限制與建議 60\n參考文獻 61\n\n圖目錄\n圖一 研究架構與流程 5\n\n表目錄\n表一 家族企業的定義 11\n表二 樣本篩選及數量表 18\n表三 變數基本統計量(全部樣本=301) 28\n表四 家族企業及非家族企業各變數基本統計量 30\n表五Pearson相關係數矩陣 32\n表六 董事會組成與實質盈餘管理之關聯性\n (全部樣本) 35\n表七 董事會組成與實質盈餘管理之關聯性\n (非家族樣本) 38\n表八 董事會組成與實質盈餘管理之關聯性\n (家族樣本) 39\n表九 董事會組成與實質盈餘管理之關聯性\n (考慮家族企業虛擬變數交乘項) 40\n表十 經理人董事與實質盈餘管理之關聯性\n (全部樣本) 43\n表十一 經理人董事與實質盈餘管理之關聯性\n (非家族樣本) 46\n表十二 經理人董事與實質盈餘管理之關聯性\n (家族企業) 47\n表十三 經理人董事與實質盈餘管理之關聯性 48\n表十四 董事會組成與實質盈餘管理之關聯性\n (分別列示家族企業及非家族企業) 50\n表十五 董事會組成與實質盈餘管理之關聯性 52\n表十六 經理人董事與實質盈餘管理之關聯性\n (分別列示家族企業及非家族企業) 54\n表十七 經理人董事與實質盈餘管理之關聯性 56\n表十八 實證結果彙整 57zh_TW
dc.format.extent 6819080 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100353046en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 實質盈餘管理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董事會組成zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 初次上市櫃zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Real Earnings Managementen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Board compositionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Initial Public Offeringsen_US
dc.title (題名) 董事會組成與我國IPO電子產業盈餘管理之關聯性──兼論家族企業因素之影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Board composition and Real Earnings Management of Initial Public Offerings,electronics industry in Taiwan.──with analysis of the effect of family businessen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
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