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題名 Revisiting the Risk-Taking Effect of Executive Stock Options on Firm Performance
作者 陳嬿如
Chen, Y.R.;Y. Ma
貢獻者 財管系
關鍵詞 Executive compensation; CEO stock options; Managerial risk-taking; Risk aversion; Firm performance
日期 2011.06
上傳時間 22-十月-2014 12:26:06 (UTC+8)
摘要 While the relation between equity-based compensation and firm performance has been widely discussed, the findings on how executive stock options (ESOs) affect firm value are still inconclusive. This research examines the risk-taking effect of ESOs on firm performance by taking into consideration managers` personal risk aversion. A three-stage-least-squares approach is adopted to examine a simultaneous system of equations describing option compensation, risk-taking, and firm performance. Evidence confirms that ESOs increase managerial risk-taking, but such risk-taking is constrained by managers` personal risk aversion. In addition, evidence indicates that managerial risk-taking induced by ESOs would increase both long-term and near-term stock returns. The negative impact on near-term and the positive impact on long-term returns on investment imply that it takes time for accounting performance to reflect the risk-taking effect of ESOs. These results further indicate that managers focus their concerns more on stock risk and return rather than near-term accounting results.
關聯 Journal of Business Research, 64, 640-648
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.02.012
dc.contributor 財管系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 陳嬿如zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Y.R.;Y. Maen_US
dc.date (日期) 2011.06en_US
dc.date.accessioned 22-十月-2014 12:26:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 22-十月-2014 12:26:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 22-十月-2014 12:26:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/70691-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) While the relation between equity-based compensation and firm performance has been widely discussed, the findings on how executive stock options (ESOs) affect firm value are still inconclusive. This research examines the risk-taking effect of ESOs on firm performance by taking into consideration managers` personal risk aversion. A three-stage-least-squares approach is adopted to examine a simultaneous system of equations describing option compensation, risk-taking, and firm performance. Evidence confirms that ESOs increase managerial risk-taking, but such risk-taking is constrained by managers` personal risk aversion. In addition, evidence indicates that managerial risk-taking induced by ESOs would increase both long-term and near-term stock returns. The negative impact on near-term and the positive impact on long-term returns on investment imply that it takes time for accounting performance to reflect the risk-taking effect of ESOs. These results further indicate that managers focus their concerns more on stock risk and return rather than near-term accounting results.en_US
dc.format.extent 208420 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Business Research, 64, 640-648en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Executive compensation; CEO stock options; Managerial risk-taking; Risk aversion; Firm performanceen_US
dc.title (題名) Revisiting the Risk-Taking Effect of Executive Stock Options on Firm Performanceen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.02.012en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.02.012 en_US