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題名 家族企業與主併公司績效之關聯: 以台灣併購案為例
The relation between family firms and acquiring firm performance_ The cases of M&A in Taiwan
作者 許韶耘
貢獻者 湛可南
許韶耘
關鍵詞 家族企業
併購績效
Family firm
Acquiring firm performance
日期 2013
上傳時間 4-Jun-2014 14:41:20 (UTC+8)
摘要 This study investigates the relation between family firms and acquiring firm performance for our sample of Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions between 1999 and 2013. We find that cumulative abnormal returns of family acquirers on average outperform those of nonfamily acquirers by 2.17% three days around the announcement. Family acquirers obtain greater abnormal returns even after controlling for both firm characteristics such as firm size, book to market, prior return, public target and deal characteristics such as year dummy and mode of payment. Furthermore, we explore the potential impact of the deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights on family acquiring performance. In the sample of Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions, the deviation is not the significant factor to cause a negative influence. As a result, family acquirers with the advantage of eliminating agency problems may generate more benefits than nonfamily acquirers.
參考文獻 1. 葉銀華 (1999)，’家族控股、董事會組成與經營績效─台灣家族企業管治機制之研究’，行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫成果報告。
2. Amihud, Y. and B. Lev (1981), ‘Risk Reduction as Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers’, Bell Journal of Economic, Vol. 12, pp. 605-17.
3. Anderson, R.C., and D.M. Reeb (2003), ‘Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 1301-1328.
4. Anderson, R., S. Mansi, and D. Reeb (2003), ‘Founding Family Ownership and the Agency cost of debt’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68, pp. 263-285.
5. Andrade, G., M. Mitchell and E. Stafford (2001), ‘New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp. 103-20.
6. Avery, C., J.A. Chevalier and S. Schaefer (1998), ‘Why Do Managers Undertake Acquisitions? An Analysis of Internal and External Rewards for Acquisitiveness’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, Vol. 14, pp. 24-43.
7. Barclay, M., and C. Holderness (1989), ‘Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 371-396.
8. Barnes, L.B., and S.A. Hershon (1976), ‘Transferring Power in the Family Business’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 105-114.
9. Barontini, R., and L. Caprio (2004), ‘The Effect of Ownership Structure and Family Control on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from Continental Europe’, Working Paper.
10. Ben-Amar, W., P. Andre (2006), ‘Separation of Ownership from Control and Acquiring Firm Performance: The Case of Family Ownership in Canada’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, pp. 517-543.
11. Bigelli, M., and S. Mengoli (2004), ‘Sub-optimal Acquisition Decision under a Majority Shareholder System’, Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 8, pp. 373-405.
12. Bohmer, E. (2000), ‘Business Group, Bank Control, and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers’, Journal of Finance Intermediation, Vol. 9, pp. 117-48.
13. Bruner, R.F. (2002), ‘Does M&A Pay? A Survey of Evidence for the Decision Maker’, Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 12, pp. 48-68.
14. Casson, M., (1999), ‘The Economics of the Family Firm’, Scandinavian Economic History Review, Vol. 47, pp. 10-23.
15. Chang, S. (1998), ‘Takeovers of Privately Held Targets, Methods of Payment and Bidder Return’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, pp. 773-84.
16. Chami, R. (1999), ‘What’s Different about Family Business?’, Notre Dame University and the International Monetary Fund Working Paper.
17. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan and L.H.P. Lang (2000), ‘The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, pp. 81-112.
18. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan and L.H.P. Lang (2002), ‘Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholders’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, pp. 2741-71.
19. Cronqvist, H., and M. Nilsson (2003), ‘Agency Cost of Controlling Minority Shareholders’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 38, pp. 695-719.
20. Davis, J.F., D. Schoorman, and L. Donaldson (1997), ‘Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22, pp. 20-47.
21. Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn (1985), ‘the Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, pp. 1155-1177.
22. Dong, M., D. Hirshleifer, S. Richardson, S.H. Teoh (2002), ‘Does investor misevaluation drive the takeover market?’, Ohio State University Working Paper.
23. Dyck, A. and L. Zingales (2004), ‘Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 537-600.
24. Faccio, M., J.J. McConnell and D. Stolin (2006), ‘Return to Acquirers of Listing and Unlisted Targets’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 197-220.
25. Faccio, M. and L.H.P. Lang (2002), ‘The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations’, Journal of Finance Economics, Vol. 65, pp. 365-95.
26. Faleye, O. and M. Huson (2002), ‘Understanding Acquisition Return: The role of Corporate Governance’, University of Alberta Working Paper.
27. Fama, E., and M. Jensen (1985), ‘Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 101-119.
28. Firth, M. (1991), ‘Corporate Takeovers, Stockholder Return and Executive Reward’, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 421-28.
29. Gomez-Mejia, L., M. Nunez-Nickel, and I. Gutierrez (2001), ‘The Role of Family Ties in Agency Contracts ’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 44, pp. 81-95.
30. James, H., (1999), ‘Owner as Manager, Extended Horizons and the Family Firm’, International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol. 6, pp. 41-56.
31. Jensen, M.C (1986), ‘Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers’, American Economic Review, Vol. 76, pp. 323-29.
32. Jensen, M.C., W.H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305-360.
33. Johnson, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2000), ‘Tunneling’, American Economics Review, Vol. 90, pp. 20-27.
34. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes and A. Shleifer (1999), ‘Corporate Ownership around the World’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, pp. 471-517.
35. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes and A. Shleifer (2002), ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, pp. 1147-70.
36. Lee, J.Z., and Y.H. Liao (2004), ‘Board of Director Characteristics and Earnings Management-evidence from the Effect of Family-controlling on Taiwan Corporations’, Taiwan Accounting Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 1-39.
37. Lemmons, M.L., and K.V. Lins (2003), ‘Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, pp. 1445-68.
38. Lewellen, W., C. Loderer and A. Rosenfeld (1985), ‘Merger Decisions and Executive Stock Ownership in Acquisition Firms’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 209-231.
39. Loderer, C., K. Martin (1990), ‘Corporate Acquisitions by Listed Firms: The Experience of a Comprehensive Sample’, Financial Management, Vol. 19, pp. 17-33.
40. Moeller, S.B., F.P. Schlingemann, and R.M. Stulz (2004), ‘Firm Size and the Gains from Acquisitions’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 73, pp. 201-228.
41. Morck, R., A. Schleifer, and R.W. Vishny (1990), ‘Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisition?’, Journal of Finance, pp. 31-47.
42. Morck, R., A. Schleifer, and R.W. Vishny (1988), ‘Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 293-315.
43. Peres-Gonzalez, F. (2001), ‘Does Inherited Control Hurt Firm Performance?’, Columbia University Working Paper.
44. Rau, P.R., and T. Vermaelen (1998), ‘Glamour, Value & the Post-acquisition Performance of Acquiring Firms’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 49, pp. 223-253.
45. Schwert, G.W. (2000), ‘Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eye of Beholder?’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, pp. 2599-2640.
46. Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny (1997), ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, pp.737-83.
47. Sirower, M. (1997), The Synergy Trap: How Companies Lose the Acquisition Game (New York: The Free Press).
48. Stein, J. (1988), ‘Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, pp. 61-80.
49. Stein, J. (1989), ‘Efficient Capital Market, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior’, Quarterly Journal of Economy, Vol. 103, pp. 655-669.
50. Travlos, N.G. (1987), ‘Corporate Takeover Bids, Method of Payment, and Bidding Firms’ Stock Return’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 42, pp. 943-963.
51. Zhang, G. (1998), ‘Ownership Concentration, Risk Aversion and the Effect of Financial Structure on Investment Decision’, European Economic Review, Vol. 42, pp. 1751-78.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
101357009
102
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101357009
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 湛可南zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 許韶耘zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 許韶耘zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned 4-Jun-2014 14:41:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 4-Jun-2014 14:41:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Jun-2014 14:41:20 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0101357009en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/66465-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 101357009zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 102zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study investigates the relation between family firms and acquiring firm performance for our sample of Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions between 1999 and 2013. We find that cumulative abnormal returns of family acquirers on average outperform those of nonfamily acquirers by 2.17% three days around the announcement. Family acquirers obtain greater abnormal returns even after controlling for both firm characteristics such as firm size, book to market, prior return, public target and deal characteristics such as year dummy and mode of payment. Furthermore, we explore the potential impact of the deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights on family acquiring performance. In the sample of Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions, the deviation is not the significant factor to cause a negative influence. As a result, family acquirers with the advantage of eliminating agency problems may generate more benefits than nonfamily acquirers.zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents I. INTRODUCTION 6
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 10
A. THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF FAMILY FIRMS 10
B. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF FAMILY FIRMS 11
C. FAMILY FIRM PERFORMANCE, LARGE-MINORITY SHAREHOLDER CONFLICTS AND THE DEVIATION BETWEEN VOTING RIGHTS AND CASH FLOW RIGHTS 13
D. RESEARCH FOCUS 14
III. SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION 15
A. SAMPLE SELECTION 15
B. VARIABLE DEFINITION 18
(a) Dependent variable 18
(b) Independent variable 18
(c) Control Variable 20
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULT 23
A. DESCRIPTION STATISTIC 23
B. EMPIRICAL RESULT 28
(a) Equation A: simple regression analysis 31
(b) Equation B: multiple regression analysis controlling for acquiring firm characteristics 31
(c) Equation C: multiple regression analysis controlling for firm characteristics and deal characteristics 34
(d) Equation D: multiple regression analysis controlling for the interaction variable 37
(e) The relation between family acquiring performance and the deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights 39
V. CONCLUSION 42
VI. REFERENCE 43
 		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 801032 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101357009en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 家族企業zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 併購績效zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Family firmen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Acquiring firm performanceen_US
dc.title (題名) 家族企業與主併公司績效之關聯: 以台灣併購案為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The relation between family firms and acquiring firm performance_ The cases of M&A in Taiwanen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1. 葉銀華 (1999)，’家族控股、董事會組成與經營績效─台灣家族企業管治機制之研究’，行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫成果報告。
2. Amihud, Y. and B. Lev (1981), ‘Risk Reduction as Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers’, Bell Journal of Economic, Vol. 12, pp. 605-17.
3. Anderson, R.C., and D.M. Reeb (2003), ‘Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 1301-1328.
4. Anderson, R., S. Mansi, and D. Reeb (2003), ‘Founding Family Ownership and the Agency cost of debt’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68, pp. 263-285.
5. Andrade, G., M. Mitchell and E. Stafford (2001), ‘New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp. 103-20.
6. Avery, C., J.A. Chevalier and S. Schaefer (1998), ‘Why Do Managers Undertake Acquisitions? An Analysis of Internal and External Rewards for Acquisitiveness’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, Vol. 14, pp. 24-43.
7. Barclay, M., and C. Holderness (1989), ‘Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 371-396.
8. Barnes, L.B., and S.A. Hershon (1976), ‘Transferring Power in the Family Business’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 105-114.
9. Barontini, R., and L. Caprio (2004), ‘The Effect of Ownership Structure and Family Control on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from Continental Europe’, Working Paper.
10. Ben-Amar, W., P. Andre (2006), ‘Separation of Ownership from Control and Acquiring Firm Performance: The Case of Family Ownership in Canada’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, pp. 517-543.
11. Bigelli, M., and S. Mengoli (2004), ‘Sub-optimal Acquisition Decision under a Majority Shareholder System’, Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 8, pp. 373-405.
12. Bohmer, E. (2000), ‘Business Group, Bank Control, and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers’, Journal of Finance Intermediation, Vol. 9, pp. 117-48.
13. Bruner, R.F. (2002), ‘Does M&A Pay? A Survey of Evidence for the Decision Maker’, Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 12, pp. 48-68.
14. Casson, M., (1999), ‘The Economics of the Family Firm’, Scandinavian Economic History Review, Vol. 47, pp. 10-23.
15. Chang, S. (1998), ‘Takeovers of Privately Held Targets, Methods of Payment and Bidder Return’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, pp. 773-84.
16. Chami, R. (1999), ‘What’s Different about Family Business?’, Notre Dame University and the International Monetary Fund Working Paper.
17. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan and L.H.P. Lang (2000), ‘The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, pp. 81-112.
18. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan and L.H.P. Lang (2002), ‘Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholders’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, pp. 2741-71.
19. Cronqvist, H., and M. Nilsson (2003), ‘Agency Cost of Controlling Minority Shareholders’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 38, pp. 695-719.
20. Davis, J.F., D. Schoorman, and L. Donaldson (1997), ‘Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22, pp. 20-47.
21. Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn (1985), ‘the Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, pp. 1155-1177.
22. Dong, M., D. Hirshleifer, S. Richardson, S.H. Teoh (2002), ‘Does investor misevaluation drive the takeover market?’, Ohio State University Working Paper.
23. Dyck, A. and L. Zingales (2004), ‘Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 537-600.
24. Faccio, M., J.J. McConnell and D. Stolin (2006), ‘Return to Acquirers of Listing and Unlisted Targets’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 197-220.
25. Faccio, M. and L.H.P. Lang (2002), ‘The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations’, Journal of Finance Economics, Vol. 65, pp. 365-95.
26. Faleye, O. and M. Huson (2002), ‘Understanding Acquisition Return: The role of Corporate Governance’, University of Alberta Working Paper.
27. Fama, E., and M. Jensen (1985), ‘Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 101-119.
28. Firth, M. (1991), ‘Corporate Takeovers, Stockholder Return and Executive Reward’, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 421-28.
29. Gomez-Mejia, L., M. Nunez-Nickel, and I. Gutierrez (2001), ‘The Role of Family Ties in Agency Contracts ’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 44, pp. 81-95.
30. James, H., (1999), ‘Owner as Manager, Extended Horizons and the Family Firm’, International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol. 6, pp. 41-56.
31. Jensen, M.C (1986), ‘Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers’, American Economic Review, Vol. 76, pp. 323-29.
32. Jensen, M.C., W.H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305-360.
33. Johnson, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2000), ‘Tunneling’, American Economics Review, Vol. 90, pp. 20-27.
34. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes and A. Shleifer (1999), ‘Corporate Ownership around the World’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, pp. 471-517.
35. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes and A. Shleifer (2002), ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, pp. 1147-70.
36. Lee, J.Z., and Y.H. Liao (2004), ‘Board of Director Characteristics and Earnings Management-evidence from the Effect of Family-controlling on Taiwan Corporations’, Taiwan Accounting Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 1-39.
37. Lemmons, M.L., and K.V. Lins (2003), ‘Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, pp. 1445-68.
38. Lewellen, W., C. Loderer and A. Rosenfeld (1985), ‘Merger Decisions and Executive Stock Ownership in Acquisition Firms’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 209-231.
39. Loderer, C., K. Martin (1990), ‘Corporate Acquisitions by Listed Firms: The Experience of a Comprehensive Sample’, Financial Management, Vol. 19, pp. 17-33.
40. Moeller, S.B., F.P. Schlingemann, and R.M. Stulz (2004), ‘Firm Size and the Gains from Acquisitions’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 73, pp. 201-228.
41. Morck, R., A. Schleifer, and R.W. Vishny (1990), ‘Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisition?’, Journal of Finance, pp. 31-47.
42. Morck, R., A. Schleifer, and R.W. Vishny (1988), ‘Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 293-315.
43. Peres-Gonzalez, F. (2001), ‘Does Inherited Control Hurt Firm Performance?’, Columbia University Working Paper.
44. Rau, P.R., and T. Vermaelen (1998), ‘Glamour, Value & the Post-acquisition Performance of Acquiring Firms’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 49, pp. 223-253.
45. Schwert, G.W. (2000), ‘Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eye of Beholder?’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, pp. 2599-2640.
46. Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny (1997), ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, pp.737-83.
47. Sirower, M. (1997), The Synergy Trap: How Companies Lose the Acquisition Game (New York: The Free Press).
48. Stein, J. (1988), ‘Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, pp. 61-80.
49. Stein, J. (1989), ‘Efficient Capital Market, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior’, Quarterly Journal of Economy, Vol. 103, pp. 655-669.
50. Travlos, N.G. (1987), ‘Corporate Takeover Bids, Method of Payment, and Bidding Firms’ Stock Return’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 42, pp. 943-963.
51. Zhang, G. (1998), ‘Ownership Concentration, Risk Aversion and the Effect of Financial Structure on Investment Decision’, European Economic Review, Vol. 42, pp. 1751-78.		zh_TW