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題名 Maintenance Outsourcing of a Multi-process Manufacturing System with Multiple Contractors
作者 唐揆
Tang, Kwei
貢獻者 企管系
日期 2006.01
上傳時間 16-Oct-2014 18:00:34 (UTC+8)
摘要 Consider a manufacturer with a manufacturing system that consists of multiple processes. The manufacturer`s revenue is determined by the minimum of the uptimes among the processes. The maintenance functions of the processes are outsourced to independent contractors so that each contractor is responsible only for one process. A performance-based incentive contract is offered to each contractor, consisting of an uptime target level and a bonus rate for exceeding the uptime target. Under the incentive contract, a contractor receives a bonus only when the achieved uptime exceeds the target level specified in the contract. We develop a model for jointly determining the uptime target levels and bonus rates for the contractors which maximize system profit. We also demonstrate the financial benefits of coordination and added flexibility in allocating the additional profit to the contractors. In addition we show the impact of the variation in individual process maintenance times and costs on channel coordination and profits.
關聯 IIE Transactions, 38(1), 67-78
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07408170500243328
dc.contributor 企管系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 唐揆zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Tang, Kweien_US
dc.date (日期) 2006.01en_US
dc.date.accessioned 16-Oct-2014 18:00:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 16-Oct-2014 18:00:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 16-Oct-2014 18:00:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/70635-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Consider a manufacturer with a manufacturing system that consists of multiple processes. The manufacturer`s revenue is determined by the minimum of the uptimes among the processes. The maintenance functions of the processes are outsourced to independent contractors so that each contractor is responsible only for one process. A performance-based incentive contract is offered to each contractor, consisting of an uptime target level and a bonus rate for exceeding the uptime target. Under the incentive contract, a contractor receives a bonus only when the achieved uptime exceeds the target level specified in the contract. We develop a model for jointly determining the uptime target levels and bonus rates for the contractors which maximize system profit. We also demonstrate the financial benefits of coordination and added flexibility in allocating the additional profit to the contractors. In addition we show the impact of the variation in individual process maintenance times and costs on channel coordination and profits.en_US
dc.format.extent 124 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) IIE Transactions, 38(1), 67-78en_US
dc.title (題名) Maintenance Outsourcing of a Multi-process Manufacturing System with Multiple Contractorsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1080/07408170500243328en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07408170500243328 en_US