| dc.contributor | 財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lai, Yu-Bong | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2003.06 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 3-Nov-2014 14:58:38 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 3-Nov-2014 14:58:38 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 3-Nov-2014 14:58:38 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71049 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | A common-agency model is constructed to investigate how two interest groups -a workers` group and an environmentalists` group -affect the formation of a capital tax and an environmental policy. The political power of interest groups, which is related to the free-rider problem that they face, is crucial in deciding these policies. This paper depicts the conditions under which either NIMBY or a race to the bottom occurs. Moreover, this paper examines whether the equivalence between a pollution tax and a pollution standard is sustained despite interference from interest groups. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 100 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 159(2), 342-361. | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Interest groups, Economic Competition, and Endogenous Public Policy | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
