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題名 經營權爭奪戰中股東召集權設計兼論監察人角色——以元大復華併購案為例
其他題名 The Regulations Concerning the Right to Convene a Shareholders’ Meeting in the Battle of Corporate Control, and the Role of Supervi-sors:Take the Merger between Yuanta Core Pacific Securities and Fuhwa Financial Holdings for Example
作者 方嘉麟
Faung, Kai-Lin Faung
貢獻者 法律系
關鍵詞 大股東 ; 元大 ; 合併 ; 改選董事 ; 所有與經營 ; 股東召集權 ; 股東提案 ; 備查案 ; 經營權爭奪 ; 監察人 ; 董事長 ; 董事會
Merger ; Corporate control ; Re-election ; Board holding period requirement ; Right to convene shareholders` meetings
日期 2009.04
上傳時間 30-Sep-2014 17:49:13 (UTC+8)
摘要 元大集團欲藉元大京華證券與復華金控之合併以加入金控行列,然元大與復華合併案並未因元大集團取得復華金最多股權即順利進行,主因是元大未取得董事會過半席位。由於另一大股東中央投資公司對於合併案有不同意見,而公股代表亦反對董事會以表決方式通過合併案之提案,故自二○○五年復華金董監改選完畢後延宕至二○○六年復華金股東常會召開前,仍遲遲無法完成合併。復華金董事以合併案延宕為由,以股東身分依公司法第一七二條之一規定提案「在股東常會召開後兩個月內舉行股東臨時會,並全面改選董事」,請求將之列入二○○六年六月十二日召開之股東常會議案,以期取得董事會過半席位再推動合併。股東召集權設計在爭奪經營權上攸關至鉅,本案元大選擇由股東常會決議限期命董事會召開臨時會改選董事,正可以與其他股東召集權設計比較,探究法律設計處理何時大股東可撤換現任經營者,貫徹本身經營理念之立場。元大案凸顯我國對於召集股東持股期間要求、監察人定位為何、主管機關應扮演何種角色、貫徹股東召集權設計應有何配套措施,以及在經營權爭奪、更迭中有無比股東召集股東會改選董事更有效率之設計等相關問題,本文重點即在討論擁有公司最大股權之股東倘未能控制董事會,以致無法推行重大政策時,在我國公司法權力設計下,可如何貫徹本身意志以及相關法規之策略意涵。
The Yuanta Group planned to set up a financial holding company through a merger between Yuanta Core Pacific Securities and Fuhwa Financial Holdings. Although the Yuanta Group acquired a substantial portion of the shares of Fuhwa Financial Holdings, the aforesaid merger did not proceed without challenges. One of the major reasons is Yuanta did not control a majority of Fuhwa’s board. Notably, another main shareholder, Central Investment Holdings, along with representatives of government shareholders, opposed such a merger. It then became dead-locked among major shareholders. To expedite the merger deal, Yuanta decided it should first acquire a majority of the board seats. The Yuanta director of Fuhwa Financial Holdings thus filed a motion as a share-holder, which required Fuhwa to call a special shareholders meeting to re-elect all directors within two months after the regular shareholders’ meeting. Yuanta further requested that such a motion be included in the notice of the regular shareholders’ meeting to be held on June 12th 2006.The regulations concerning the right to convene a shareholders’ meeting played a key role in the battle of corporate control. In the present case, Yuanta chose to request the directors to call a special shareholders’ meeting within a definite time to re-elect directors after the regular shareholders’ meeting. Comparing different articles govern-ing the shareholders’ right to convene shareholders’ meetings, one can find out when a majority shareholder is able to replace the incumbent managers and thus implement his own business strategy. The Yuanta case highlights several issues such as the holding period requirement of the right to convene shareholders’ meetings, the function of supervisors, the role to be assumed by government authorities, the infrastructures to implement the shareholders’ right to convene shareholders’ meetings and whether there is any regulatory structure that is more effective than convening a special shareholders’ meeting to re-elect directors. The fo-cus of this article is a discussion of how a major shareholder, who does not have control of the board, can force his will on the company, and the underlying policy regarding allocation of power under the ROC Corporation Law.
關聯 法學評論, 108 , 213-258
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 法律系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 方嘉麟zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Faung, Kai-Lin Faungen_US
dc.date (日期) 2009.04en_US
dc.date.accessioned 30-Sep-2014 17:49:13 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 30-Sep-2014 17:49:13 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 30-Sep-2014 17:49:13 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/70235-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 元大集團欲藉元大京華證券與復華金控之合併以加入金控行列,然元大與復華合併案並未因元大集團取得復華金最多股權即順利進行,主因是元大未取得董事會過半席位。由於另一大股東中央投資公司對於合併案有不同意見,而公股代表亦反對董事會以表決方式通過合併案之提案,故自二○○五年復華金董監改選完畢後延宕至二○○六年復華金股東常會召開前,仍遲遲無法完成合併。復華金董事以合併案延宕為由,以股東身分依公司法第一七二條之一規定提案「在股東常會召開後兩個月內舉行股東臨時會,並全面改選董事」,請求將之列入二○○六年六月十二日召開之股東常會議案,以期取得董事會過半席位再推動合併。股東召集權設計在爭奪經營權上攸關至鉅,本案元大選擇由股東常會決議限期命董事會召開臨時會改選董事,正可以與其他股東召集權設計比較,探究法律設計處理何時大股東可撤換現任經營者,貫徹本身經營理念之立場。元大案凸顯我國對於召集股東持股期間要求、監察人定位為何、主管機關應扮演何種角色、貫徹股東召集權設計應有何配套措施,以及在經營權爭奪、更迭中有無比股東召集股東會改選董事更有效率之設計等相關問題,本文重點即在討論擁有公司最大股權之股東倘未能控制董事會,以致無法推行重大政策時,在我國公司法權力設計下,可如何貫徹本身意志以及相關法規之策略意涵。en_US
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The Yuanta Group planned to set up a financial holding company through a merger between Yuanta Core Pacific Securities and Fuhwa Financial Holdings. Although the Yuanta Group acquired a substantial portion of the shares of Fuhwa Financial Holdings, the aforesaid merger did not proceed without challenges. One of the major reasons is Yuanta did not control a majority of Fuhwa’s board. Notably, another main shareholder, Central Investment Holdings, along with representatives of government shareholders, opposed such a merger. It then became dead-locked among major shareholders. To expedite the merger deal, Yuanta decided it should first acquire a majority of the board seats. The Yuanta director of Fuhwa Financial Holdings thus filed a motion as a share-holder, which required Fuhwa to call a special shareholders meeting to re-elect all directors within two months after the regular shareholders’ meeting. Yuanta further requested that such a motion be included in the notice of the regular shareholders’ meeting to be held on June 12th 2006.The regulations concerning the right to convene a shareholders’ meeting played a key role in the battle of corporate control. In the present case, Yuanta chose to request the directors to call a special shareholders’ meeting within a definite time to re-elect directors after the regular shareholders’ meeting. Comparing different articles govern-ing the shareholders’ right to convene shareholders’ meetings, one can find out when a majority shareholder is able to replace the incumbent managers and thus implement his own business strategy. The Yuanta case highlights several issues such as the holding period requirement of the right to convene shareholders’ meetings, the function of supervisors, the role to be assumed by government authorities, the infrastructures to implement the shareholders’ right to convene shareholders’ meetings and whether there is any regulatory structure that is more effective than convening a special shareholders’ meeting to re-elect directors. The fo-cus of this article is a discussion of how a major shareholder, who does not have control of the board, can force his will on the company, and the underlying policy regarding allocation of power under the ROC Corporation Law.en_US
dc.format.extent 744516 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) 法學評論, 108 , 213-258en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 大股東 ; 元大 ; 合併 ; 改選董事 ; 所有與經營 ; 股東召集權 ; 股東提案 ; 備查案 ; 經營權爭奪 ; 監察人 ; 董事長 ; 董事會en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Merger ; Corporate control ; Re-election ; Board holding period requirement ; Right to convene shareholders` meetingsen_US
dc.title (題名) 經營權爭奪戰中股東召集權設計兼論監察人角色——以元大復華併購案為例zh_TW
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) The Regulations Concerning the Right to Convene a Shareholders’ Meeting in the Battle of Corporate Control, and the Role of Supervi-sors:Take the Merger between Yuanta Core Pacific Securities and Fuhwa Financial Holdings for Exampleen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen