| dc.contributor | 資科系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 左瑞麟 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Tso,Raylin;Miao,Ying;Takeshi Okamoto;Eiji Okamoto | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2005 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 7-Aug-2014 14:41:34 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 7-Aug-2014 14:41:34 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 7-Aug-2014 14:41:34 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/68433 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In the Shamir (t, n)-threshold scheme, the dealer constructs a random polynomial f(x) ∈ GF(p)[x] of degree at most t-1 in which the constant term is the secret K ∈ GF(p). However, if the chosen polynomial f(x) is of degree less than t-1, then a conspiracy of any t-1 participants can reconstruct the secret K;on the other hand, if the degree of f(x) is greater than t-1, then even t participants can not reconstruct the secret K properly. To prevent these from happening, the degree of the polynomial f(x) should be exactly equal to t-1 if the dealer claimed that the threshold of this scheme is t. There also should be some ways for participants to verify whether the threshold is exactly t or not. A few known verifiable threshold schemes provide such ability but the securities of these schemes are based on some cryptographic assumptions. The purpose of this paper is to propose some threshold-verification protocols for the Shamir (t, n)-threshold scheme from the viewpoint of unconditional security. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 285448 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Transactions of Information Processing Society of Japan,46(8),1824-1833 | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | How to verify the threshold t of the Shamir’s (t,n)-threshold scheme | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
