| dc.contributor | 財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 賴育邦 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lai, Yu-Bong | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2006.05 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 3-Nov-2014 14:59:05 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 3-Nov-2014 14:59:05 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 3-Nov-2014 14:59:05 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71052 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 在典型的租稅競爭模型中，財貨市場為完全競爭，因此不會出現利潤移轉效果。本文將假設財貨市場為雙佔市場，並分析利潤移轉效果的出現將對國際間的資本稅競爭產生何種影響。本文建構一個兩階段賽局，在第二階段，兩個出口國的廠商在第三國市場進行數量或價格上的競爭。在第一階段，出口國則決定該國的資本稅稅率。在此架構下，出口國政府在決定稅率時，會試圖利用資本稅以移轉對手國的利潤，換言之，資本稅具有策略性貿易政策之性質。本文發現，當廠商進行數量競爭時，利潤移轉效果會使公共財提供過少的情況加劇；在價格競爭下，利潤移轉效果則會改善公共財提供過少的情況。本文進一步指出，在數量競爭下，出口國相互合作可增進彼此的福利；然而在價格競爭下，出口國的合作有可能使雙方的福利下降。 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The tax competition literature usually specifies competitive product markets, so that the rent-shifting effect is overlooked. By incorporating an duopolistic product market, this paper considers two exporting countries that use capital taxes as devices to promote exports in a two-stage game. We find that when firms compete in terms of quantity, the rent-shifting effect aggravates the under-provision of public goods. However, when firms compete in terms of price, the rent-shifting effect reduces the inefficiency arising from tax competition. Moreover, we show that cooperation between exporting countries enhances the welfare of both countries in a Cournot duopoly, but this is not necessarily true in a Bertrand duopoly. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 207221 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Taipei Economic Inquiry (經濟研究), 42(1), 1-24. | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 租稅競爭 ; 公共財 ; 利潤移轉效果 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Tax competition; Public goods; Profit-shifting effect | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 考慮利潤移轉效果之租稅競爭 | zh_TW |
| dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | Capital Tax Competition in the Presence of Rent-Shifting Incentives | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
