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題名 Clawback條款是否影響公司之權益資金成本及信用評等?
Do Clawback Provisions Affect Firm’s Cost of Equity Capital and Credit Rating?
作者 謝天
Hsieh, Tien
貢獻者 俞洪昭
Yu, Hung Chao
謝天
Hsieh, Tien
關鍵詞 Clawback條款
權益資金成本
信用評等
Clawback provisions
Cost of equity capital
Credit rating
日期 2013
上傳時間 12-Aug-2014 14:00:46 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究旨在探討不同的市場參與者是否會視公司自願性採用Clawback條款與否，而給予不同的回應。以2007至2011年間納入Russel 3000指數之公司(排除金融服務與保險業)為樣本，本研究發現，與未採用Clawback條款之公司相比，自願性採用Clawback條款之公司，其權益資金成本較低，且信用評等較佳，顯示投資人及信用評等機構皆認為Clawback條款有助於提升公司之財務報導品質，進而降低其所承受之資訊風險。本研究進一步以F-score (Dechow et al. 2011)來衡量公司的事前舞弊風險，並將樣本區分為高舞弊風險組與低舞弊風險組。本研究發現，Clawback條款僅在低舞弊風險組與權益資金成本呈顯著負相關，顯示財務品質較佳之公司確實會透過自願性採用Clawback條款來向資本市場彰顯其信心，而投資人亦會以較低之要求報酬做出回應。然而，本研究亦發現，Clawback條款僅在高舞弊風險組與信用評等呈顯著正相關，這意味著信用評等機構能夠區別Clawback條款對於高舞弊風險公司及低舞弊風險公司的效益，並針對尋求實質改善的公司做出正面回應。最後，本研究使用機構投資人持股比例，將樣本區分為高外部監督與低外部監督(亦即低代理問題與高代理問題)兩組。迴歸結果顯示，僅有在公司所受到的外部監督程度較低時，Clawback條款方會與權益資金成本及信用評等呈顯著相關。
This study examines whether different market participants react differently to voluntary adopters and non-adopters of clawback provisions. Based on the sample of non-financial firms included in the Russel 3000 index from year 2007 to 2011, the empirical results show that, comparing to non-adopters, firms who voluntarily adopt the clawback provisons have lower cost of equity capital and higher credit rating, suggesting that both investors and credit rating agency regard clawback provisions as a means to reduce information risk and, therefore, enhance firms’ financial reporting quality. This study further uses the F-score (Dechow et al. 2011) to separate the sample into high versus low risk of occuring fraudulent financial reporting groups. The regression results from both groups indicate that the adoption of clawback provisions is negatively related to cost of equity capital only when firms have lower fraud risk. This finding implies that firms with good financial reporting quality tend to adopt clawback provisions to signal their confidence on financial reporting, and investors respond by requiring lower returns. In contrast, the results report that the adoption of clawback provisions is positively related to credit rating only when firms are more likely to incur fraudulent financial reporting, implying that credit rating agency appears to consider the effect of clawback provisions and responds to firms who seek real improvement in their financial reporting quality. Finally, this study adopts institutional investors’ ownership to seperate the sample into high versus low external monitoring (i.e., low versus high agency problem) groups. The regression results from both groups show that the effects of clawback provisions on cost of equity capital and credit rating remain only for firms that are subjected to low external monitoring.
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Ang, J., Y. Cheng, and S. Fulmer. 2013. Clawing back executive compensation. Working paper. Florida State University.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W. Collins, and R. LaFond. 2006. The effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 203–243.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W. Collins, W. R. Kinney, and R. LaFond. 2009. The effect of SOX internal control deficiencies on firm risk and cost of equity. Journal of Accounting Research 47 (1): 1-43.
Attig, N., S. E. Ghoul, and O. Guedhami. 2013. Corporate social responsibility and credit ratings. Journal of Business Ethics 117:679–694.
Babenko, I., B. Bennett, J. Bizjak, J. L. Coles. 2012. Clawback provisions. Working paper. Arizona State University, and Texas Christian University.
Beneish, M. D. and M. E. Vargus. 2002. Insider trading, earnings quality, and accrual mispricing. The Accounting Review 77(4): 755-791.
Bhojraj, S., and P. Sengupta. 2003. Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: The role of institutional investors and outside directors. Journal of Business 76 (3): 455–475.
Blume, M. E., F. Lim, and A. C. Mackinlay. 1998. The declining credit quality of U.S. corporate debt: Myth or reality. Journal of Finance 53 (4): 1389–1413.
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Brown, A., P. Davis-Friday, and L. Guler. 2011. Economic determinants of the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts. Working paper. Baruch College.
Brown, A., P. Davis-Friday, and L. Guler. 2014. M&A performance and the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts. Working paper. Idaho State University, City University of New York-Baruch College, and Koç University.
Burns, N., and S. Kedia. 2006. The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting. Journal of Financial Economics 79 (1): 35–67.
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Chan, L. H., K. Chen, T. Y. Chen, and Y. Yu. 2012b. Substitution between real and accrual-based earnings management after voluntary adoption of compensation clawback provisions. Working paper. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
Chan, L. H., K. Chen, and T. Y. Chen. 2013. The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on bank loan contracting. Journal of Financial Economics 110: 659-679.
Chen, M. A., D. Greene, and J. Owers. 2014. The costs and benefits of clawback provisions in CEO compensation. Working paper. Georgia State University.
Cheng, Q., and T. D. Warfield. 2005. Equity incentives and earnings management, The Accounting Review 80: 441-476.
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
101353004
102
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101353004
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 俞洪昭zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Yu, Hung Chaoen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 謝天zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Hsieh, Tienen_US
dc.creator (作者) 謝天zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Hsieh, Tienen_US
dc.date (日期) 2013en_US
dc.date.accessioned 12-Aug-2014 14:00:46 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 12-Aug-2014 14:00:46 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 12-Aug-2014 14:00:46 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0101353004en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/68522-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 101353004zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 102zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究旨在探討不同的市場參與者是否會視公司自願性採用Clawback條款與否，而給予不同的回應。以2007至2011年間納入Russel 3000指數之公司(排除金融服務與保險業)為樣本，本研究發現，與未採用Clawback條款之公司相比，自願性採用Clawback條款之公司，其權益資金成本較低，且信用評等較佳，顯示投資人及信用評等機構皆認為Clawback條款有助於提升公司之財務報導品質，進而降低其所承受之資訊風險。本研究進一步以F-score (Dechow et al. 2011)來衡量公司的事前舞弊風險，並將樣本區分為高舞弊風險組與低舞弊風險組。本研究發現，Clawback條款僅在低舞弊風險組與權益資金成本呈顯著負相關，顯示財務品質較佳之公司確實會透過自願性採用Clawback條款來向資本市場彰顯其信心，而投資人亦會以較低之要求報酬做出回應。然而，本研究亦發現，Clawback條款僅在高舞弊風險組與信用評等呈顯著正相關，這意味著信用評等機構能夠區別Clawback條款對於高舞弊風險公司及低舞弊風險公司的效益，並針對尋求實質改善的公司做出正面回應。最後，本研究使用機構投資人持股比例，將樣本區分為高外部監督與低外部監督(亦即低代理問題與高代理問題)兩組。迴歸結果顯示，僅有在公司所受到的外部監督程度較低時，Clawback條款方會與權益資金成本及信用評等呈顯著相關。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study examines whether different market participants react differently to voluntary adopters and non-adopters of clawback provisions. Based on the sample of non-financial firms included in the Russel 3000 index from year 2007 to 2011, the empirical results show that, comparing to non-adopters, firms who voluntarily adopt the clawback provisons have lower cost of equity capital and higher credit rating, suggesting that both investors and credit rating agency regard clawback provisions as a means to reduce information risk and, therefore, enhance firms’ financial reporting quality. This study further uses the F-score (Dechow et al. 2011) to separate the sample into high versus low risk of occuring fraudulent financial reporting groups. The regression results from both groups indicate that the adoption of clawback provisions is negatively related to cost of equity capital only when firms have lower fraud risk. This finding implies that firms with good financial reporting quality tend to adopt clawback provisions to signal their confidence on financial reporting, and investors respond by requiring lower returns. In contrast, the results report that the adoption of clawback provisions is positively related to credit rating only when firms are more likely to incur fraudulent financial reporting, implying that credit rating agency appears to consider the effect of clawback provisions and responds to firms who seek real improvement in their financial reporting quality. Finally, this study adopts institutional investors’ ownership to seperate the sample into high versus low external monitoring (i.e., low versus high agency problem) groups. The regression results from both groups show that the effects of clawback provisions on cost of equity capital and credit rating remain only for firms that are subjected to low external monitoring.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
第二章 研究背景、文獻探討與假說建立 4
第一節 Clawback條款之沿革 4
第二節 Clawback條款之意義與性質 6
一、 Clawback條款之意義 6
二、 Clawbcak條款之構成要件 6
第三節 文獻探討 7
一、 公司自願性採用Clawback條款之決定因素 8
二、 公司採用Clawback條款後之影響 9
三、 市場對於公司採用Clawback條款之反應 10
四、 採用Clawback條款對經理人行為之影響 11
五、 強制採用Clawback條款之效果與利弊得失 12
第四節 假說建立 13
一、 採用Clawback條款對權益資金成本之影響 13
二、 採用Clawback條款對信用評等之影響 14
第三章 研究設計 15
第一節 樣本篩選 15
第二節 研究方法 17
一、 控制內生性問題(Endogenity problem) 17
二、 自願性採用Clawback條款模型 18
三、 迴歸模型 21
第四章 實證結果 30
第一節 敘述性統計與單變量檢定 30
一、 敘述統計量 30
二、 平均數與中位數檢定 30
三、 相關係數矩陣 39
第二節 迴歸結果 43
一、 Heckman第一階段自願性採用Clawback條款模型 43
二、 Heckman第二階段權益資金成本模型 46
三、 Heckman第二階段信用評等模型 49
四、 額外測試 51
第五章 結論與建議 63
參考文獻 65
附錄 70

表目錄
表 1　Clawback條款之採用情形 16
表 2　樣本篩選過程 17
表 3　自願性採用Clawback條款模型之變數定義表 18
表 4　Clawback條款與權益資金成本模型之變數定義表 21
表 5　Clawback條款與信用評等模型之變數定義表 26
表 6　信用評等分類表 27
表 7　Heckman第一階段自願性採用Clawback條款模型變數之敘述統計量 32
表 8　Heckman第二階段權益資金成本模型變數之敘述統計量 33
表 9　Heckman第二階段信用評等模型變數之敘述統計量 34
表 10　Heckman第二階段權益資金成本模型之平均數與中位數檢定結果 35
表 11　Heckman第二階段信用評等模型之平均數與中位數檢定結果 37
表 12　Heckman第二階段權益資金成本模型之相關係數矩陣─PEG法 40
表 13　Heckman第二階段權益資金成本模型之相關係數矩陣─OJ法 41
表 14　Heckman第二階段信用評等模型之相關係數矩陣 42
表 15　Heckman第一階段自願性採用Clawback條款模型之迴歸結果 45
表 16　Heckman第二階段權益資金成本模型之迴歸結果 48
表 17　Heckman第二階段信用評等模型之迴歸結果 50
表 18　F-score財務報表變數模型之變數定義表 51
表 19　Heckman第二階段權益資金成本模型之迴歸結果─以事前舞弊風險分組 54
表 20　Heckman第二階段信用評等模型之迴歸結果─以事前舞弊風險分組 56
表 21　Heckman第二階段權益資金成本模型之迴歸結果─以外部監督程度分組 59
表 22　Heckman第二階段信用評等模型之迴歸結果─以外部監督程度分組 61		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1892101 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101353004en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Clawback條款zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 權益資金成本zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 信用評等zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Clawback provisionsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Cost of equity capitalen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Credit ratingen_US
dc.title (題名) Clawback條款是否影響公司之權益資金成本及信用評等?zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Do Clawback Provisions Affect Firm’s Cost of Equity Capital and Credit Rating?en_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Addy, N., X. Chu, and T. Yoder. 2011. Recovering bonuses after restated financials: adopting clawback provisions. Working paper. Mississippi State University, Louisiana State Tech University, and University of Nebraska at Omaha.
Ang, J., Y. Cheng, and S. Fulmer. 2013. Clawing back executive compensation. Working paper. Florida State University.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W. Collins, and R. LaFond. 2006. The effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 203–243.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W. Collins, W. R. Kinney, and R. LaFond. 2009. The effect of SOX internal control deficiencies on firm risk and cost of equity. Journal of Accounting Research 47 (1): 1-43.
Attig, N., S. E. Ghoul, and O. Guedhami. 2013. Corporate social responsibility and credit ratings. Journal of Business Ethics 117:679–694.
Babenko, I., B. Bennett, J. Bizjak, J. L. Coles. 2012. Clawback provisions. Working paper. Arizona State University, and Texas Christian University.
Beneish, M. D. and M. E. Vargus. 2002. Insider trading, earnings quality, and accrual mispricing. The Accounting Review 77(4): 755-791.
Bhojraj, S., and P. Sengupta. 2003. Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: The role of institutional investors and outside directors. Journal of Business 76 (3): 455–475.
Blume, M. E., F. Lim, and A. C. Mackinlay. 1998. The declining credit quality of U.S. corporate debt: Myth or reality. Journal of Finance 53 (4): 1389–1413.
Botosan, C. A. 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review 72 (3): 323–349.
Botosan, C. A., and M. A. Plumlee. 2002. A re-examination of disclosure level and the expected cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research 40 (1): 21–40.
Brown, A., P. Davis-Friday, and L. Guler. 2011. Economic determinants of the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts. Working paper. Baruch College.
Brown, A., P. Davis-Friday, and L. Guler. 2014. M&A performance and the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts. Working paper. Idaho State University, City University of New York-Baruch College, and Koç University.
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