| dc.contributor | 法律系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 劉連煜 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2012.02 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 10-Sep-2014 15:36:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 10-Sep-2014 15:36:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 10-Sep-2014 15:36:16 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/69714 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 對於敵意併購，各國立法政策上是否應採取董事會中立主義或董事會優先原則，涉及每一國家股東資訊不對稱、公司股權結構及公司治理等複雜問題，可能一時之間仍難有共識。在臺灣，現行法制似較傾向採取董事會優先原則，則目標公司董事會對敵意併購所採取之防禦措施是否違反受任人義務，並不是假議題而是真實必須立刻面對的問題。本文針對此一議題援用實際案例加以深入研究。 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Hostile takeovers are very complicated issues: it is not easy to achieve a consensus amongst the legislative policies of different legal regimes on whether to adopt the so-called “director neutralization” or “director primacy” model due to such complex problems as information asymmetry of shareholders, shareholding construction and corporate governance, etc. In Taiwan, it seems that the current legal regime tends to adopt the “director primacy” model, and therefore whether the defensive measures adopted by a target company have violated fiduciary duty is not an imaginary but a real issue, one which should be dealt with seriously and immediately. This article tries to explore in-depth these issues with a case study. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 1046854 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 政大法學評論, Vol.125, No.125, pp.1-53 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 敵意併購;防禦措施;非合意併購;受任人義務;受託義務;董事會優先原則 | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 敵意併購下目標公司董事的受任人（受託）義務——以開發金控敵意併購金鼎證券為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
