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題名 違約的代價: 契約違約金存在之合理性
其他題名 The Price of Breaching the Contract: The Rationality of Penalty
作者 黃俊源;郭照榮;江彌修
Huang,Chun-Yuan;Kuo,Chau-Jung;Chiang,Mi-Hsiu
貢獻者 金融系
關鍵詞 最適違約金;選擇權評價;契約違約
optimum penalty;option pricing;breach of contract
日期 2008-01
上傳時間 24-Mar-2014 14:07:31 (UTC+8)
摘要 買賣或服務契約常因任一方違約而造成契約失效,同時違約方必須付出一筆違約金額以賠償被違約方之損失,然而違約金之收取比例適當與否卻常是買賣雙方在解除契約後最易引起糾紛之處。買賣雙方會依其情況選擇是否違約,因此本文利用簡單的選擇權模型予於評價此部分的價值。經由模型之推導,我們求得契約雙方都擁有選擇權下的預期現金流量折現值,同時得到了令買賣雙方在簽約時點有合理公平交易地位之最適違約金比例。最後我們利用敏感性分析證明了契約買方通常是處於較為劣勢之一方,據此本文認為應對契約賣方之違約金比例應有較嚴格之規定以保護買方在交易之際所簽訂之違約金是否適宜,進而達到公平交易之目的。
A contract becomes invalid whenever the contracting parties are in breach of it, at which point one of them has to compensate the other for damages. However, disputes frequently arise when both contracting parties break the contract, especially when inappropriate penaltie1s are involved. We consider that contracting parties have the right to break a contract due to cost considerations, so that they will often consider whether or not it is beneficial to them to break the contract. Here we develop a simple options pricing model to examine the rationality of imposing penalties and the factors that have an effect on this. In terms of pricing, we determine the discounted cash flows of the contracting parties when both of them own options. We also suggest that it is important to set a fair penalty when signing a contract, while we also use sensitivity analysis to prove that the consumers usually belong to the disadvantaged minority. In other words, from the viewpoint of the Fair Trade Law, the standards for setting the seller’s share of the penalty should be more strict.
關聯 公平交易季刊, 16(1), 35-55
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 金融系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 黃俊源;郭照榮;江彌修zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Huang,Chun-Yuan;Kuo,Chau-Jung;Chiang,Mi-Hsiu-
dc.date (日期) 2008-01en_US
dc.date.accessioned 24-Mar-2014 14:07:31 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 24-Mar-2014 14:07:31 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 24-Mar-2014 14:07:31 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/64856-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 買賣或服務契約常因任一方違約而造成契約失效,同時違約方必須付出一筆違約金額以賠償被違約方之損失,然而違約金之收取比例適當與否卻常是買賣雙方在解除契約後最易引起糾紛之處。買賣雙方會依其情況選擇是否違約,因此本文利用簡單的選擇權模型予於評價此部分的價值。經由模型之推導,我們求得契約雙方都擁有選擇權下的預期現金流量折現值,同時得到了令買賣雙方在簽約時點有合理公平交易地位之最適違約金比例。最後我們利用敏感性分析證明了契約買方通常是處於較為劣勢之一方,據此本文認為應對契約賣方之違約金比例應有較嚴格之規定以保護買方在交易之際所簽訂之違約金是否適宜,進而達到公平交易之目的。en_US
dc.description.abstract (摘要) A contract becomes invalid whenever the contracting parties are in breach of it, at which point one of them has to compensate the other for damages. However, disputes frequently arise when both contracting parties break the contract, especially when inappropriate penaltie1s are involved. We consider that contracting parties have the right to break a contract due to cost considerations, so that they will often consider whether or not it is beneficial to them to break the contract. Here we develop a simple options pricing model to examine the rationality of imposing penalties and the factors that have an effect on this. In terms of pricing, we determine the discounted cash flows of the contracting parties when both of them own options. We also suggest that it is important to set a fair penalty when signing a contract, while we also use sensitivity analysis to prove that the consumers usually belong to the disadvantaged minority. In other words, from the viewpoint of the Fair Trade Law, the standards for setting the seller’s share of the penalty should be more strict.en_US
dc.format.extent 1281349 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) 公平交易季刊, 16(1), 35-55en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 最適違約金;選擇權評價;契約違約en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) optimum penalty;option pricing;breach of contract-
dc.title (題名) 違約的代價: 契約違約金存在之合理性zh_TW
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) The Price of Breaching the Contract: The Rationality of Penalty-
dc.type (資料類型) articleen