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題名 台灣上市公司總經理更換的宣告效果
The Announcement Effect of CEO Turnover of Listed Companies in Taiwan
作者 許可姍
貢獻者 吳啟銘
許可姍
關鍵詞 宣告效果
事件研究法
總經理更換
公司治理
Announcement Effect
Event Study
CEO Turnover
Corporate Governance
日期 2013
上傳時間 4-Jun-2014 14:41:42 (UTC+8)
摘要 隨著公司治理議題逐漸受到注意，我國政府制定了許多相關規範以使董事會對於公司管理者的監督功能健全。故本研究希望能藉由股票市場對於公司宣告總經理更換之反應，了解董事會是否發揮監督功能，撤換管理表現不佳的總經理。
     本研究以2007年至2011年於證交所公開資訊觀測站之重大訊息公告專區宣告更換總經理之台灣上市公司為研究樣本，透過事件研究法計算個別公司更換總經理的宣告效果。
     本研究首先探討市場對公司更換總經理之整體看法為何，再透過複迴歸分析進一步探討更換總經理前公司經營績效的好壞、卸任總經理之在位期間長短、卸任總經理是否離開公司、卸任總經理之持股百分比、董監事持股百分比、獨立董事人數占董事總人數之百分比等因素對宣告效果的影響。
     實證結果有以下發現：(一) 更換前公司營運績效好壞對宣告效果有顯著的影響。更換前營運績效佳之公司有負面的宣告效果，更換前營運績效差之公司有正面的宣告效果。(二)更換前營運績效佳的公司，若卸任的總經理在位期間越長，則宣告效果越負面。(三)更換前營運績效差的公司，若卸任的總經理離開公司，則宣告效果比卸任的總經理沒有離開公司還要正面。(四)更換前營運績效差的公司，若原總經理持股百分比越高，則宣告效果越正面。表示對於這些總經理持股百分比高的公司而言，造成公司績效不佳的原因是總經理能力不足，而不是因為存在代理問題。(五)董監事持股百分比對更換總經理的宣告效果沒有顯著的影響。(六)獨立董事占公司董事總人數之百分比越高卻使更換總經理之宣告效果越負面，表示本研究之實證結果不支持獨立董事對更換總經理有正面的影響。
This research studies the announcement effects of CEO turnovers with a view to understanding the reactions of stocks market toward CEO turnovers, and whether the boards play their role to oversee managers and replace those managers who perform poorly.
     This research collected samples from Taiwan listed companies who announced CEO turnovers during year 2007 through year 2011 and then calculated announcement effects by event study method.
     This research first studied the overall viewpoint of the stock market to CEO turnovers and then tried to figure out whether and how corporate operating performance before CEO turnovers, tenure of ex-CEO, whether the ex-CEO leaves the corporate, stock holding percentage of ex-CEO, stock holding percentage of directors and the percentage of number of independent directors accounts for total number of directors influence the announcement effects of CEO turnovers.
     This research finds that: (1) Companies’ performances before CEO turnover significantly influence the announcement effects. Sub-sample of well-performed companies has negative announcement effects and the sub-sample of poorly-performed companies has positive announcement effects. (2) For well-performed companies, the longer the tenure of ex-CEO, the more negative the announcement effect is. (3) For poor-performed companies, the announcement effect of companies whose ex-CEO leaves the company is more positive than those whose ex-CEO does not leave the companies. (4) For poorly-performed companies, the higher the ex-CEO stock holding percentage, the more positive the announcement effect is. It means that for those companies whose ex-CEO stock holding percentage is high, it is not agency problem that causes CEO to perform poorly but the lack of the CEO’s ability does. (5) The stock holding percentage of directors does not significantly influence the announcement effect. (6) The higher the percentage of number of independent directors accounts for the total number of directors, the more negative the CEO turnover announcement effect is. This means that the result of this research does not support that independent directors have a positive impact on CEO turnover.
參考文獻 1.Abe, Y. (1996). Chief executive turnover and firm performance in Japan. Journal of The Japanese and International Economies, 11, 2–26.
     2.Allgood, S. and Farrell, K. A. (2000). The effect of CEO tenure on the relation between firm performance and turnover. Journal of Financial Research, 23(3), 373-390.
     3.Armutage, S. (1995). Event study methods and evidence on their performance. Journal of Economic Survey, 8(4), 25-28.
     4.Bonnier, K. A. and Bruner, R. F. (1988). An analysis of stock price reaction to management change in distressed firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 11, 95-106.
     5.Brown, L. D. and Caylor, M. L. (2006). Corporate governance and firm operating performance. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 32, 129-144.
     6.Cosh, A., Hughes, A. (1997). Executive remuneration, executive dismissal and institutional shareholdings. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 469-492.
     7.Dahya, J., McConnell, J. J. and Travlos, N. G. (2002). The Cadbury committee, corporate performance, and top management turnover. The Journal of Finance, 1, 461-483.
     8.Engel, E., Hayes, R.M., Want, X. (2003). CEO turnover and properties of accounting information. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36, 1-3.
     9.Farell, K.A. and Whidbee, D.A. (2003). The impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover and replacement decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36, 1-3.
     10.Flanagan, W. (1982). Board and room. Forbes, 219-297.
     11.Goyal, V. K. and Park, C. W. (2001). Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8, 49-66.
     12.Grusky, O. (1963). Managerial succession and organizational effectiveness. American Journal of Sociology, 69(1), 21-31.
     13.Guest, R. H. (1962). Managerial succession in complex organizations. American Journal of Sociology, 68(1), 47-56.
     14.Harrison, J. R., Torres, D. L. and Kukalis, S. (1988). The changing of the guard: turnover and structural change in the top-management positions. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33(2), 211-232.
     15.Helmich, D. L. (1974). Organizational growth and succession patterns. The Academy of Management Journal, 17(4), 771-775.
     16.Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74-91.
     17.Huson, M. R., Parrino, R. and Starks, L. T. (2001). Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO turnover: a long-term Perspective. The Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2265-2297.
     18.Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 4, 305-360.
     19.Kato, T. and Long, C. (2006). CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: evidence from micro data. Journal of Comparative Economics, 34, 96-817.
     20.Kini, O., Kracaw, W. and Mian, S.(2004). The nature of discipline by corporate takeovers. The Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1511-1552.
     21.Lausten, M. (2002). CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical evidence on Danish firms. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, 391-414.
     22.MacAvoy, P.W., Cantor, S., Dana, J., and Peck, S. (1983), AL1 proposals for increased control of the corporation by the board of directors: An economic analysis, in: Statement of the Business Roundtable on the American Law Institute’s proposed principles of corporate governance and structure: Restatement and recommendations (Business Roundtable New York).
     23.Peterson, P. P. (1989). Event study: a review of issues and methodology. Quarterly Journal of Business of and Economics, 28, 36-67.
     24.Puffer, S.M. and Weintrop, J.B. (1991). Corporate performance and CEO turnover: the role of performance expectations. Administration Science Quarterly, 36, 1-19.
     25.Reinganum, M. R. (1985). The effect of executive succession on stockholder wealth. Administrative Science Quarterly, 30, 46-60.
     26.Shen, W. and Cannella, A. A. Jr. (2002). Revisiting the performance consequences of CEO succession: the impacts of successor type, postsuccession senior executive turnover, and departing CEO tenure. The Academy of Management Journal, 45(4), 717-733.
     27.Smith, J. E., Carson, K. P. and Alexander, R. A. (1984). Leadership: it can make a difference. The Academy of Management Journal, 27(4), 765-776.
     28.Vance, S. (1983). Corporate leadership. New York: McGraw-Hill.
     29.Warner, J. B., Watts, R. L. and Wruck, K. H. (1988). Stock prices and top management changes. Journal f Financial Economics, 20, 461-462.
     30.Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economic, 20, 431-460.
     31.李欣柔(2010)。實證替換高階經理人之績效，高雄大學金融管理學系研究所碩士論文。
     32.黃旭輝(2005)。經理人異動與股東財富效果，管理評論，第25卷，第1期，23-45頁。
     33.簡金成、鄭雅云(2004)。獎酬制度對董監事獨立性之影響，行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫 成果報告。
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
101357019
102
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101357019
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 吳啟銘zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 許可姍zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 許可姍zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned 4-Jun-2014 14:41:42 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 4-Jun-2014 14:41:42 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Jun-2014 14:41:42 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0101357019en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/66467-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 101357019zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 102zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 隨著公司治理議題逐漸受到注意，我國政府制定了許多相關規範以使董事會對於公司管理者的監督功能健全。故本研究希望能藉由股票市場對於公司宣告總經理更換之反應，了解董事會是否發揮監督功能，撤換管理表現不佳的總經理。
     本研究以2007年至2011年於證交所公開資訊觀測站之重大訊息公告專區宣告更換總經理之台灣上市公司為研究樣本，透過事件研究法計算個別公司更換總經理的宣告效果。
     本研究首先探討市場對公司更換總經理之整體看法為何，再透過複迴歸分析進一步探討更換總經理前公司經營績效的好壞、卸任總經理之在位期間長短、卸任總經理是否離開公司、卸任總經理之持股百分比、董監事持股百分比、獨立董事人數占董事總人數之百分比等因素對宣告效果的影響。
     實證結果有以下發現：(一) 更換前公司營運績效好壞對宣告效果有顯著的影響。更換前營運績效佳之公司有負面的宣告效果，更換前營運績效差之公司有正面的宣告效果。(二)更換前營運績效佳的公司，若卸任的總經理在位期間越長，則宣告效果越負面。(三)更換前營運績效差的公司，若卸任的總經理離開公司，則宣告效果比卸任的總經理沒有離開公司還要正面。(四)更換前營運績效差的公司，若原總經理持股百分比越高，則宣告效果越正面。表示對於這些總經理持股百分比高的公司而言，造成公司績效不佳的原因是總經理能力不足，而不是因為存在代理問題。(五)董監事持股百分比對更換總經理的宣告效果沒有顯著的影響。(六)獨立董事占公司董事總人數之百分比越高卻使更換總經理之宣告效果越負面，表示本研究之實證結果不支持獨立董事對更換總經理有正面的影響。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This research studies the announcement effects of CEO turnovers with a view to understanding the reactions of stocks market toward CEO turnovers, and whether the boards play their role to oversee managers and replace those managers who perform poorly.
     This research collected samples from Taiwan listed companies who announced CEO turnovers during year 2007 through year 2011 and then calculated announcement effects by event study method.
     This research first studied the overall viewpoint of the stock market to CEO turnovers and then tried to figure out whether and how corporate operating performance before CEO turnovers, tenure of ex-CEO, whether the ex-CEO leaves the corporate, stock holding percentage of ex-CEO, stock holding percentage of directors and the percentage of number of independent directors accounts for total number of directors influence the announcement effects of CEO turnovers.
     This research finds that: (1) Companies’ performances before CEO turnover significantly influence the announcement effects. Sub-sample of well-performed companies has negative announcement effects and the sub-sample of poorly-performed companies has positive announcement effects. (2) For well-performed companies, the longer the tenure of ex-CEO, the more negative the announcement effect is. (3) For poor-performed companies, the announcement effect of companies whose ex-CEO leaves the company is more positive than those whose ex-CEO does not leave the companies. (4) For poorly-performed companies, the higher the ex-CEO stock holding percentage, the more positive the announcement effect is. It means that for those companies whose ex-CEO stock holding percentage is high, it is not agency problem that causes CEO to perform poorly but the lack of the CEO’s ability does. (5) The stock holding percentage of directors does not significantly influence the announcement effect. (6) The higher the percentage of number of independent directors accounts for the total number of directors, the more negative the CEO turnover announcement effect is. This means that the result of this research does not support that independent directors have a positive impact on CEO turnover.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
      第一節 研究背景與動機 1
      第二節 研究目的 3
      第三節 研究架構 4
     第二章 文獻回顧與假說發展 5
      第一節 文獻回顧 5
      第二節 假說發展 9
     第三章 研究方法 12
      第一節 資料來源與樣本 12
      第二節 樣本分類及分布 13
      第三節 事件研究法 17
      第四節 複迴歸分析 23
     第四章 實證結果分析 30
      第一節 累積異常報酬率檢定分析 30
      第二節 複迴歸分析 33
     第五章 結論與建議 41
      第一節 研究結論 41
      第二節 研究限制與後續研究建議 42
     參考文獻 44		zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101357019en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 宣告效果zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 事件研究法zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 總經理更換zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Announcement Effecten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Event Studyen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CEO Turnoveren_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate Governanceen_US
dc.title (題名) 台灣上市公司總經理更換的宣告效果zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Announcement Effect of CEO Turnover of Listed Companies in Taiwanen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1.Abe, Y. (1996). Chief executive turnover and firm performance in Japan. Journal of The Japanese and International Economies, 11, 2–26.
     2.Allgood, S. and Farrell, K. A. (2000). The effect of CEO tenure on the relation between firm performance and turnover. Journal of Financial Research, 23(3), 373-390.
     3.Armutage, S. (1995). Event study methods and evidence on their performance. Journal of Economic Survey, 8(4), 25-28.
     4.Bonnier, K. A. and Bruner, R. F. (1988). An analysis of stock price reaction to management change in distressed firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 11, 95-106.
     5.Brown, L. D. and Caylor, M. L. (2006). Corporate governance and firm operating performance. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 32, 129-144.
     6.Cosh, A., Hughes, A. (1997). Executive remuneration, executive dismissal and institutional shareholdings. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 469-492.
     7.Dahya, J., McConnell, J. J. and Travlos, N. G. (2002). The Cadbury committee, corporate performance, and top management turnover. The Journal of Finance, 1, 461-483.
     8.Engel, E., Hayes, R.M., Want, X. (2003). CEO turnover and properties of accounting information. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36, 1-3.
     9.Farell, K.A. and Whidbee, D.A. (2003). The impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover and replacement decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36, 1-3.
     10.Flanagan, W. (1982). Board and room. Forbes, 219-297.
     11.Goyal, V. K. and Park, C. W. (2001). Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8, 49-66.
     12.Grusky, O. (1963). Managerial succession and organizational effectiveness. American Journal of Sociology, 69(1), 21-31.
     13.Guest, R. H. (1962). Managerial succession in complex organizations. American Journal of Sociology, 68(1), 47-56.
     14.Harrison, J. R., Torres, D. L. and Kukalis, S. (1988). The changing of the guard: turnover and structural change in the top-management positions. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33(2), 211-232.
     15.Helmich, D. L. (1974). Organizational growth and succession patterns. The Academy of Management Journal, 17(4), 771-775.
     16.Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74-91.
     17.Huson, M. R., Parrino, R. and Starks, L. T. (2001). Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO turnover: a long-term Perspective. The Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2265-2297.
     18.Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 4, 305-360.
     19.Kato, T. and Long, C. (2006). CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: evidence from micro data. Journal of Comparative Economics, 34, 96-817.
     20.Kini, O., Kracaw, W. and Mian, S.(2004). The nature of discipline by corporate takeovers. The Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1511-1552.
     21.Lausten, M. (2002). CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical evidence on Danish firms. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, 391-414.
     22.MacAvoy, P.W., Cantor, S., Dana, J., and Peck, S. (1983), AL1 proposals for increased control of the corporation by the board of directors: An economic analysis, in: Statement of the Business Roundtable on the American Law Institute’s proposed principles of corporate governance and structure: Restatement and recommendations (Business Roundtable New York).
     23.Peterson, P. P. (1989). Event study: a review of issues and methodology. Quarterly Journal of Business of and Economics, 28, 36-67.
     24.Puffer, S.M. and Weintrop, J.B. (1991). Corporate performance and CEO turnover: the role of performance expectations. Administration Science Quarterly, 36, 1-19.
     25.Reinganum, M. R. (1985). The effect of executive succession on stockholder wealth. Administrative Science Quarterly, 30, 46-60.
     26.Shen, W. and Cannella, A. A. Jr. (2002). Revisiting the performance consequences of CEO succession: the impacts of successor type, postsuccession senior executive turnover, and departing CEO tenure. The Academy of Management Journal, 45(4), 717-733.
     27.Smith, J. E., Carson, K. P. and Alexander, R. A. (1984). Leadership: it can make a difference. The Academy of Management Journal, 27(4), 765-776.
     28.Vance, S. (1983). Corporate leadership. New York: McGraw-Hill.
     29.Warner, J. B., Watts, R. L. and Wruck, K. H. (1988). Stock prices and top management changes. Journal f Financial Economics, 20, 461-462.
     30.Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economic, 20, 431-460.
     31.李欣柔(2010)。實證替換高階經理人之績效，高雄大學金融管理學系研究所碩士論文。
     32.黃旭輝(2005)。經理人異動與股東財富效果，管理評論，第25卷，第1期，23-45頁。
     33.簡金成、鄭雅云(2004)。獎酬制度對董監事獨立性之影響，行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫 成果報告。		zh_TW