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題名 Incentive maintenance outsourcing contracts for channel coordination and improvement
作者 唐揆
Tang, Kwei
貢獻者 企管系
日期 2006.08
上傳時間 16-Oct-2014 18:00:32 (UTC+8)
摘要 Consider a manufacturer who has a process with an increasing failure rate over time. In order to improve the process performance, the following two types of maintenance activity are outsourced to an external contractor: (i) preventive maintenance is performed periodically to improve the reliability of the process when the process is functional; and (ii) corrective maintenance is used to restore the process to a specified condition when it fails. We consider the use of incentive contracts to induce the contractor to select the maintenance policy that optimizes the total profit of the manufacturer and contractor. It is demonstrated that an incentive contract based on a combination of a target uptime level and a bonus always leads to the desired win-win coordination, and provides flexibility in allocating the extra profit generated from coordination and, importantly, an incentive to the contractor to improve the efficiency of the maintenance operations. The incentive contract can also be used to select the most economically efficient contractor from multiple contractors with different maintenance capabilities.
關聯 IIE Transactions, 38(8), 671-684
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07408170600692259
dc.contributor 企管系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 唐揆zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Tang, Kweien_US
dc.date (日期) 2006.08en_US
dc.date.accessioned 16-Oct-2014 18:00:32 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 16-Oct-2014 18:00:32 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 16-Oct-2014 18:00:32 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/70634-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Consider a manufacturer who has a process with an increasing failure rate over time. In order to improve the process performance, the following two types of maintenance activity are outsourced to an external contractor: (i) preventive maintenance is performed periodically to improve the reliability of the process when the process is functional; and (ii) corrective maintenance is used to restore the process to a specified condition when it fails. We consider the use of incentive contracts to induce the contractor to select the maintenance policy that optimizes the total profit of the manufacturer and contractor. It is demonstrated that an incentive contract based on a combination of a target uptime level and a bonus always leads to the desired win-win coordination, and provides flexibility in allocating the extra profit generated from coordination and, importantly, an incentive to the contractor to improve the efficiency of the maintenance operations. The incentive contract can also be used to select the most economically efficient contractor from multiple contractors with different maintenance capabilities.en_US
dc.format.extent 124 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) IIE Transactions, 38(8), 671-684en_US
dc.title (題名) Incentive maintenance outsourcing contracts for channel coordination and improvementen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1080/07408170600692259en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07408170600692259 en_US