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題名 考慮利潤移轉效果之租稅競爭
其他題名 Capital Tax Competition in the Presence of Rent-Shifting Incentives
作者 賴育邦
Lai, Yu-Bong
貢獻者 財政系
關鍵詞 租稅競爭 ; 公共財 ; 利潤移轉效果
Tax competition; Public goods; Profit-shifting effect
日期 2006.05
上傳時間 3-十一月-2014 14:59:05 (UTC+8)
摘要 在典型的租稅競爭模型中,財貨市場為完全競爭,因此不會出現利潤移轉效果。本文將假設財貨市場為雙佔市場,並分析利潤移轉效果的出現將對國際間的資本稅競爭產生何種影響。本文建構一個兩階段賽局,在第二階段,兩個出口國的廠商在第三國市場進行數量或價格上的競爭。在第一階段,出口國則決定該國的資本稅稅率。在此架構下,出口國政府在決定稅率時,會試圖利用資本稅以移轉對手國的利潤,換言之,資本稅具有策略性貿易政策之性質。本文發現,當廠商進行數量競爭時,利潤移轉效果會使公共財提供過少的情況加劇;在價格競爭下,利潤移轉效果則會改善公共財提供過少的情況。本文進一步指出,在數量競爭下,出口國相互合作可增進彼此的福利;然而在價格競爭下,出口國的合作有可能使雙方的福利下降。
The tax competition literature usually specifies competitive product markets, so that the rent-shifting effect is overlooked. By incorporating an duopolistic product market, this paper considers two exporting countries that use capital taxes as devices to promote exports in a two-stage game. We find that when firms compete in terms of quantity, the rent-shifting effect aggravates the under-provision of public goods. However, when firms compete in terms of price, the rent-shifting effect reduces the inefficiency arising from tax competition. Moreover, we show that cooperation between exporting countries enhances the welfare of both countries in a Cournot duopoly, but this is not necessarily true in a Bertrand duopoly.
關聯 Taipei Economic Inquiry (經濟研究), 42(1), 1-24.
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 財政系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 賴育邦zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lai, Yu-Bongen_US
dc.date (日期) 2006.05en_US
dc.date.accessioned 3-十一月-2014 14:59:05 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 3-十一月-2014 14:59:05 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 3-十一月-2014 14:59:05 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71052-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 在典型的租稅競爭模型中,財貨市場為完全競爭,因此不會出現利潤移轉效果。本文將假設財貨市場為雙佔市場,並分析利潤移轉效果的出現將對國際間的資本稅競爭產生何種影響。本文建構一個兩階段賽局,在第二階段,兩個出口國的廠商在第三國市場進行數量或價格上的競爭。在第一階段,出口國則決定該國的資本稅稅率。在此架構下,出口國政府在決定稅率時,會試圖利用資本稅以移轉對手國的利潤,換言之,資本稅具有策略性貿易政策之性質。本文發現,當廠商進行數量競爭時,利潤移轉效果會使公共財提供過少的情況加劇;在價格競爭下,利潤移轉效果則會改善公共財提供過少的情況。本文進一步指出,在數量競爭下,出口國相互合作可增進彼此的福利;然而在價格競爭下,出口國的合作有可能使雙方的福利下降。en_US
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The tax competition literature usually specifies competitive product markets, so that the rent-shifting effect is overlooked. By incorporating an duopolistic product market, this paper considers two exporting countries that use capital taxes as devices to promote exports in a two-stage game. We find that when firms compete in terms of quantity, the rent-shifting effect aggravates the under-provision of public goods. However, when firms compete in terms of price, the rent-shifting effect reduces the inefficiency arising from tax competition. Moreover, we show that cooperation between exporting countries enhances the welfare of both countries in a Cournot duopoly, but this is not necessarily true in a Bertrand duopoly.en_US
dc.format.extent 207221 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Taipei Economic Inquiry (經濟研究), 42(1), 1-24.en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅競爭 ; 公共財 ; 利潤移轉效果en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax competition; Public goods; Profit-shifting effecten_US
dc.title (題名) 考慮利潤移轉效果之租稅競爭zh_TW
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) Capital Tax Competition in the Presence of Rent-Shifting Incentivesen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen