| dc.contributor | 財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Joe Chen;Joseph E. Harrington Jr. | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2007.03 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 4-Nov-2014 18:10:27 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 4-Nov-2014 18:10:27 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 4-Nov-2014 18:10:27 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71118 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modeled the oligopoly stage game as a Prisoners` Dilemma. Using numerical analysis, we consider the Bertrand price game and allow the probability of detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms` prices. Consistent with earlier results, a maximal leniency program necessarily makes collusion more difficult. However, we also find that partial leniency programs—such as in the U.S.—can make collusion easier compared to offering no leniency. We also show that even if cartel formation is not deterred, a leniency program can reduce the prices charged by firms. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 574364 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | The Political Economy of Antitrust, CEA 282, 59-80, Elsevier Science | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | book/chapter | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/S0573-8555(06)82003-1 | en_US |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0573-8555(06)82003-1 | en_US |
