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題名 Collusion or Competition? Interfirm Relationships in the Chinese Auto Industry
作者 胡偉民
Hu, Wei-Min ; Xiao, Junji ; Zhou, Xiaolan
貢獻者 財政系
日期 2012.09
上傳時間 30-Jun-2014 17:56:34 (UTC+8)
摘要 The Chinese passenger-vehicle industry contains a large number of manufacturers. Some of them are members of big corporate groups centered around state owned enterprises. These corporate relationships may facilitate collusion. This paper applies the non-nested hypothesis test methodology to data on passenger vehicles to identify whether price collusion exists within corporate groups or across groups. Our empirical results support the assumption of Bertrand Nash competition in the Chinese passenger-vehicle industry: We find no evidence for within or cross-group price collusion. Our policy experiments show that indigenous brands will gain market shares and profits if within-group companies merge.
關聯 Journal of Industrial Economics, 62(1), 1-40
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12035
dc.contributor 財政系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 胡偉民zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Hu, Wei-Min ; Xiao, Junji ; Zhou, Xiaolanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2012.09en_US
dc.date.accessioned 30-Jun-2014 17:56:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 30-Jun-2014 17:56:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 30-Jun-2014 17:56:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/67026-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The Chinese passenger-vehicle industry contains a large number of manufacturers. Some of them are members of big corporate groups centered around state owned enterprises. These corporate relationships may facilitate collusion. This paper applies the non-nested hypothesis test methodology to data on passenger vehicles to identify whether price collusion exists within corporate groups or across groups. Our empirical results support the assumption of Bertrand Nash competition in the Chinese passenger-vehicle industry: We find no evidence for within or cross-group price collusion. Our policy experiments show that indigenous brands will gain market shares and profits if within-group companies merge.en_US
dc.format.extent 126 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Industrial Economics, 62(1), 1-40en_US
dc.title (題名) Collusion or Competition? Interfirm Relationships in the Chinese Auto Industryen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1111/joie.12035en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12035en_US