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題名 產品成為主流之過程與影響因素
Mainstream Products: Formation and Determinant Factors作者 陳年億
Chen, Nein Yi貢獻者 何靜嫺
Ho, Shirley
陳年億
Chen, Nein Yi關鍵詞 網絡
學習
流行
動態行為模型
重複加權平均
馬可夫鍊
network
learning
popular
dynamic behavior model
repeated weighted average
Markov chain日期 2014 上傳時間 1-Sep-2014 13:51:28 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文模型來自於DeGroot (1974)的模型，以此模型為基礎延伸至兩產品之架構，並利用比較效果與網絡效果疲乏之間的交互作用，而得到了本文的定理2.。此定理2.可解釋許多市場上，廠商選擇其產品推出時間而影響其銷售量之變化。因此，本文對於兩廠商的競爭提出了一個新觀點：廠商因何時推出其產品，而能使得其產品成為主流。我們討論的不是價格或者品質的競爭，而在於產品相對推出的時間，因此，本文在定理2.得到了一個充分條件，這個條件讓廠商知道應何時推出其產品，而此產品可成為市場上之主流產品。 參考文獻 1.Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A., & ParandehGheibi, A. (2010). Spread of (mis) information in social networks. Games and Economic Behavior, 70(2), 194-227.2.Acemoglu, D., & Ozdaglar, A. (2011). Opinion dynamics and learning in social networks. Dynamic Games and Applications, 1(1), 3-49.3.Axelrod, R. (1997). The dissemination of culture a model with local convergence and global polarization. Journal of conflict resolution, 41(2), 203-226.4.Banerjee, A. V. (1992). A simple model of herd behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 797-817.5.Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1992). A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and cultural change as informational cascades. Journal of political Economy, 992-1026.6.Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission.Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1431-1451.7.Deffuant, G., Neau, D., Amblard, F., & Weisbuch, G. (2000). Mixing beliefs among interacting agents. Advances in Complex Systems, 3(01n04), 87-98.8.DeGroot, M. H. (1974). Reaching a consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69(345), 118-121.9.DeMarzo, P. M., Vayanos, D., & Zwiebel, J. (2003). Persuasion bias, social influence, and unidimensional opinions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 909-968.10.Friedkin, N. E., & Johnsen, E. C. (1997). Social positions in influence networks.Social Networks, 19(3), 209-222.11.French Jr, J. R. (1956). A formal theory of social power. Psychological review,63(3), 181.12.Galeotti, A., Ghiglino, C., & Squintani, F. (2013). Strategic information transmission networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 148(5), 1751-1769.13.Jackson, M. O. (2010). Social and economic networks. Princeton University Press.14.Jadbabaie, A., Molavi, P., Sandroni, A., & Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2012). Non-Bayesian social learning. Games and Economic Behavior, 76(1), 210-225.15.Krause, U. (2000). A discrete nonlinear and non-autonomous model of consensus formation. Communications in difference equations, 227-236.16.Mueller‐Frank, M. (2013). A general framework for rational learning in social networks. Theoretical Economics, 8(1), 1-4017.Pan, Z. (2010). Trust, influence, and convergence of behavior in social networks.Mathematical Social Sciences, 60(1), 69-78.18.Teraji, S. (2003). Herd behavior and the quality of opinions. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 32(6), 661-673. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
101258030
103資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1012580301 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 何靜嫺 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Ho, Shirley en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳年億 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chen, Nein Yi en_US dc.creator (作者) 陳年億 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chen, Nein Yi en_US dc.date (日期) 2014 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Sep-2014 13:51:28 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Sep-2014 13:51:28 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Sep-2014 13:51:28 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G1012580301 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/69470 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 經濟學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 101258030 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 103 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文模型來自於DeGroot (1974)的模型，以此模型為基礎延伸至兩產品之架構，並利用比較效果與網絡效果疲乏之間的交互作用，而得到了本文的定理2.。此定理2.可解釋許多市場上，廠商選擇其產品推出時間而影響其銷售量之變化。因此，本文對於兩廠商的競爭提出了一個新觀點：廠商因何時推出其產品，而能使得其產品成為主流。我們討論的不是價格或者品質的競爭，而在於產品相對推出的時間，因此，本文在定理2.得到了一個充分條件，這個條件讓廠商知道應何時推出其產品，而此產品可成為市場上之主流產品。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章、 緒論 1第貳章、 文獻回顧 4第參章、 基本模型 9第肆章、 模型延伸－兩種產品 14第伍章、 模擬 27第陸章、 結論 32第柒章、 附錄 33 zh_TW dc.format.extent 2916711 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1012580301 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 網絡 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 學習 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 流行 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 動態行為模型 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 重複加權平均 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 馬可夫鍊 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) network en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) learning en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) popular en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) dynamic behavior model en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) repeated weighted average en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Markov chain en_US dc.title (題名) 產品成為主流之過程與影響因素 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Mainstream Products: Formation and Determinant Factors en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1.Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A., & ParandehGheibi, A. (2010). Spread of (mis) information in social networks. Games and Economic Behavior, 70(2), 194-227.2.Acemoglu, D., & Ozdaglar, A. (2011). Opinion dynamics and learning in social networks. Dynamic Games and Applications, 1(1), 3-49.3.Axelrod, R. (1997). The dissemination of culture a model with local convergence and global polarization. Journal of conflict resolution, 41(2), 203-226.4.Banerjee, A. V. (1992). A simple model of herd behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 797-817.5.Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1992). A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and cultural change as informational cascades. Journal of political Economy, 992-1026.6.Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission.Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1431-1451.7.Deffuant, G., Neau, D., Amblard, F., & Weisbuch, G. (2000). Mixing beliefs among interacting agents. Advances in Complex Systems, 3(01n04), 87-98.8.DeGroot, M. H. (1974). Reaching a consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69(345), 118-121.9.DeMarzo, P. M., Vayanos, D., & Zwiebel, J. (2003). Persuasion bias, social influence, and unidimensional opinions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 909-968.10.Friedkin, N. E., & Johnsen, E. C. (1997). Social positions in influence networks.Social Networks, 19(3), 209-222.11.French Jr, J. R. (1956). A formal theory of social power. Psychological review,63(3), 181.12.Galeotti, A., Ghiglino, C., & Squintani, F. (2013). Strategic information transmission networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 148(5), 1751-1769.13.Jackson, M. O. (2010). Social and economic networks. Princeton University Press.14.Jadbabaie, A., Molavi, P., Sandroni, A., & Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2012). Non-Bayesian social learning. Games and Economic Behavior, 76(1), 210-225.15.Krause, U. (2000). A discrete nonlinear and non-autonomous model of consensus formation. Communications in difference equations, 227-236.16.Mueller‐Frank, M. (2013). A general framework for rational learning in social networks. Theoretical Economics, 8(1), 1-4017.Pan, Z. (2010). Trust, influence, and convergence of behavior in social networks.Mathematical Social Sciences, 60(1), 69-78.18.Teraji, S. (2003). Herd behavior and the quality of opinions. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 32(6), 661-673. zh_TW
