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題名 績效資訊特性與控制、薪資設計—組織控制觀點與代理理論觀點之整合
其他題名 Relationships between Performance Information, Control and Compensation Design: Integrating Organizational Control and Agency Theory Approach
作者 黃家齊
Huang, Jia-Chi
貢獻者 企管系
關鍵詞 薪資設計 ; 薪資給付基礎 ; 組織控制 ; 績效資訊 ; 代理理論
compensation design ; basis for pay ; organizational control ; performance information ; agency theory
日期 2000.06
上傳時間 30-Sep-2014 16:45:48 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究針對薪資設計進行探討。作者將薪資給付基礎視為組織可有效運用的控制機制,並透過文獻探討與觀念推演,分析績效本位、職務本位以及技能本位等三類薪資給付基礎具備之控制功能。其中,績效本位薪資具備了產出控制的功能,職務本位薪資偏重在行為控制功能,技能本位薪資則強調投入控制的效果。其次,文中整合組織控制與代理理論觀點,歸納出產出可衡量性、轉換過程知識完整性以及行為可觀察性等三項績效資訊特性,並建構績效資訊與薪資給付基礎的關係模式。研究結果發現,代理理論的預測能力略高於組織控制觀點。且產出可衡量性與績效本位薪資的使用有正相關,轉換過程知識完整性與行為可觀察性則與職務本位薪資之使用呈正相關,而與技能本位薪資呈負相關。
Based on organizational control perspective, the basis for pay is recognized as some kinds of control mechanism. After reviewing the relevant literature, we got three categories of basis for pay, including performance-based pay, job-based pay and skill-based pay. And these three bases for pay have output control, behavior control and input control functions respectively. By integrating organizational control and agency theory approach, we got three dimensions of performance information, including outcome measurability, knowledge of transformation process, and behavior observability. And we building a model of relationships between performance information and basis for pay. We found agency theory was more predictive than organizational control theory. Besides, outcome measurability has positive relationships with performance-based pay, knowledge of transformation process and behavior observability also positively related to job-based pay, and negatively related to skill-based pay.
關聯 台大管理論叢, 10(2), 227-255
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 企管系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 黃家齊zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Huang, Jia-Chien_US
dc.date (日期) 2000.06en_US
dc.date.accessioned 30-Sep-2014 16:45:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 30-Sep-2014 16:45:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 30-Sep-2014 16:45:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/70203-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究針對薪資設計進行探討。作者將薪資給付基礎視為組織可有效運用的控制機制,並透過文獻探討與觀念推演,分析績效本位、職務本位以及技能本位等三類薪資給付基礎具備之控制功能。其中,績效本位薪資具備了產出控制的功能,職務本位薪資偏重在行為控制功能,技能本位薪資則強調投入控制的效果。其次,文中整合組織控制與代理理論觀點,歸納出產出可衡量性、轉換過程知識完整性以及行為可觀察性等三項績效資訊特性,並建構績效資訊與薪資給付基礎的關係模式。研究結果發現,代理理論的預測能力略高於組織控制觀點。且產出可衡量性與績效本位薪資的使用有正相關,轉換過程知識完整性與行為可觀察性則與職務本位薪資之使用呈正相關,而與技能本位薪資呈負相關。en_US
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Based on organizational control perspective, the basis for pay is recognized as some kinds of control mechanism. After reviewing the relevant literature, we got three categories of basis for pay, including performance-based pay, job-based pay and skill-based pay. And these three bases for pay have output control, behavior control and input control functions respectively. By integrating organizational control and agency theory approach, we got three dimensions of performance information, including outcome measurability, knowledge of transformation process, and behavior observability. And we building a model of relationships between performance information and basis for pay. We found agency theory was more predictive than organizational control theory. Besides, outcome measurability has positive relationships with performance-based pay, knowledge of transformation process and behavior observability also positively related to job-based pay, and negatively related to skill-based pay.en_US
dc.format.extent 2275556 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) 台大管理論叢, 10(2), 227-255en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪資設計 ; 薪資給付基礎 ; 組織控制 ; 績效資訊 ; 代理理論en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) compensation design ; basis for pay ; organizational control ; performance information ; agency theoryen_US
dc.title (題名) 績效資訊特性與控制、薪資設計—組織控制觀點與代理理論觀點之整合zh_TW
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) Relationships between Performance Information, Control and Compensation Design: Integrating Organizational Control and Agency Theory Approachen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen